ROK AMBASSADOR CLAIMS "TURNING POINT" IN SOUTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003988 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2026 TAGS: JA KN KS PREL SUBJECT: ROK AMBASSADOR CLAIMS "TURNING POINT" IN SOUTH KOREA TOWARD THE NORTH Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASON: 1.4(B)(D) ¶1. (C) Summary: ROK Ambassador Ra Jong Yil told Ambassador Schieffer July 18 that public opinion toward North Korea had reached a "turning point" in South Korea as a result of the North's missile launches and bad behavior at the recent South-North ministerial. Ra worried, however, that a visit by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 could reverse that favorable trend. The Ambassador firmly deflected Ra's attempt to drag the United States into the middle of the Yasukuni issue, pointedly saying South Korea's disputes with Japan had to be settled bilaterally. End Summary. ¶2. (C) ROK Ambassador Ra Jong Yil requested an urgent meeting with Ambassador Schieffer July 18 at the Embassy to discuss North Korea. He told the Ambassador that public opinion in South Korea toward the DPRK had reached a "turning point" as a result of the missile launches and North Korea's bad behavior at the recent South-North ministerial meeting in Busan. Ra made it clear that he thought the new, tougher South Korean attitude toward North Korea was a good development, and one that would be reflected in ROK Government policy. ¶3. (C) Ra continued that this positive development risked being reversed if Prime Minister Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, and particularly if he did so in a very public way. Ra said that because August 15 carried a political meaning, "even for you (the US)," and because of its effect on ROK public opinion, the United States should try to dissuade PM Koizumi from visiting Yasukuni on that day. Ra said US-ROK relations could suffer as a result of a Koizumi visit. Ambassador Schieffer firmly deflected Ra's attempt to drag the US into the middle of the Yasukuni issue, pointedly saying it was in no one's interest for there to be disputes between the US, Japan and the ROK right now. "You need to take that up with the Japanese Government," the Ambassador declared, noting that Korea's attempt to leverage the United States was not an effective way of addressing the matter. Ambassador Schieffer continued that in the middle of the North Korean missile crisis, it had been particularly unfortunate to hear rhetoric in South Korea that made it sound as if Japan, not North Korea, was the problem. It had appeared almost as if some in South Korea were trying to excuse the North's behavior by attacking the Japanese. ¶4. (C) On other matters, cautioning that his information should be held "in absolute secrecy," Ambassador Ra said that the ROK Government was ready to take a "step forward" in mending relations with Japan. He specified that South Korea was ready to meet with Japan and "listen to what Japan has to say" in regard to the Liancourt Rocks dispute. Ra noted that during a visit back to Seoul last month, he had a three-hour talk with President Roh, and he thought the ROK Government was ready to try to restore good relations with Japan "in the latter half of this year." ¶5. (C) Asked for his thoughts on what North Korea might do in the wake of the reaction to the missile launches, Ra said North Korea was supressing any news about the UNSC resolution and the G-8 statement by, for example, censoring CNN broadcasts in North Korean hotels and even by downplaying the missile launches at home. Ambassador Schieffer asked if the South Korean Government had any information on what the DPRK meant when it talked about additional "physical" measures. Ra replied that the ROK had contradictory intelligence about whether there might be another round of missile firings. Speaking personally, he thought there would not. SCHIEFFER