Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO3988
2006-07-18 22:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
ROK AMBASSADOR CLAIMS "TURNING POINT" IN SOUTH
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHKO #3988 1992245 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 182245Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4416 INFO RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 9483 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003988
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2026
TAGS: JA KN KS PREL
SUBJECT: ROK AMBASSADOR CLAIMS "TURNING POINT" IN SOUTH
KOREA TOWARD THE NORTH
Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASON: 1.4(B)(D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003988
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2026
TAGS: JA KN KS PREL
SUBJECT: ROK AMBASSADOR CLAIMS "TURNING POINT" IN SOUTH
KOREA TOWARD THE NORTH
Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASON: 1.4(B)(D)
1. (C) Summary: ROK Ambassador Ra Jong Yil told Ambassador
Schieffer July 18 that public opinion toward North Korea had
reached a "turning point" in South Korea as a result of the
North's missile launches and bad behavior at the recent
South-North ministerial. Ra worried, however, that a visit
by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15
could reverse that favorable trend. The Ambassador firmly
deflected Ra's attempt to drag the United States into the
middle of the Yasukuni issue, pointedly saying South Korea's
disputes with Japan had to be settled bilaterally. End
Summary.
2. (C) ROK Ambassador Ra Jong Yil requested an urgent
meeting with Ambassador Schieffer July 18 at the Embassy to
discuss North Korea. He told the Ambassador that public
opinion in South Korea toward the DPRK had reached a "turning
point" as a result of the missile launches and North Korea's
bad behavior at the recent South-North ministerial meeting in
Busan. Ra made it clear that he thought the new, tougher
South Korean attitude toward North Korea was a good
development, and one that would be reflected in ROK
Government policy.
3. (C) Ra continued that this positive development risked
being reversed if Prime Minister Koizumi visited Yasukuni
Shrine on August 15, and particularly if he did so in a very
public way. Ra said that because August 15 carried a
political meaning, "even for you (the US)," and because of
its effect on ROK public opinion, the United States should
try to dissuade PM Koizumi from visiting Yasukuni on that
day. Ra said US-ROK relations could suffer as a result of a
Koizumi visit. Ambassador Schieffer firmly deflected Ra's
attempt to drag the US into the middle of the Yasukuni issue,
pointedly saying it was in no one's interest for there to be
disputes between the US, Japan and the ROK right now. "You
need to take that up with the Japanese Government," the
Ambassador declared, noting that Korea's attempt to leverage
the United States was not an effective way of addressing the
matter. Ambassador Schieffer continued that in the middle of
the North Korean missile crisis, it had been particularly
unfortunate to hear rhetoric in South Korea that made it
sound as if Japan, not North Korea, was the problem. It had
appeared almost as if some in South Korea were trying to
excuse the North's behavior by attacking the Japanese.
4. (C) On other matters, cautioning that his information
should be held "in absolute secrecy," Ambassador Ra said that
the ROK Government was ready to take a "step forward" in
mending relations with Japan. He specified that South Korea
was ready to meet with Japan and "listen to what Japan has to
say" in regard to the Liancourt Rocks dispute. Ra noted that
during a visit back to Seoul last month, he had a three-hour
talk with President Roh, and he thought the ROK Government
was ready to try to restore good relations with Japan "in the
latter half of this year."
5. (C) Asked for his thoughts on what North Korea might do
in the wake of the reaction to the missile launches, Ra said
North Korea was supressing any news about the UNSC resolution
and the G-8 statement by, for example, censoring CNN
broadcasts in North Korean hotels and even by downplaying the
missile launches at home. Ambassador Schieffer asked if the
South Korean Government had any information on what the DPRK
meant when it talked about additional "physical" measures.
Ra replied that the ROK had contradictory intelligence about
whether there might be another round of missile firings.
Speaking personally, he thought there would not.
SCHIEFFER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2026
TAGS: JA KN KS PREL
SUBJECT: ROK AMBASSADOR CLAIMS "TURNING POINT" IN SOUTH
KOREA TOWARD THE NORTH
Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASON: 1.4(B)(D)
1. (C) Summary: ROK Ambassador Ra Jong Yil told Ambassador
Schieffer July 18 that public opinion toward North Korea had
reached a "turning point" in South Korea as a result of the
North's missile launches and bad behavior at the recent
South-North ministerial. Ra worried, however, that a visit
by Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15
could reverse that favorable trend. The Ambassador firmly
deflected Ra's attempt to drag the United States into the
middle of the Yasukuni issue, pointedly saying South Korea's
disputes with Japan had to be settled bilaterally. End
Summary.
2. (C) ROK Ambassador Ra Jong Yil requested an urgent
meeting with Ambassador Schieffer July 18 at the Embassy to
discuss North Korea. He told the Ambassador that public
opinion in South Korea toward the DPRK had reached a "turning
point" as a result of the missile launches and North Korea's
bad behavior at the recent South-North ministerial meeting in
Busan. Ra made it clear that he thought the new, tougher
South Korean attitude toward North Korea was a good
development, and one that would be reflected in ROK
Government policy.
3. (C) Ra continued that this positive development risked
being reversed if Prime Minister Koizumi visited Yasukuni
Shrine on August 15, and particularly if he did so in a very
public way. Ra said that because August 15 carried a
political meaning, "even for you (the US)," and because of
its effect on ROK public opinion, the United States should
try to dissuade PM Koizumi from visiting Yasukuni on that
day. Ra said US-ROK relations could suffer as a result of a
Koizumi visit. Ambassador Schieffer firmly deflected Ra's
attempt to drag the US into the middle of the Yasukuni issue,
pointedly saying it was in no one's interest for there to be
disputes between the US, Japan and the ROK right now. "You
need to take that up with the Japanese Government," the
Ambassador declared, noting that Korea's attempt to leverage
the United States was not an effective way of addressing the
matter. Ambassador Schieffer continued that in the middle of
the North Korean missile crisis, it had been particularly
unfortunate to hear rhetoric in South Korea that made it
sound as if Japan, not North Korea, was the problem. It had
appeared almost as if some in South Korea were trying to
excuse the North's behavior by attacking the Japanese.
4. (C) On other matters, cautioning that his information
should be held "in absolute secrecy," Ambassador Ra said that
the ROK Government was ready to take a "step forward" in
mending relations with Japan. He specified that South Korea
was ready to meet with Japan and "listen to what Japan has to
say" in regard to the Liancourt Rocks dispute. Ra noted that
during a visit back to Seoul last month, he had a three-hour
talk with President Roh, and he thought the ROK Government
was ready to try to restore good relations with Japan "in the
latter half of this year."
5. (C) Asked for his thoughts on what North Korea might do
in the wake of the reaction to the missile launches, Ra said
North Korea was supressing any news about the UNSC resolution
and the G-8 statement by, for example, censoring CNN
broadcasts in North Korean hotels and even by downplaying the
missile launches at home. Ambassador Schieffer asked if the
South Korean Government had any information on what the DPRK
meant when it talked about additional "physical" measures.
Ra replied that the ROK had contradictory intelligence about
whether there might be another round of missile firings.
Speaking personally, he thought there would not.
SCHIEFFER