MILITARY PREEMPTION DEBATE RESURFACES IN JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003890

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2016
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL KS KN JA
SUBJECT: MILITARY PREEMPTION DEBATE RESURFACES IN JAPAN

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reason: 1.4(B)(D)


1. (C) Summary: North Korea's missile launches have
rekindled debate over whether Japan should be able to preempt
an imminent attack by acquiring capabilities to strike
abroad. Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Nukaga,
Foreign Minister Aso and Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe recently
said such action would be both constitutional and within
international norms. Their comments notwithstanding, Prime
Minister Koizumi, other politicians and most of the media
have subsequently taken a more cautious approach. In
addition, senior MOFA officials, pointing to similar comments
dating back to 1956, have pointed out that Japan lacks the
capability to take any preemptive action. End summary.


2. (U) On July 9, JDA Director General Fukushiro Nukaga
told reporters that "as a sovereign nation, it is natural to
have an idea to possess minimally essential capability" to
attack foreign bases when under imminent threat of attack.
Clearly referring to the recent DPRK missile launches, he
later told a TV audience that the government "can decide on
attacking an enemy to defend Japan when the enemy, which is
targeting Japan puts a finger on the trigger of a gun."
Separately, Foreign Minister Aso asserted the right of
preemptive self-defense saying on NHK TV that "if a missile
(with a nuclear warhead) is targeted at Japan, we do not have
an option of doing nothing until we suffer damage." These
comments were echoed by Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe
who told the press on July 10 that overseas strikes would be
considered self-defense "if there were no other way to
prevent a missile attack on Japan."


3. (U) Later in the day, Prime Minister Koizumi took a more
carefully modulated line, saying that while it would be all
right to study whether Japan should acquire capabilities to
meet certain theoretical threats, it would be hard to judge
whether a specific country intended to attack Japan, and it
would also raise constitutional questions about the use of
armed force. "We will have to think about this matter in a
cautious manner," Koizumi concluded. Koizumi's coalition
party, Komeito President Takenori Kanzaki, took a similar
line, urging extreme caution in discussing the issue.
Subsequent editorial commentary among the major Japanese
dailies was generally negative, with Mainichi, Asahi and
Tokyo Shimbun all coming out against the idea. Tokyo Shimbun
worried that a preemptive capability would change Japan's
basic policy of "defense-only" defense, and Mainichi argued
that, by Japan going it alone, it would harm the US-Japan
alliance.


4. (C) Meeting with Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Lawless on July 11, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faction
leader and former JDA Director General Taku Yamasaki noted
that in the US-Japan alliance, Japan had always served as the
"shield" and the US as the "spear." There was no reason to
change this, he asserted, and discussions on a Japanese
offensive military capability were a waste of time. Yamasaki
added that the debate needed to be shifted back to how Japan
can better strengthen the shield. Turning to the ROK, he
observed that "on a certain level they may be correct about
an overreaction (to the missile launches) in Japan, but their
recent statements will only fuel public resentment against
Korea." In a separate meeting the same day, JDA Defense
Policy Division Director
Ro Manabe told political officer that as long as Komeito was
in the ruling coalition, there would be no serious
discussions on pre-emptive strikes. "No one in Japan doubts
the US willingness to carry out pre-emptive strikes when and
if needed," Manabe said, "so we see no need to develop this
capability ourselves."


5. (C) During dinner hosted by MOFA Director General for
Asian Affairs Kenichiro Sasae for Assistant Secretary Hill on
July 10, MOFA Foreign Policy Bureau Deputy Director General
Koji Tsuruoka noted that the Korean media had latched on to
the statements about a possible preemptive military
capability and were certain to spin them in a negative way.
Tsuruoka pointed out that the views expressed were not new;

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indeed, there was track record of statements in the Diet by
senior Japanese politicians dating back to 1956 (during the
cabinet of Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama),asserting the
constitutionality of preempting an imminent attack. That
said, the Japanese Government, as a matter of policy, had
eschewed acquiring power projection capability. The result,
Tsuruoka observed, was that Japan remained completely

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incapable of taking such preemptive action. DG Sasae chimed
in that talk about "all options" in the context of the DPRK
missile launches was a good thing; it would encourage China
to work harder on the North Koreans.


6. (C) Comment: Japanese politicians, academics and the
media are much more willing than even five years ago to
debate sensitive issues, such as revising the constitution
or, in this case, possible acquisition of offensive military
capability. This represents a growing nationalism and a
vaguely defined notion that it is time for Japan to act as a
"normal country." That said, a strong pacifist strain
persists in Japan, and many Japanese approach even discussing
the subject of a military strike capability with decidedly
mixed feelings. Reflecting this hesitancy, Takushoku
University professor of international relations Takashi
Kawakami related to us that he still feels uncomfortable
discussing the merits of Japan acquiring a theoretical
military capability to attack a theoretical foe in a
theoretical dire scenario, knowing that such debate will
inevitably invite criticism from Japan's neighbors.
SCHIEFFER