LTGEN EIKENBERRY MEETINGS ON TOKYO CONFERENCE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 003815 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT PASS TO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT, EUR/RPM NSC FOR AHARRIMAN, KAMEND CENTCOM FOR CG, CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2026 TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR PGOV SUBJECT: LTGEN EIKENBERRY MEETINGS ON TOKYO CONFERENCE, RING ROAD AND PRT Classified By: JOSEPH R. DONOVAN, DCM, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) (C) SUMMARY: In a July 6 meeting with Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs DG for Economic Cooperation Shigeki Sato, Commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry praised the GOJ for its ongoing contributions to the security, reconstruction and stability of Afghanistan. He thanked Japan for its additional contribution of $60 million announced at the July 5 Tokyo Conference II on Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan. The Lt. General urged Japan to complete the Kandahar-Herat ring road by the end of 2007 and asked Japan to consider participation in a PRT in one of the more secure provinces in Afghanistan. Japan agrees that the ring road should be completed as soon as possible, although its current time frame for completion is 20 months, once the contract is awarded sometime at the end of August. Japan is not considering direct participation in any PRT at the moment, but may consider coordination with the U.S. or some other form of participation. END SUMMARY ¶2. (U) On July 6, Commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry discussed with MOFA DG for Economic Cooperation Sato the results of the July 5 Tokyo Conference on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDG) and Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG),the Afghan ring road, and a possible Japanese PRT in Afghanistan. -------------- -------------- TOKYO CONFERENCE II: CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Lt. General Eikenberry began by praising the GOJ for its role in hosting the excellent and substantive Tokyo Conference on Consolidation of Peace in Afghanistan on July ¶5. Although DG Sato was not at the meeting, he heard that it was a success. DG Sato said that although Japan pledged an additional $60 million at the Conference, Foreign Minister Aso ommitted mention of this core point in his opening statement when he edited his speech to include a condemnation of the North Korean missile launch. Similarly, it was not highlighted at the PM Koizumi-President Karzai bilateral that same afternoon since Karzai made a long presentation on the situation in Afghanistan. Karzai reportedly told Koizumi that the situation in Afghanistan was improving, but problems remained. It was therefore important for Japan and other nations to continue to support Afghanistan. DG Sato explained that the $60 million would be broken down as follows and disbursed "rather quickly": - $29 million: DIAG and the Afghanistan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) ($23 million for DIAG/Rural Development and $6 million for ANBP) - $ 5 million: DIAG Community Development-National Solidarity Program (Japan Special Fund) - $ 5 million: Counter-narcotics - $20 million: ADB Japan Special Fund (particularly for the rehabilitation of the Bamyan-Mazur Sharif roads) - and an additional $2.9 million: Law and Order Trust Fund (LOFTA) for police salaries from "counterpart funds" ¶4. (C) Lt. General Eikenberry thanked the GOJ for its contributions to the security, reconstruction, and stability of Afghanistan. He remarked that Japan's contributions were extraordinary, beyond just funding, but also its diplomatic leadership on the ground where Japan has been effective and persuasive with Afghan leaders. Japan's reconstruction efforts beyond DDR and DIAG have been vital as well. He praised Japan's two Ambassadors that have served in Kabul and the entire GOJ team involved in Afghan issues. -------------- Ring Road -------------- ¶5. (C) Lt. General Eikenberry said that the Kandahar-Herat ring road was a challenging project due to the uneven security situation. Sato responded that Japan has been working closely with the U.S. on road construction. He said that the Kandahar-Kabul road was completed, as well as the by-pass road outside Kandahar. Regarding the Kandahar-Herat road, Sato admitted that progress had been hampered by the security situation as well as mines. Japan was also somewhat frustrated by the slow progress, but the security situation was so serious that Japanese contractors had to leave the project site. The GOJ therefore decided to use third country contractors for the construction and has already put out an open tender. The GOJ hopes a new contract will be completed by the end of August. Construction will start soon after. Japan hopes that the project will get back on track, with the guidance of a Japanese consultant. In response to a question from Lt. General Eikenberry, DG Sato explained that the construction period is estimated at 20 months (10 percent of the project is already complete). ¶6. (C) Lt. General Eikenberry reminded Sato of the U.S. offer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to complete the project. He explained that the Corps of Engineers is an effective group that knows Afghanistan well. They have also been successful hiring local Afghan contractors and subcontractors. The Lt. General highlighted U.S. concern that the project would not be completed until 2008 and stressed that the security situation in the south was critical. The lack of roads is a contributing factor to increased insecurity. Conversely, the presence of roads added to overall security. Once you have improved roads, the Afghan people will want to fight to protect their assets and their own security. He stressed that we have reached a tipping point where we have to take some security risks in order to enhance overall security for the long-term. Lt. General Eikenberry stressed three factors that reinforced the need for more roads in Afghanistan. First, reconstruction improves security. Second, once the Kandahar-Herat ring road is complete, it will greatly improve economic growth and vitality. The Herat-Kandahar-Kabul road will allow fruits from the south (Helmand province) to be transported and sold in Kabul markets on the same day. Third, roads meet the Afghan peoples' expectations and have symbolic significance beyond physical benefits. They are a sign of the international commitment to the Afghan people. The U.S. is worried that if we go through 2007 and another winter without completion of the Kandahar-Herat road, the disappointment of the Afghan people and their leaders would be more manifest than it is now. ¶7. (C) DG Sato responded that it might be possible to complete the road in less than 20 months, by the middle of 2008 and asked if this would be acceptable. The Lt. General said that it would be better if the project were completed in ¶2007. Sato explained that the GOJ fully realized the importance of the road to security and economic growth. The GOJ fully shared U.S. views on the benefits. Japan would like to expedite the project, but it depended on the capacity of the construction company, which was not under the GOJ's control. He stressed that the GOJ also wants to complete the project as soon as possible. Japan hoped that the construction project would not be further hampered by the security situation. Lt. General Eikenberry offered any U.S. assistance that Japan might need. Sato said he appreciated the U.S. offer. Lt. General Eikenberry briefly described the work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, highlighting that it was a primarily civilian outfit, which has hired 12,000 Afghanis to work on a range of sophisticated projects. Currently, four large international contractors and 12 Afghan firms were working with them. They have great experience working in Afghanistan and the U.S. would be happy to offer their expertise. Road building in Afghanistan is as challenging as anywhere in the world. ¶8. (C) DG Sato explained that road building projects were now part of Japan's ODA. Japan had entered into a new stage of ODA and was ready to get more involved in projects that promoted the consolidation of peace in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. But identifying actual projects remained a challenge since this was a new territory for Japan. Lt. General Eikenberry remarked that in the years ahead we would need to better adapt and adjust to environments like Iraq and Afghanistan. In places like Sudan or Somalia, the old days of working in secure environments will not return for some time. He said that the U.S. had done much analysis of the impact of roads on security. For example, in the south and east where the main insurgency was active, areas where the roads ended coincided with areas where terrorist and insurgency activities began. Where there are roads, the GOA is able to control and dominate. Therefore, the U.S. is trying to aggressively build roads in the south and east, but is still short. The U.S. estimates an additional $600 million is required to connect provincial capitals to district centers in the south and east. -------------- Japanese PRT -------------- ¶9. (C) Lt. General Eikenberry asked DG Sato if Japan had given any consideration to contributing to a PRT. Sato said that the GOJ had been discussing the issue, but that so far there were no plans to directly participate in a PRT. Sato commented that there might be ways for Japan to participate or coordinate with the U.S., but direct participation was not being considered at the moment. ¶10. (C) Lt. General Eikenberry explained that there are provinces in Afghanistan where the security situation was good, e.g., Bamyan in central Afghanistan and Panjir, northeast of Kabul. The U.S. is considering transforming some PRTs, to be led by the State Department, with about 40 military personnel. Panjir was one PRT which is moving to become more civilian dominated. Other provinces also had good opportunities for development assistance teams and where the risks were quite low. Sato said that Japan was ready to provide as much assistance for reconstruction as possible. Japan was exploring new areas for this. For example, JICA, headed by Ms. Ogata, was doing much work in Afghanistan, especially in rural development. Lt. General Eikenberry said one other point Japan should consider is that in the long-term, the NATO mission would be expanding and will have responsibility for all of Afghanistan. The PRTs would also then fall under NATO. European NATO members would also be expanding their PRTs. These countries are already forming various networks on assistance and other consolidation of peace activities. Japan could benefit by participating in such a network. DG Sato said that policy matters, such as Japan's contribution to PRTs, would need to be discussed with other policy bureaus at MOFA. ¶11. (U) In closing, Lt. General Eikenberry again thanked the GOJ for its enormous contributions to Afghanistan. We would not be where we are today without Japan's assistance, he told Sato. ¶12. (U) Lt. General Eikenberry cleared this message. SCHIEFFER