DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: AMBASSADOR SCHIEFFER'S

S E C R E T TOKYO 003737 SECDEF PASS TO DUSD LAWLESS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016 TAGS: PREL ASEC JA SUBJECT: DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: AMBASSADOR SCHIEFFER'S JULY 5 MEETING WITH ABE, ASO AND NUKAGA Classified By: AMBASSADPR SCHIEFFER, REASONS 1.4(B),(D) ¶1. (U) Ambassador Schieffer was called to the Prime Minister,s office at 6:45 AM on July 5 to review developments in the wake of the early morning launches of three North Korean missiles. The Ambassador met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Aso, Defense Minister Nukaga, MOFA Deputy Vice Minister Kohno, and staff from the Cabinet,s Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO). ¶2. (S) CCS Abe expressed thanks to the Ambassador for information the U.S, had supplied and indicated that immediately following the discussion with Ambassador Schieffer there would be a Cabinet National Security meeting to address steps Japan should take in reaction to the DPRK missile launches. Abe said that as previously planned and as had been coordinated with the U.S., he had issued a short SECRET 2 of 3 SECRET 2 of 3 press statement at 6:15 confirming that "three flying objects" launched from North Korea had been detected. Abe said any additional information on the launches (or the U.S. response) the Ambassador could provide would be helpful before he went into the Cabinet meeting. ¶3. (S) Ambassador Schieffer, emphasizing we were in a grave period, told Abe he had just come from a video conference with PACOM, US Forces Japan, and intelligence community representatives in the United States. As of 6:50 AM, the latest information the United States had was that there had been three launches. The first, a Scud C, came just four minutes after the launch of the U.S. space shuttle. The second was a Nodong from the area around Kittaeryong. The Ambassador added that there were indications that there were additional missiles in the Kittaeryong area that might be available for launch. The third missile was believed to be a Taepodong2, which suffered a failure shortly after launch, the Ambassador reported. ¶4. (S) Ambassador Schieffer urged Abe, Aso, and Nukaga to use this early data with caution and, in particular, not to make the assessments public at this point. He stressed the need to be conscious of what was said publicly and to be accurate in what we say. Ambassador Schieffer read Abe a draft press release of the U.S. reaction to the launches, but, explaining the text had not yet been completely cleared in Washington and could be changed, did not provide the Japanese with a hard copy. ¶5. (S) Abe thanked the Ambassador for providing up-dated information on the launches and explaining the U.S. position. Abe said the third launch had been a Taepodong2 and was a violation of the Pyongyang Declaration and the missile launch moratorium North Korea had pledged to uphold. Abe declared that the launches must be discussed in the UNSC. Foreign Minister Aso, seconding Abe, said he believed Japan would take the issue to the UNSC and stressed Japan would want to have the cooperation of the United States in the UN. ¶6. (C) Abe said that a DPRK ferry was approaching Japan and would not likely be allowed to land (Japan subsequently denied the ferry's formal landing though passengers were allowed to exit). ¶7. (S) Defense Minister Nukaga echoing Abe,s thanks for U.S. information sharing, said the Defense Agency likewise appreciates the U.S. supplying information. Nukaga said Japan, using its Aegis ships and other information gathering means, was following the launches closely and would base SECRET 3 of 3 SECRET 3 of 3 their response on analysis of the data collected. Nukaga emphasized that it is important for the US and Japan to cooperate closely on this analysis, adding that it would be "very useful" for our defense cooperation in the future. ¶8. (S) Ambassador Schieffer said that the US will cooperate closely with Japan in responding to the DPRK missile launches. In a final exchange on how to explain to the press and media what had been discussed, Abe promised to say only that the US had provided the most current information on the launches, but would not divulge the content of what Ambassador Schieffer had said. Abe said since the UNSC issue would be decided in Cabinet meeting later in the morning, the media would not be told of plans to submit the launch issue to the UNSC until after the Cabinet meeting. Amb. Schieffer suggested, and all agreed that the message for the media would be that there had been multiple launches from multiple sites and that Japan and the United States were carefully evaluating the information available to us. Abe added that after the Cabinet meeting Japan would have more to say publicly, but promised to coordinate any new announcements with the US. SCHIEFFER NNNN