Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO3737
2006-07-05 10:09:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:
DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: AMBASSADOR SCHIEFFER'S
ACTION ISN-00 INFO LOG-00 A-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 DS-00 EAP-00 EUR-00 VCI-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 L-00 VCIE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIG-00 OMB-00 PA-00 PM-00 PRS-00 P-00 ISNE-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 ASDS-00 IIP-00 PMB-00 DSCC-00 DRL-00 G-00 CARC-00 SAS-00 /000W ------------------EE9141 051429Z /06 O 051009Z JUL 06 FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3992 INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE IMMEDIATE COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T TOKYO 003737
SECDEF PASS TO DUSD LAWLESS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PREL ASEC JA
SUBJECT: DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: AMBASSADOR SCHIEFFER'S
JULY 5 MEETING WITH ABE, ASO AND NUKAGA
Classified By: AMBASSADPR SCHIEFFER, REASONS 1.4(B),(D)
S E C R E T TOKYO 003737
SECDEF PASS TO DUSD LAWLESS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PREL ASEC JA
SUBJECT: DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: AMBASSADOR SCHIEFFER'S
JULY 5 MEETING WITH ABE, ASO AND NUKAGA
Classified By: AMBASSADPR SCHIEFFER, REASONS 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) Ambassador Schieffer was called to the Prime
Minister,s office at 6:45 AM on July 5 to review
developments in the wake of the early morning launches of
three North Korean missiles. The Ambassador met with Chief
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who was accompanied by Foreign
Minister Aso, Defense Minister Nukaga, MOFA Deputy Vice
Minister Kohno, and staff from the Cabinet,s Intelligence
and Research Office (CIRO).
2. (S) CCS Abe expressed thanks to the Ambassador for
information the U.S, had supplied and indicated that
immediately following the discussion with Ambassador
Schieffer there would be a Cabinet National Security meeting
to address steps Japan should take in reaction to the DPRK
missile launches. Abe said that as previously planned and as
had been coordinated with the U.S., he had issued a short
SECRET 2 of 3
SECRET 2 of 3
press statement at 6:15 confirming that "three flying
objects" launched from North Korea had been detected. Abe
said any additional information on the launches (or the U.S.
response) the Ambassador could provide would be helpful
before he went into the Cabinet meeting.
3. (S) Ambassador Schieffer, emphasizing we were in a grave
period, told Abe he had just come from a video conference
with PACOM, US Forces Japan, and intelligence community
representatives in the United States. As of 6:50 AM, the
latest information the United States had was that there had
been three launches. The first, a Scud C, came just four
minutes after the launch of the U.S. space shuttle. The
second was a Nodong from the area around Kittaeryong. The
Ambassador added that there were indications that there were
additional missiles in the Kittaeryong area that might be
available for launch. The third missile was believed to be a
Taepodong2, which suffered a failure shortly after launch,
the Ambassador reported.
4. (S) Ambassador Schieffer urged Abe, Aso, and Nukaga to
use this early data with caution and, in particular, not to
make the assessments public at this point. He stressed the
need to be conscious of what was said publicly and to be
accurate in what we say. Ambassador Schieffer read Abe a
draft press release of the U.S. reaction to the launches,
but, explaining the text had not yet been completely cleared
in Washington and could be changed, did not provide the
Japanese with a hard copy.
5. (S) Abe thanked the Ambassador for providing up-dated
information on the launches and explaining the U.S. position.
Abe said the third launch had been a Taepodong2 and was a
violation of the Pyongyang Declaration and the missile launch
moratorium North Korea had pledged to uphold. Abe declared
that the launches must be discussed in the UNSC. Foreign
Minister Aso, seconding Abe, said he believed Japan would
take the issue to the UNSC and stressed Japan would want to
have the cooperation of the United States in the UN.
6. (C) Abe said that a DPRK ferry was approaching Japan and
would not likely be allowed to land (Japan subsequently
denied the ferry's formal landing though passengers were
allowed to exit).
7. (S) Defense Minister Nukaga echoing Abe,s thanks for
U.S. information sharing, said the Defense Agency likewise
appreciates the U.S. supplying information. Nukaga said
Japan, using its Aegis ships and other information gathering
means, was following the launches closely and would base
SECRET 3 of 3
SECRET 3 of 3
their response on analysis of the data collected. Nukaga
emphasized that it is important for the US and Japan to
cooperate closely on this analysis, adding that it would be
"very useful" for our defense cooperation in the future.
8. (S) Ambassador Schieffer said that the US will cooperate
closely with Japan in responding to the DPRK missile
launches. In a final exchange on how to explain to the
press and media what had been discussed, Abe promised to say
only that the US had provided the most current information on
the launches, but would not divulge the content of what
Ambassador Schieffer had said. Abe said since the UNSC issue
would be decided in Cabinet meeting later in the morning, the
media would not be told of plans to submit the launch issue
to the UNSC until after the Cabinet meeting. Amb. Schieffer
suggested, and all agreed that the message for the media
would be that there had been multiple launches from multiple
sites and that Japan and the United States were carefully
evaluating the information available to us. Abe added that
after the Cabinet meeting Japan would have more to say
publicly, but promised to coordinate any new announcements
with the US.
SCHIEFFER
NNNN
SECDEF PASS TO DUSD LAWLESS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2016
TAGS: PREL ASEC JA
SUBJECT: DPRK MISSILE LAUNCHES: AMBASSADOR SCHIEFFER'S
JULY 5 MEETING WITH ABE, ASO AND NUKAGA
Classified By: AMBASSADPR SCHIEFFER, REASONS 1.4(B),(D)
1. (U) Ambassador Schieffer was called to the Prime
Minister,s office at 6:45 AM on July 5 to review
developments in the wake of the early morning launches of
three North Korean missiles. The Ambassador met with Chief
Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who was accompanied by Foreign
Minister Aso, Defense Minister Nukaga, MOFA Deputy Vice
Minister Kohno, and staff from the Cabinet,s Intelligence
and Research Office (CIRO).
2. (S) CCS Abe expressed thanks to the Ambassador for
information the U.S, had supplied and indicated that
immediately following the discussion with Ambassador
Schieffer there would be a Cabinet National Security meeting
to address steps Japan should take in reaction to the DPRK
missile launches. Abe said that as previously planned and as
had been coordinated with the U.S., he had issued a short
SECRET 2 of 3
SECRET 2 of 3
press statement at 6:15 confirming that "three flying
objects" launched from North Korea had been detected. Abe
said any additional information on the launches (or the U.S.
response) the Ambassador could provide would be helpful
before he went into the Cabinet meeting.
3. (S) Ambassador Schieffer, emphasizing we were in a grave
period, told Abe he had just come from a video conference
with PACOM, US Forces Japan, and intelligence community
representatives in the United States. As of 6:50 AM, the
latest information the United States had was that there had
been three launches. The first, a Scud C, came just four
minutes after the launch of the U.S. space shuttle. The
second was a Nodong from the area around Kittaeryong. The
Ambassador added that there were indications that there were
additional missiles in the Kittaeryong area that might be
available for launch. The third missile was believed to be a
Taepodong2, which suffered a failure shortly after launch,
the Ambassador reported.
4. (S) Ambassador Schieffer urged Abe, Aso, and Nukaga to
use this early data with caution and, in particular, not to
make the assessments public at this point. He stressed the
need to be conscious of what was said publicly and to be
accurate in what we say. Ambassador Schieffer read Abe a
draft press release of the U.S. reaction to the launches,
but, explaining the text had not yet been completely cleared
in Washington and could be changed, did not provide the
Japanese with a hard copy.
5. (S) Abe thanked the Ambassador for providing up-dated
information on the launches and explaining the U.S. position.
Abe said the third launch had been a Taepodong2 and was a
violation of the Pyongyang Declaration and the missile launch
moratorium North Korea had pledged to uphold. Abe declared
that the launches must be discussed in the UNSC. Foreign
Minister Aso, seconding Abe, said he believed Japan would
take the issue to the UNSC and stressed Japan would want to
have the cooperation of the United States in the UN.
6. (C) Abe said that a DPRK ferry was approaching Japan and
would not likely be allowed to land (Japan subsequently
denied the ferry's formal landing though passengers were
allowed to exit).
7. (S) Defense Minister Nukaga echoing Abe,s thanks for
U.S. information sharing, said the Defense Agency likewise
appreciates the U.S. supplying information. Nukaga said
Japan, using its Aegis ships and other information gathering
means, was following the launches closely and would base
SECRET 3 of 3
SECRET 3 of 3
their response on analysis of the data collected. Nukaga
emphasized that it is important for the US and Japan to
cooperate closely on this analysis, adding that it would be
"very useful" for our defense cooperation in the future.
8. (S) Ambassador Schieffer said that the US will cooperate
closely with Japan in responding to the DPRK missile
launches. In a final exchange on how to explain to the
press and media what had been discussed, Abe promised to say
only that the US had provided the most current information on
the launches, but would not divulge the content of what
Ambassador Schieffer had said. Abe said since the UNSC issue
would be decided in Cabinet meeting later in the morning, the
media would not be told of plans to submit the launch issue
to the UNSC until after the Cabinet meeting. Amb. Schieffer
suggested, and all agreed that the message for the media
would be that there had been multiple launches from multiple
sites and that Japan and the United States were carefully
evaluating the information available to us. Abe added that
after the Cabinet meeting Japan would have more to say
publicly, but promised to coordinate any new announcements
with the US.
SCHIEFFER
NNNN