DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/14/06

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 003277 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/14/06 INDEX: (1) North Korea in war of nerves with Japan, US (2) Opinion column: Bright and dark sides of US public diplomacy (3) 2006 LDP presidential campaign: Taro Aso says, "I will definitely run if I can get 20 lawmakers to recommend me"; but who will back ASO? How will he raise public support? (4) Editorial: Japan-South Korea EEZ talks should be pursued separately from Takeshima/Dokdo ownership issue (5) Three personnel actions at the Foreign Ministry ARTICLES: (1) North Korea in war of nerves with Japan, US SANKEI (Page 7) (Full) June 14, 2006 WASHINGTON-North Korea may shortly test-fire a long-range ballistic missile that can reach the US mainland, according to Japanese and US government officials. North Korea could carry out a missile test in a week at the earliest, one official said, adding that North Korea, now in a fix due to financial sanctions taken by the United States against North Korea, is showing such a political pose in an aim to find a way out of its current difficulties. However, there is also a chance of North Korea carrying out a missile test. As it stands, Japan and the United States are on high alert. Such a potential North Korean missile test, should it be carried out, will intensify tensions in the region. Japan and the United States appear to be in a war of nerves with North Korea. According to Japanese and US government officials, there were busy moves-including vehicles and radio communications-near a missile test site in North Korea's eastern province of Hamkyong Bukdo. In response to such moves, the Japanese and US governments have now raised warning levels. The US military is now flying RC- 135S Cobra Ball electronic reconnaissance aircraft on warning and surveillance missions. North Korea is presumed to test-fire a missile before the rainy season. This is believed to be why officials say North Korea could carry out a missile test in a week or so. However, it seems that North Korea has yet to fuel its missiles. Meanwhile, the six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear programs have been suspended. "China, which hosts the six-party talks, have failed to persuade North Korea," one US government official noted. "Since then," the official added, "North Korea has been threatening to launch a missile." North Korea is of course well aware of Japanese and US satellite surveillance activities in outer space for its missile launches, so North Korea knows that Japan and the United States are watching its moves. For now, the chance of North Korea launching a missile is 30% or so, according to a US official. However, Japan and the United States will surely step up their moves to impose sanctions on TOKYO 00003277 002 OF 008 North Korea should that country launch a missile. "It's against the spirit of the joint statement that was released at the fourth round of six-party talks in September last year and that was signed by North Korea, too," US State Department Spokesman McComack said. "We don't think their missile launch is imminent at this point," Chief Cabinet Secretary SHINZO ABE told a press conference yesterday. However, he warned: "I want North Korea to take action for the international community's confidence." In 1999, the then US Clinton administration eased its economic sanctions on North Korea in exchange for that country's freeze on its Taepodong-2 missile test. At present, the United States is giving priority to its negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program. The US government has come up with a comprehensive plan in exchange for Iran's moratorium on its nuclear development. With an eye on the United States' moves over Iran's nuclear program, North Korea is apparently trying to check the United States and wants to hold negotiations to its advantage. (2) Opinion column: Bright and dark sides of US public diplomacy ASAHI (Page 9) (Slightly abridged) June 12, 2006 By Yasushi Watanabe, professor of anthropology at Keio University I watched the film Good Night and Good Luck now being released here in Japan. The film was directed and co-written by popular actor George Clooney in Hollywood. The hero of the film is a renowned newscaster, Edward Murrow, who dauntlessly stood up to Senator Joseph McCarthy, a leading figure in the so-called "Red Scare" or McCarthyism that engulfed the United States in the early 1950s. Murrow said: "We cannot defend freedom abroad by deserting it at home." This line seems to reflect what Clooney feels about what is happening in the US today. In 1961, Murrow was invited by President John F. Kennedy to take office as director of the United States Information Agency (USIA),though this episode is not included in the film. The post enabled him to play a leading role in public diplomacy aimed at making other countries have a good grip on the US and improve America's image abroad. When he accepted that position, Murrow cited this condition: "If you want me in on emergency landings, I'd better be there for the takeoffs (TN: sic; Murrow actually said: "If you want me in on the landings, I'd better be there for the takeoffs.") Kennedy accepted the condition and allowed Murrow to attend the National Security Council (NSC),the nation's supreme organization handling national defense and foreign policy. The above line, along with these remarks by Murrow "Truth is the best advertisement, and fallacy is the worst"; and "A skillful advertisement for a poor policy only exacerbates the fallacy," are often quoted even today as the essence of public diplomacy. The true value of public diplomacy is questioned most in Islamic TOKYO 00003277 003 OF 008 nations. For the security of the US and in order to set an environment for policy-making, it is essential to assuage antipathy toward the US. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 against the US, the Bush administration, as part of its top priority national strategy, has been trying to attract the hearts of Islamic people by highlighting American culture, lifestyles, and the charm of the American society by introducing such programs as "Radio Sawa," a television network "Al-Hurra," and Arabic-language youth magazine "Hi." The US also ran an advertisement on television showing that the US has not hostility toward the Islamic religion. In the ad, five Islamic-Americans -- a baker, a teacher, a paramedic, a student majoring in journalism, and a government official -- emphasized the tolerance of the American society. But this advertisement aroused criticism even in the US for concealing the negative realities that Islamic-Americans are facing in the US. At present six million Islamic-Americans are said to live in the US, and their population in the US, particularly in big cities, is on the rise, and it is likely to exceed that of Jewish- Americans in a few years. Of those Muslims, one-fourth are Blacks who converted to Islam. The reason for their conversion is presumably their deep sense of despair stemming from their being at the bottom of the social pyramid in the US. Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, President Bush issued a statement, in which the president warned against any hostile action toward Arab- Americans (most of whom are Christians) and Islamic-Americans. But the hate crimes and violations of human rights are too frequent to enumerate, so some describe such a situation as a revival of the dark days of the Red Scare. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report in May that sharply criticized the government's strategy, which has already expended massive amounts of money, as a failure in every respect. The report stressed instead the importance of exchanges with other countries, for instance, journalists, politicians, teachers, and students, as well as the importance of foreign language education. What is urgently needed, in other words, is to dispel misperceptions and prejudice through dialogues and exchanges instead of a one-way flow of information. This criticism stems from the notion that a distorted perception of others can only lead to a distorted foreign policy. It also comes from the self-reflection that the quantity of information provided or the public relations strategies used are not germane to the solution of the problem. These days, when international exchange projects are financed by public money in the US or in Japan, there is a tendency to eliminate those people whose opinions are critical of the country's policies, all in the name of the logic that this is taxpayers' money. This approach, however, can only bring about an adverse effect especially in the present-day information-oriented society or network society. It is narrow-minded, given the present-day society where there are a diversity of public organizations ranging from the civic society to regional federations to the global society that are overlapping with each other. Senator J. William Fulbright, who was on friendly terms with Murrow and was the proponent of the Fulbright Program that has TOKYO 00003277 004 OF 008 contributed to Japan-US exchanges since the end of World War II, released a statement in the name of chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the year when Murrow took office as director of USIA. The statement goes: "I strongly dismiss such an idea that regards educational and cultural exchange projects as weapons or a means for the US to fight." This remark appears to point to the danger of a power game- oriented idea that fighting comes first before anything else. It also appears to be an aphorism to the world today. (3) 2006 LDP presidential campaign: Taro Aso says, "I will definitely run if I can get 20 lawmakers to recommend me"; but who will back ASO? How will he raise public support? SANKEI (Page 4) (Full) June 10, 2006 In a speech delivered in Tokyo on June 9, Foreign Minister Taro Aso declared his intention to run in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election. "Among the four contenders (to succeed Prime Minister Koizumi),only I have declared my intention to run in the presidential race. I will definitely run if I can line up 20 (backers)." But Aso is far behind Chief Cabinet Secretary SHINZO ABE and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda in public support, according to opinion polls. Even if he secures the required number of recommenders to run for the race, Aso would not be able to avoid an uphill battle. High hurdle lies ahead In the speech, Aso said, "I'm sure 20 lawmakers will stand up for my candidacy," promising that he can secure the required number of 20 lawmakers for him to run in the election. Until then he had said he was confident about getting such a number of lawmakers, but now he has begun saying he was sure he would do so. Late in that day, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi also told reporters: "I believe Mr. Aso will have 20 such lawmakers. It's good for willing people to run for the race without hesitation." Aso belongs to the Kono group in the LDP, but the group has only 10 members, excluding its head Yohei Kono, who has left the group upon assuming the post of speaker of the Lower House and is now an independent. This circumstance requires Aso to secure at least 10 lawmakers from other factions in the party. Another concern is that Taro Kono, a House of Representatives member, who is also a member of the Kono group, has indicated his intention to run for the race. Considering these elements, some in the party are skeptical about whether he can secure the required number of lawmakers. On June 6, Aso met with Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki, head of the Tanigaki faction, and lawmakers Yuya Niwa and Makoto Koga, representatives of the Niwa-Koga faction. All these three groups deriving from the former Miyazawa faction now see some of their members moving to merge their groups into one to be called the "grand Kochi-kai." Ahead of this three-way meeting, Aso dined with Koga one on one and exchanged views. But it is not an easy task to unify a candidate among the three groups. TOKYO 00003277 005 OF 008 Aso talks tough about his candidacy: "Given that I garnered 31 votes in the presidential race five years ago, I think I can secure at least more than that." A person close to Aso, expressing the hope of other groups, such as the Komura faction, giving endorsement to Aso, explained: "That's because (Aso) has now a prospect of securing the required number of supporters for his candidacy even without counting on members of the former Miyazawa faction." Low public supporting rates A headache for Aso is that he tends to be overshadowed by the most promising contender Abe. The two basically will follow Koizumi's reform line, so there is no major policy difference between them. This is perhaps one reason why Aso cannot widen public support, observers say. "Are you confident of coming in second at best?" LDP General Council Chairman Fumio Kyuma asked Aso when he met with Aso at a Tokyo hotel on April 28. When Aso was chair of the LDP Policy Research Council, Kyuma served as deputy chair of the council. Kyuma and Aso are on the same wavelength with each other. So, Kyuma sounded out Aso about his real feelings, but Aso avoided making a clear answer. Aso has said, "I don't care about" (low supporting rates for him),but he sometimes murmurs to his aides: "There's a significant difference between one-digit support ratings and two-digit ones." Finding time between his diplomatic schedules, Aso has taken a tour of some prefectures, such as Hokkaido and Hiroshima, and he has appealed to the public regarding his own policy ideas, such as shifting the present Japanese society to an more active graying society." Gaining more of support from local LDP chapters by making clear his stance of grappling with rectifying social disparities and revitalizing local economies seems to be Aso's strategy. While ABE has indicated his intention to announce his candidacy after the Group of Eight (G8) Summit in mid-July, expectations for Fukuda, who remains mute, are rising. Amid this situation, Aso finds himself under pressure to do something for him to draw public attention. He wants to get out of his current unfavorable situation by working out as early as in July what he calls an Aso vision charting the future image of Japan. (4) Editorial: Japan-South Korea EEZ talks should be pursued separately from Takeshima/Dokdo ownership issue YOMIURI (Page 3) (Full) June 14, 2006 The governments of Japan and South Korea held for the first time in six years two days of talks on the demarcation of the boundaries their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in the Sea of Japan. South Korea has changed a base point for its EEZ claim from Ullung Island to a group of disputed islets in the Sea of Japan, which are called Takeshima in Japan and Dokdo in South Korea. In the previous talks, Seoul did not make the islets a base point as protruding rocks that could not be used as the base point under international law. TOKYO 00003277 006 OF 008 The two days of talks ended with the gap as wide as ever between the two sides because Tokyo did not change its EEZ claim that the boundary should be the median line between Ullung Island and Takeshima/Dokdo. In the past talks, South Korea proposed that Takeshima/Dokdo be located within its EEZ claim, which is advantageous to Seoul. Although it was difficult for Japan to accept South Korea's EEZ claim, it could became the base for the bilateral negotiations. It is true that Seoul's policy change made it more difficult to conclude the negotiations. South Korean President Roh Moon Hyun's hard line stance against Japan is the main reason for making the talks difficult further. Linking the Takeshima/Dokdo issue to Japan's prewar colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula, Roh released a special statement in April in which he said that South Korea wouldn't be able to take a calm response any more. He also stated that as long as Japan claimed sovereignty over Takeshima/Dokdo, a friendship between the two countries would not be formed. Under such a president, it will be extremely difficult for the two countries to demarcate the boundaries of their EEZs. In order to prevent South Korea from proposing the naming of underwater topography in waters around Takeshima/Dokdo to an international conference, Japan planned in April to survey the seabed around Takeshima/Dokdo. The two sides agreed to hold the talks this time around in an attempt to avoid a conflict. South Korea promised it would forgo its plan if Japan gave up on its plan. The two governments then agreed to resume the EEZ talks. However, Seoul is now planning current-observation research in July in waters around Takeshima/Dokdo. It did not turn down Japan's request of cancellation. Do they think that they are free to conduct a research but Japan is not allowed to do so? The UN Convention of the law of the Sea assures the freedom of scientific research within other countries' EEZs. South Korea, however, does not allow Japan to conduct marine research in its EEZ, and it does not hesitate to seize Japanese ships. Therefore, Japan cannot carry out research freely in waters around Takeshima/Dokdo. Minimum rules are needed. Japan proposed setting a system under which the two country would notify their research plans in advance, but South Korea rejected it. If the two countries make no compromises, the gulf on the issue between the two countries will widen further. We urge Seoul to reconsider. In the 1996 Japan-South Korea summit, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Kim Yong Sam agreed to push ahead with the EEZ talks, apart from the issue of sovereignty over Takeshima/Dokdo. Seoul acknowledged in the latest talks that the 1996 agreement is still effective. Holding fast to the principle of the Hashimoto-Kim summit will lead to a resolution of the issue. Linking the ownership of Takeshima/Dokdo to the issue of demarcating EEZs will only make the issue more complicated. TOKYO 00003277 007 OF 008 (5) Three personnel actions at the Foreign Ministry BUNGEISHUNJU (Pp. 235-236) (Abridged slightly) July 2006 Every year, many lawmakers visit foreign countries during the Golden Week holiday period from late April through early May. This year, trips to the United States particularly stood out, reflecting lawmakers' desire to play up their activities in that country in preparation for the post-Koizumi LDP presidential race. Government officials also scurried around making arrangements for their trips. Although Chief Cabinet Secretary SHINZO ABE did not visit the US in person, his presence was felt in Washington. On April 28, Sakie Yokota of the Association of the Families of Victims of Kidnapped by North Korea (AFVKN) was able to meet with President George Bush at the White House. The meeting was made possible largely by Abe's persistent requests through US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer, a close friend of President Bush, appointments with National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, his deputy Jack Crouch, and other US officials. In the process, Japanese Minister to the US Akitaka Saiki (who entered the Foreign Ministry in 1976) made tremendous efforts. Saiki enjoys the confidence of the AFVKN and Abe. Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga also relied heavily on Ambassador Schieffer to pave the way for a meeting with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld that successfully concluded a series of bilateral talks on US force realignment. The Foreign Ministry's "mainstream" members, such as North American Affairs Bureau chief Chikao Kawai (1975) and others, contacted Pentagon officials regarding US force realignment. Despite that, they were completely left out of the loop by the "sub-current" of the Defense Agency, such as Administrative Vice Defense Minister Takemasa Moriya (who joined the agency in 1971) and others, in force realignment talks with the US. Amid such developments, the Takeshima/Dokdo issue reemerged. Administrative Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi (1969),the ministry's top administrative officer, visited South Korea to discuss the issue without telling Isao Iijima, Prime Minister Koizumi's private secretary. Yachi and Iijima were at each other's throat. Yachi consulted only with ABE within the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei),while Iijima openly complained about Yachi's tactic: "Once a top official moves, that is as far as we can go. Mr. Yachi's action didn't help resolve the issue. The matter was simply put off." Pinning its hopes on the next administration, the Foreign Ministry is now patiently waiting for the end of the Koizumi administration, which is only three months away. A prime minister ABE would please officials like Yachi who are on good terms with him, but the China School would be in an uncomfortable position. Former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda is also known for his cold treatment of bureaucrats. Fukuda visited the United States after Golden Week. Before leaving for the US, he notified the Japanese Embassy in Washington that his aides in Japan would completely take care of his itinerary and that there was nothing the embassy need do. As a result, only Minister to the US Kimihiro Ishikane (1981) accompanied Fukuda during his stay in the US. Ishikane served as TOKYO 00003277 008 OF 008 Fukuda's secretary during his tenure as chief cabinet secretary. Moves associated with the post-Koizumi race have begun affecting personnel affairs as well. Rumor has it that if the government decided to allow Yachi to remain in his post beyond this summer, at least three more personnel actions would be affected. First, Ambassador to Indonesia Shin Ebihara's (1971) promotion to administrative vice- minister would become certain. Second, Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau chief Kenichiro Sasae (1974) would eventually head the Foreign Policy Bureau, a lateral move. Third, Ambassador to the US Ryozo Kato (1965) would retain his post in order to later hand it over to Yachi. But hurdles lie ahead of such appointments. Ebihara reportedly took on the ambassadorial post due to his feud with Iijima. Sasae, who served as a secretary to former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, is also close to Fukuda. Sasae kept his distance from Iijima, who locked horns with Fukuda over the question of resuming US beef imports and the option of building a national war memorial to replace Yasukuni Shrine. It remains to be seen whether Iijima and others will allow Ebihara to become administrative vice-minister after Prime Minister Koizumi steps down. Former Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi (1967) is still eager to become ambassador to the US, replacing Kato. Psychological warfare is underway regarding who will give Takeuchi the coup de grace. In the event Yachi resigns from his post this summer, Deputy Foreign Minister Tsuneo Nishida (1970) would surface as his successor. Although Nishida lagged behind other members in the vice minister race, there are vocal calls among division directors for "Vice Minister Nishida." The Yachi-based three personnel actions might fall through with the appointment of Nishida as vice minister. A Yachi-Nishida war involving Chief Cabinet Secretary ABE and Foreign Minister Taro Aso is going on behind the scenes in the Foreign Ministry. SCHIEFFER