JDA'S TOKUCHI URGES GUIDELINES REPLACEMENT TO PDAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 003023 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2026 TAGS: MARR PREL SUBJECT: JDA'S TOKUCHI URGES GUIDELINES REPLACEMENT TO PDAS STEPHENS REF: TOKYO 2985 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer, reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting at the Japan Defense Agency May 29, Defense Councilor Tokuchi told visiting EAP PDAS Stephens that the 1997 U.S.-Japan Revised Guidelines need to be replaced by a "new policy framework" to enable successful implementation of the May 1 Security Consultative Committee (aka "2 2") agreement on alliance transformation. This step was needed to ensure alliance changes are not misunderstood by the Japanese public and neighboring countries. PDAS Stephens stressed the need to implement agreements already reached, and to avoid a protracted negotiation over principles. Administrative Vice Minister Moriya, in a brief meeting with PDAS Stephens, stressed the historic significance of Cabinet approval of the "2 2" agreement. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In the wake of the May 1 Security Consultative Committee (aka "2 2") agreement on alliance transformation, JDA's priority is to implement what has been agreed by both sides, Defense Councilor Hideshi Tokuchi told visiting EAP PDAS Kathy Stephens May 29. To ensure successful implementation, however, JDA believes that the "outdated" 1997 bilateral Guidelines need replacing. The Japanese public and neighboring Asian countries might misperceive recent alliance changes, suggested Tokuchi; they need to be reassured that bilateral contingency planning will occur within a clear policy framework. To JDA, a replacement for the Guidelines would promote transparency about where the alliance is heading, and underscore the principle of civilian control to a sensitive domestic and regional audience, he said. ¶3. (C) JDA regards the 1997 Guidelines as outdated for four reasons, said Tokuchi: -- their scope is too limited, because they focus on operational issues and fail to emphasize other areas of cooperation, such as intelligence-sharing, or the development of military equipment and technology; -- they do not deal with new threats and contingencies, such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; -- they focus too narrowly on military-military cooperation, ignoring "the full range of instruments of national power"; -- they do not address deployments outside the framework of the Mutual Security Treaty, such as SDF deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, humanitarian relief, or the Proliferation Security Initiative. ¶4. (C) JDA is not wedded to revising the Guidelines document per se, said Tokuchi, but some replacement is needed. A new document should make clear that U.S.-Japan security cooperation goes beyond the Mutual Security Treaty, and spell out the bilateral division of labor in new areas, such as humanitarian relief and disaster assistance, and ballistic missile defense, he said. One option would be to agree to a set of "planning principles" to guide increased cooperation in contingency planning. These could be discussed simultaneously with the coming series of bilateral tabletop exercises, he suggested. ¶5. (C) PDAS Stephens replied that the "2 2" agreement was a profound achievement and now needed to be implemented. She cautioned against engaging in a protracted, theological discussion of principles. Such an exercise ran the risk of backfiring, she suggested, causing heightened concern among Japan's Asian neighbors. Advancing U.S.-Japan cooperation in concrete areas such as humanitarian deployments and PSI was arguably more transparent, and more comforting to the regional neighbors, she said. ¶6. (C) In order to make the U.S.-Japan alliance a full-fledged partnership, said Tokuchi, many in JDA believe that improvements are needed in three areas: -- information-sharing (this was being done, but only through narrow intelligence channels); -- contingency planning (this was the main thrust of the "2 2" agreement); and TOKYO 00003023 002 OF 002 -- bilateral development and use of military equipment (this area had barely been addressed). ¶7. (C) Tokuchi noted that JDA would like to increase its interaction with the State Department. Given the inherent inter-agency nature of new threats such as terrorism and WMD proliferation, he said, it was important to avoid the "stove-piping" which sometimes plagued Japanese government agencies. ¶8. (C) In a brief meeting the same day, Administrative Vice Minister Moriya told PDAS Stephens that Cabinet approval of the "2 2" agreement would mark a historic step forward in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance. The result was in large measure thanks to Prime Minister Koizumi's interventions at critical stages in the talks, he said. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: JDA continues to beat the drum of Guidelines revision/replacement, despite a clear, consistent message from senior State and DOD officials that the priority now must be implementation of what has been agreed. Tokuchi's view does not, however, represent a unified Japanese government position. MOFA has stated clearly they do not support JDA's proposal to negotiate a "new policy framework" to replace the Guidelines (see reftel). END COMMENT. ¶10. (U) PDAS Stephens cleared this message. SCHIEFFER