U.S.-JAPAN-ROK POLICY PLANNING TRILATERAL TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 002666 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2026 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA KS RS IN JA SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN-ROK POLICY PLANNING TRILATERAL TALKS, SESSION 5: NON-PROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT REF: A. TOKYO 2654 ¶B. TOKYO 2663 ¶C. TOKYO 2664 ¶D. TOKYO 2665 (NOTAL) Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Joe Donovan. Reason: 1.4 (b)(d ). ¶1. (C) Summary. During Session 5 of the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral policy planning talks on May 12, ROK Deputy Minister for Policy Planning Park In-kook characterized the NPT regime as under siege and that its "fatal loophole" allows parties to reach the brink of developing nuclear weapons under the guise of permitted civilian nuclear activities. Park proposed measures to restore the regime's effectiveness. Japan's DDG for Foreign Policy Endo urged further ratification of START II and negotiation of START III, as well as universalization of the Additional Protocols. S/P Director Stephen D. Krasner argued that nonproliferation regimes require effective verification mechanisms to be successful, noting that the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) now lacks credible verification. Park said South Korea recognizes the positive aspects of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. Endo remarked that Japan does not oppose the agreement, but worries that it may negatively affect the global nonproliferation regime. End summary. ¶2. (C) During the May 12 session of the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral policy planning talks on nonproliferation issues, Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations Park In-kook described the NPT regime as being under siege and argued that the AQ Khan network exposed the potential for fissile materials to fall into the wrong hands. Despite being the cornerstone of international non-proliferation efforts for the past 35 years, Park said that the greatest danger facing the regime today is the "fatal loophole" that allows Parties to reach the brink of developing nuclear weapons under the guise of permitted civil nuclear activities. He cited the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to reach a substantive conclusion and setbacks in negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) as evidence of a global non-proliferation regime in disarray. ¶3. (C) Park suggested proposals that would go a long way towards restoring the credibility and effectiveness of the regime: - The U.S. and Russia meeting the 2012 target date for voluntary reductions under the Moscow Treaty could increase momentum for revitalizing the NPT; - Develop a proper safety net to catch would-be proliferators and to protect legitimate civil nuclear programs and introducing hurdles for Parties trying to withdraw from the NPT; - Develop a secure global nuclear fuel supply in order to restrict the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Park noted that South Korea appreciates and supports GNEP; - Promote the universalization of Additional Protocols; and - Enhance the security of nuclear materials through such mechanisms as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Park added that active Chinese participation in these efforts is crucial. ¶4. (C) Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Director General for Foreign Policy Yoshihisa Endo said that Japan shares South Korea's concerns about the lack of a concluding document at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Japan encourages the NPT nuclear weapons states to further promote disarmament by ratifying early START II and by beginning negotiations on START III as well as by entering into good faith negotiations on a CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Endo added that PSI, UNSCR 1540, and the G8 Global Partnership all are effective tools for countering proliferation, but more needs to be done to encourage the universalization of Additional Protocols. Endo agreed with Park that GNEP is a positive step forward that Japan fully supports. ¶5. (C) S/P Director Dr. Stephen D. Krasner argued that non-proliferation regimes require effective verification mechanisms to be successful. Non-proliferation regimes cannot be solely about values or principles, but must be functionally effective. Krasner said that the FMCT now lacks credible verification measures. Krasner argued that pressure to adhere to the NPT is not the sole reason more states have not sought nuclear weapons over the past 30 years. Instead, states make the decision to seek nuclear weapons based on their own calculations of perceived strategic necessity and value of nuclear weapons to their national interest. The loophole alluded to by Park is an inherent flaw in the NPT, he said. ¶6. (C) Reiterating the U.S. case for its nuclear deal with India, Krasner pointed out that India is not a signatory of the NPT and has not violated any obligations, unlike North Korea and Iran. India is an emerging regional and global power that faces rising energy demand. India hopes to meet some of that demand with nuclear power, and having 80 percent of India's civil nuclear infrastructure under IAEA safeguards is a win for global non-proliferation efforts. ¶7. (C) Park told Krasner that South Korea recognizes the positive aspects of the U.S.-India agreement and welcomes India to be a responsible member of the international community. He agreed that fully engaging India on non-proliferation matters is good for international stability. Endo added that while Japan does not oppose the agreement and fully recognizes India's strategic importance, Japan worries that the agreement may negatively affect the global non-proliferation regime. Endo noticed during the 2005 NPT Review Conference a certain level of fatigue many Parties had about living up to their obligations and worried that were India to receive nuclear materials and technology outside the NPT structure, those Parties could be encouraged to leave the NPT in search of their own bilateral agreements. Park followed up by arguing that we should be careful to avoid giving any excuse to Iran to legitimize withdrawing from the NPT. ¶8. (U) Participants in the meeting included: United States -------------- Stephen D. Krasner, Director, Policy Planning Staff Evan Feigenbaum, S/P Member Joyce Rabens, EST Minister Counselor Matthew Wallace, EST Officer, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker) David Wolff, Political Officer, Embassy Tokyo (control officer) Japan -------------- Masaharu Kohno, MOFA Vice-Minister for Foreign Policy Yoshihisa Endo, Deputy Director General, Foreign Policy Bureau Nobukatsu Kanehara, Minister, Embassy of Japan (Washington) Koji Tomita, Minister, Embassy of Japan (Korea) Hiroshi Kawamura, MOFA Director, Policy Planning Division Shinobu Yamaguchi, MOFA Policy Planning Division ROK --- In-Kook Park, Deputy Minister for Policy Planning and International Organizations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFAT) Sang-Mo Yeon, Minister Counselor, ROK Embassy (Tokyo) Choong-Hee Hahn, Director, North America Division I, MOFAT Song OH, Director, Policy Planning and Coordination Division, MOFAT Ki-Woong Kim, Director, Inter-Korean Policy Division Ki-Jun Park, Deputy Director for North-East Asia Division II, MOFAT Young-Kyu Park, Deputy Director for Policy Planning and Coordination Division, MOFAT ¶9. (U) S/P Director Krasner cleared this message. DONOVAN