S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MAY 11 MEETING WITH MOFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002650 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2026 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA IR IS IN JA SUBJECT: S/P DIRECTOR KRASNER'S MAY 11 MEETING WITH MOFA DISARMAMENT DG NAKANE REF: A. TOKYO 2609 ¶B. TOKYO 2610 ¶C. TOKYO 2613 ¶D. TOKYO 2637 ¶E. TOKYO 2638 ¶F. TOKYO 2639 ¶G. TOKYO 2640 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Joe Donovan. Reason: 1.4 (d) ( d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. During a May 11 meeting, MOFA Disarmament DG Takeshi Nakane told visiting S/P Director Dr. Stephen D. Krasner that although Japan has not yet fixed its position, it remains concerned about the possible effect the U.S.-India nuclear agreement may have on the NPT regime, remains unconvinced that India can be trusted to live up to its obligations, and is dissatisfied that the agreement does not bind India to any new disarmament commitments. Krasner explained that the agreement is the best solution available to a long-standing problem and emphasized that having 80 percent of India's civilian nuclear infrastructure under safeguards is better than nothing. Nakane told Krasner that Japan is deeply troubled by Iran's provocative attitude and activities. Nakane does not see any real chance for a meaningful UNSC resolution so long as Russia and China oppose such a move. Although the diplomatic road will be challenging and time consuming, it is the one the international community must take, he said. Krasner agreed and assured Nakane that the U.S. is firmly committed to pursuing diplomatic options. END SUMMARY. Japan Wary of India Nuclear Agreement -------------- ¶2. (C) MOFA Director General for Disarmament, Science and Non-proliferation Ambassador Takeshi Nakane briefed Policy Planning Director Dr. Stephen D. Krasner on his May 1 discussion on disarmament and non-proliferation with Indian Ministry of External Affairs Joint Secretary for Disarmament and International Security Hamid Ali Rao. Nakane explained that Japan and India initially had been discussing disarmament and non-proliferation on the sidelines of a broader bilateral security dialogue, but a January 2006 joint statement by Japan FM Aso and the Indian Minister for External Affairs calls on Japan and India to hold annual discussions on these issues. India traditionally has been reluctant to hold such discussions with Japan because of Japan's penchant for calling on India to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was the main topic of discussion during the May 1 talks, according to Nakane. ¶3. (C) Stressing that Japan had not yet fixed its position on the U.S. India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Nakane added that Japan understands well the growing strategic importance of India and appreciates its need for greater energy resources. However, Japan cannot overlook the potential that the agreement may have a negative impact on the credibility of the NPT regime, he stated. During the May 1 meeting, Nakane pressed Rao for details on the type and scope of India's safeguards agreement with the IAEA; it is his understanding that other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) partners are focusing on this as well. Rao implied that it would not be appropriate for India to be subject to comprehensive safeguards similar to those of NPT non-nuclear weapons states, according to Nakane. ¶4. (C) Nakane indicated he was disappointed with India's insistence that because the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is civilian in nature, it is not an appropriate vehicle for discussions about disarmament. It is Japan's understanding that disarmament is a component of the agreement-by calling for a fissile material cut-off treaty, for example. ¶5. (C) During the May 1 discussions, Japan formally urged India to become formal active participant in PSI, Nakane said. India told Japan that it supports the PSI in principle, but cannot justify becoming a participant unless it is allowed to join as a core group member. Nakane told Krasner that it is statements such as these that raise questions about India's commitment to actually live up its non-proliferation obligations and become an active partner in global non-proliferation activities. Nonetheless, Japan and India were able to find common ground regarding the BWC and combating small arms proliferation. TOKYO 00002650 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) Krasner responded that the civil nuclear agreement with India is an essential component to a broader strategic realignment in our relations with India. Improving our relationships with multiethnic democracies like India is crucial to dealing with repressive regions and failed states in the Third World. Krasner argued that developing coherent regional coordination in Central and South Asia could provide stability in a fragmented region. ¶7. (C) There is little likelihood that India will give up its nuclear weapons and, without the deal, India would continue to exist outside the non-proliferation regime, Krasner explained. Under the agreement, approximately 80 percent of India's civil nuclear facilities will come under IAEA safeguards. Nakane responded that Japan has long-standing policies on disarmament and non-proliferation that enjoy popular support. Japan attaches great importance to the NPT regime, and major media outlets and Diet politicians have been critical of the agreement since its announcement. Japan's disarmament and non-proliferation policies are a matter of principle that the government cannot easily abandon, according to Nakane. From Japan's perspective, the deal is inadequate since it does not require India to commit itself to any disarmament obligations that go beyond those already in place. It is crucial that requirements for India to pursue a comprehensive test ban treaty and fissile material cut off treaty remain in the agreement. ¶8. (C) While recognizing that India does not have a record of horizontal proliferation, Nakane noted that nuclear material imported from Canada in the 1970s did wind up in India's nuclear weapons program. He also noted that the Indian PM has repeatedly argued before the Indian Parliament that the agreement will in no way infringe upon India's nuclear weapons infrastructure. ¶9. (C) Krasner assured Nakane that the U.S. appreciates Japan's position but argued that the issue at hand is how to best make the world a safer and more stable place. Krasner noted that Israel's neighbors do not complain loudly about Israel's nuclear weapons because these weapons, in themselves, are not seen as a regional threat, whereas regimes like North Korea and Iran are seen as threats. Non-proliferation policy must be flexible enough to be able to distinguish between the nature of regimes and nuclear programs instead of clinging dogmatically to the NPT. ¶10. (C) Japan does not officially oppose the agreement and is currently trying to balance U.S.-Japan relations, Japan-India relations, and its own domestic non-proliferation policies, Nakane observed. Regarding Israel, Nakane argued that in Japan's experience, most Middle East countries in fact are deeply concerned about Israel's nuclear weapons. Disagreement about the status of Israel was a major reason the 2005 NPT RevCon was unable to reach a substantive agreement or concluding document, he said. Nakane added that while the actual military utility of nuclear weapons is debatable, the threat they pose is unmistakable. For that reason, the U.S. must be prepared to clearly articulate why India gets the deal and Pakistan does not. According to Nakane, the Pakistani ambassador already has told him that Pakistan will follow suit if India is permitted to produce weapons grade fissile material. Diplomacy Only Option on Iran -------------- ¶11. (C) Nakane told Krasner that Japan is deeply troubled by Iran's attitude and activities. Japan has been very proactive trying to find a diplomatic solution and has had frequent senior-level contact urging Iran to comply with its IAEA and UN obligations. Iran's actions have only escalated tensions. Nakane argued that the international community must send a strong unified message to Iran in the form of a Chapter VII resolution, but is concerned that Russian and Chinese opposition will delay a meaningful resolution. Nonetheless, the international community must remain committed to finding a diplomatic solution, he insisted. ¶12. (C) Nakane reiterated Japan's desire to be more closely involved in the multilateral discussions on Iran. Nakane told Krasner that being seen to be on the inside of the international decision-making process is crucially important for Japan. Being perceived domestically as outside the decision-making process could make it hard for Japan to take difficult steps when the time comes, according to Nakane. TOKYO 00002650 003 OF 003 Participants -------------- ¶13. (U) Participants in the meeting included: United States -------------- Stephen D. Krasner, Director, Policy Planning Staff Joe Donovan, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy Tokyo Evan Feigenbaum, S/P Member David Wolff, Political Officer, Embassy Tokyo Matthew Wallace, EST Officer, Embassy Tokyo (notetaker) Japan -------------- Ambassador Takeshi Nakane, Director General for Disarmament, Science and Non-proliferation Bureau Shou Ohno, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division Kaoru Magosaki, Principal Deputy Director, Non- proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division Satoshi Kikuchi, Desk Officer, Non-proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division ¶14. (U) S/P Director Krasner cleared this message. DONOVAN