JAPAN: MISUSE OF LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 002441

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR OES/IHA COMELLA
HHS FOR NIH AMY PATTERSON

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO PTER EAGR JA PARM PREL BWC
SUBJECT: JAPAN: MISUSE OF LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH

REF: A. STATE 56179


B. 05 TOKYO 6750

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1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph 10.


2. (U) On April 18, ESToff and EST FSN delivered the
talking points in reftel on the misuse of life science
research and left a non-paper with the Ministry of Health,
Labor and Welfare's (MHLW) Office of International
Cooperation Director Kaname Kanai, Health Sciences Division
Deputy Director Noriyo Yoshikawa and Tuberculosis and
Infectious Diseases Control Division Deputy Director
Takehiko Suzuki. Office of Health Emergency Preparedness
and Response Chief Fumi Irie and International Affairs
Division official Reiko Akizuki were also present.


3. (SBU) The officials present at the meeting acknowledged
that the dual-use potential of life sciences research could
be of concern, but admitted that they were not aware of any
current discussions taking place within the GOJ or Japanese
academia on the subject. They also recognized that work on
dual-use has been taken up under the BWC work program. The
officials explained that MHLW is still working on
incorporating the concept of biosecurity into Japan's
infectious diseases legal framework, and as a result,
discussions on dual-use were still off into the future.


4. (U) Mostly in listening mode, the officials were unclear
as to how the work plan and international collaboration
proposed by the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) would tie into existing international
mechanisms. ESToff explained that what was being proposed
would not supplant any existing work within the BWC and
WHO, but rather was a request for the exchange of
information and opinions between the United States and
Japan. The officials offered to circulate the non-paper
among relevant offices within MHLW, but requested further
information (questions listed below) and a more concrete
"concepts paper" that outlined what the Board envisioned
its cooperation with Japan to look like, before providing a
more formal response to the demarche and the name of a
point of contact.


5. (U) The officials also asked the following questions.

-- Are the NSABB and/or USG requesting a formalized
partnership of some sort? Does Washington plan to
ultimately establish a multilateral network as a result of
the collaboration, or will the "global partnerships" be
strictly on a bilateral level?

-- After Japan exchanges information with the United States
and the NSABB establishes a relationship with the GOJ POC,
are there any plans for the USG to put forward some kind of
international guidelines or proposals on the dual-use of
life sciences in consultation with other countries? Or,
will the relationship be strictly for the exchange of
information and opinions that both countries' POCs will
take back to their respective governments?

-- The officials asked for a clarification on the
relationship between the proposal and the US-Japan Workshop
on S&T for a Secure and Safe Society (SSS),the BWC and the
US-Japan Cooperative Medical Sciences Program (CMSP).
ESToff provided a basic explanation of the differences
among the four, but the officials requested further
information if possible.

-- How does the NSABB plan to contact the Japanese POC?
Would individual agency members of the Board directly
contact their counterpart agencies in Japan (example: HHS
and MHLW),or would all contacts go through the POC? The
officials commented that it would be confusing if the NSABB
had only one contact but Japan was to have several, both at
the government and non-governmental levels.


6. (U) On April 25, ESToff and EST FSN met with Yutaka
Hishiyama, Director for Research, in the Secretariat Office
of the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) to discuss the same
topic with the non-governmental science council. Hishiyama
also understood the potential threat posed to society by

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the potential of dual-use life sciences research, but
admitted that this topic has not been raised or discussed
within the SCJ. He did explain that concerns over such
dual-use have grown especially since the September 11
attacks. As an example, Hishiyama said that MHLW would
revise pathogen-handling requirements within the Infectious
Diseases Law based on these concerns. (For further details
see ref B).


7. (U) Hishiyama explained that the SCJ has drafted a basic
code of conduct for researchers in Japan. It covers a
broad range of general issues that hint at the concept of
"misuse", stating that scientists must be responsible to
ensure a safe society, human health and welfare and nature
conservation. Though not using the specific term "misuse",
the code can be interpreted as stating that scientists
should not produce anything that can harm society,
including weapons. It also urges researchers to ensure
that their studies are open to the public and that they
follow Japan's laws and regulations. The code does not
specifically touch on the dual-use of life sciences. The
main purpose of the SCJ's code of conduct is to prevent
researchers from stealing and/or fabricating data. The SCJ
established a committee to work on the code of conduct for
researchers in December 2005 in response to several
incidents where data was fabricated or samples were stolen
by researchers from other institutions.


8. (U) Note: The SCJ's mandate is to deliberate on
important scientific matters, implement its decisions, and
promote the effective exchange of knowledge between
researchers to achieve greater productivity in scientific
research. Its 210 representative members are elected from
approximately 760,000 scientists nationwide. When
requested, the Council offers advice and recommendations to
the government, and has the authority to offer the same on
its own initiative. It is a member of the InterAcademy
Council and is the closest equivalent of the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) in Japan. End note.


9. (SBU) Comment: Both MHLW and SCJ officials were aware
that a discussion on the potential misuse of life sciences
research was taking place internationally. However, it
does not appear that the topic is being seriously discussed
among researchers and government officials in Japan. The
GOJ is working to steadily boost its measures to protect
against potential bioterrorism threats. As international
engagement on the topic of dual-use increases, the GOJ will
likely come on board to participate in the discussion. For
the time being, MHLW officials are looking forward to
Washington's answers to their questions. EST will continue
to engage the GOJ on this issue as more information becomes
available. End comment.


10. (U) Action request: Post requests answers to MHLW's
questions and any further information that can be provided
to the GOJ on the NSABB's envisioned cooperation with Japan
on this issue.

DONOVAN