WHA A/S SHANNON'S APRIL 10 CONSULTATIONS WITH MOFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001959 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR BEEMAN, CUTLER E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2026 TAGS: PREL ETRD ECON XR CH LA XK JA SUBJECT: WHA A/S SHANNON'S APRIL 10 CONSULTATIONS WITH MOFA LATIN AFFAIRS DG SAKABA: MORNING SESSION REF: A. DEPT PLEASE PASS USTR FOR BEEMAN ¶B. CUTLER Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Japan's top priority in Latin America is to revitalize its economic relationship, MOFA Latin American Affairs DG Sakaba told WHA A/S Shannon April 10. Sakaba said policy mistakes by Latin American governments over the past 10-15 years have lead to widening income gaps, a broad disappointment with democracy and the left's resurgence. Japan now recognizes that its programs must reach out to the people, not just governments. A/S Shannon described U.S. efforts to overcome a perception of U.S. disengagement in the region despite greater attention and doubled ODA. A/S Shannon separately reviewed the U.S.-Venezuela relationship and concerns about the role of Chavez in the region. Sakaba underscored the role of the international community in ensuring a fair election. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) MOFA Lain American and Caribbean Affairs Director General Mitsuo Sakaba welcomed Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Shannon and Executive Assistant John Creamer to Tokyo, noting that although this was the 25th round of U.S.-Japan consultations on Latin America, it was his first as MOFA's Latin America DG. A/S Shannon responded that at a time when Latin America was undergoing dramatic change, the U.S. believes it is important to consult with partners in Asia and Europe, to enable them to work together to ensure that change in the region contributes to stability. While acknowledging that Japan attaches lower priority to Latin America than does the U.S., Sakaba stressed that Japanese foreign policy does not neglect the region. Prime Minister Koizumi had visited the region in 2004, and eight Latin American presidents had visited Japan in 2005. Furthermore, Japanese ODA and investment in the region gives it some leverage. Sakaba noted that he had proposed this round of consultations to gain a better under standing of U.S. policies and perspectives on the region. ¶3. (SBU) Sakaba briefly reviewed Japan's historical engagement with Latin America, citing Japanese emigration to Latin America from the late 19th century and the expansion of economic ties in the 1950s and '60s, when it was easier for Japanese firms to do business in Latin America than in neighboring Asian countries as a result of "issues" left over from WWII. Trade and investment flows dropped off sharply following Latin America's debt crisis in the 1980s and Japan's economic slowdown in the 1990s. ¶4. (SBU) Japan's top priority with Latin America is to revitalize the economic relationship, Sakaba continued. This had been the focus of PM Koizumi's visits to Mexico, Chile and Brazil, and it motivated Japan's conclusion of an "economic partnership agreement" (EPA) with Mexico, which entered into force in April 2005. It is also behind the EPA it is negotiating with Chile, which Sakaba said he expects will be concluded by the end of 2006. Japan also holds general consultations with Mercosur on business climate topics, most recently during the early April visit to Argentina of MOFA Deputy Minister Yabunaka. ¶5. (C) Describing Latin America as a major source of energy resources and an export market for Japan, Sakaba admitted to a sense of economic rivalry with China for access to the region's energy resources. He expressed frustration with Japanese business's "excessive caution," which he characterized as left over from the region's debt crisis. China's trade with the region overtook Japan's in 2003. ¶6. (C) Turning to negative issues on Japan's agenda with Latin America, Sakaba first cited former Peruvian President Fujimori, whose decision to stay in Japan had complicated Japan's dialogue with Peru. Second, he cited the rising numbers of "Nikkei" - descendent of Japanese emigrants - entering Japan since the GOJ eased visa regulations to make it easier for them to remain in Japan. Not only were the numbers large - around 300,000 in the case of Brazil - they also tended to concentrate in a few large cities, compounding pressures on those communities. Sakaba identified this as an issue in Japan's dialogues with Brazil and Peru. Third, Sakaba cited remaining public and private debt owed to Japan by Argentina and Cuba. ¶7. (SBU) A/S Shannon provided an overview of U.S. relations with the region, describing efforts to overcome the perception of U.S. disengagement from the region following the September 11 terrorist attacks and U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. He noted this perception had arisen even as the Bush Administration had doubled ODA to the region. The President had also participated in the Summit of the Americas process, traveled to the region, and received numerous Latin American heads of state. Shannon identified a main policy challenge as the need to help governments in the region build the capacity to address the popular expectations created by Latin America's democratic revolution. Shannon looked forward to identifying ways in which the U.S. and Japan could coordinate and cooperate. ¶8. (C) Turning to the political landscape in Latin America, Sakaba said there are many analyses of why the political left is resurgent. He found the most compelling in a recent UNDP report on democracy in the Peru, which attributed rising dissatisfaction with democratic governance to governments' failure to meet people's expectations that democracy would bring concrete benefits to their lives. The general public in Latin America seems to evaluate democracy not for its merits as a political philosophy but on its ability to deliver, Sakaba commented. They are ready to accept authoritarian governments that deliver what democratic governance has not. This is a dangerous trend, he added, and underscores the need for Japan to reach out not only to Latin American governments but also directly to Latin American peoples, for example through Japanese ODA projects. ¶9. (C) Citing the widening gap between rich and poor in Latin America, Sakaba described this as the result of policy mistakes committed over the last 10 to 15 years, which also contributed to the sense of disappointment with democracy. This helped to explain how Peruvian presidential candidate Humala could do so well in his campaign despite having no political background and no policy agenda. Sakaba separately flagged Japan's interest in deepening political engagement with Haiti, Colombia, and Guatemala, which he described as focused on peace building. ¶10. (C) A/S Shannon agreed with Sakaba's analysis. Latin American publics understand democracy first in terms of individual freedoms, second in terms of living standards, and not at all as a political philosophy. The challenge is to build capacity not only at the state level but also at the individual level. The clear implication for ODA strategy, Shannon continued, is to try to connect directly with people, an approach the U.S. is adopting after years of trying to work through Latin American governments. ¶11. (C) Asked for his analysis of the apparent contradiction between the size of the U.S.-Venezuela economic relationship and the anti-U.S. thrust of Chavez' rhetoric, A/S Shannon described in detail how Chavez had undermined government-to-government relations, to the point that the historically close relationship had broken down in all but the economic sphere. The energy relationship persists because it is private on the U.S. side and Venezuela has its own refining and distribution capacity in the U.S. The USG would like to rebuild bilateral relations, but Chavez needs the U.S. as an enemy. While trying not to let itself be provoked, the USG has real concerns with what Chavez is trying to do in the region. Sakaba agreed that other leaders are increasingly fed up with Chavez' anti-U.S. rhetoric but he noted that some Latin electorates still applaud it. He voiced concern over Venezuelan economic controls, tax policy, and moves to increase government shares in joint ventures. ¶13. (C) At Sakaba's request, A/S Shannon offered his assessment of Venezuelan opposition parties and expectations for the election in December. The old political parties had lost credibility and collapsed when Chavez first came to power, while the emerging opposition groups lack experience and organizational ability. Shannon voiced concern that voting rates have fallen because people don't think their votes matter. They are unlikely to return to the political process until an effective opposition leader emerges. Sakaba responded that the role for the international community is to demonstrate its interest and ensure that votes are counted. Japan has supported and contributed to OAS election monitoring efforts and is in talks to continue doing so. ¶14. (U) A/S Shannon cleared this message. SCHIEFFER