WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: YOUR VISIT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 001894 SIPDIS SIPDIS FROM AMBASSADOR SCHIEFFER TO WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY TOM SHANNON E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2021 TAGS: OTRA PREL ETRD ECON LA XK JA SUBJECT: WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON: YOUR VISIT TO JAPAN Classified By: Classified by Ambassador J.T. Schieffer for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Embassy Tokyo welcomes your coming visit. You will arrive in Japan at a time when our relationship is as good or better than it has ever been; the government is eager to expand its special relationship with the United States. Japan and the U.S. share many commonalities in our relations with Latin America: a long history of immigration, active participation in development projects, and we are both signatories to Free Trade Agreements with Latin countries. Japan welcomes your first visit to Asia as an opportunity to exchange ideas on how to cooperate on issues of mutual concern in the Western Hemisphere. We hope you will: 1) express appreciation for Japan's recent support for elections in the region; 2) urge Japan to play a more active role in promoting democracy and good governance; and (3) encourage cooperation with Japan on mutually selected assistance issues. Politics and Foreign Policy -------------- ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Koizumi's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),together with its coalition partner New Komeito Party, controls over two-thirds of the Lower House and enjoys a simple majority in the Upper House. The recent resignation of opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Seiji Maehara has dominated headlines in the past week. While this is an important development for domestic politics, we do not expect the change in leadership to affect Japanese political decision making or U.S. interests. The opposition in Japan is weak. The DPJ holds less than a quarter of the seats in the Diet and has minimal say on policies. Of greater importance is the expected prime ministerial contest this fall. Koizumi is expected to step down in September, and the race to succeed him has already begun. Among the contenders are Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe ) who leads the race at this point, Foreign Minister Aso, Finance Minister Tanigaki, and former Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda. The election could have implications for Latin America. If the successor to Prime Minister Koizumi ) whose cousins and uncles immigrated to Brazil does not share the same affinity toward the region, the Prime Minster,s "strategic partnership" announced during his 2004 visit to Brazil could fall flat. ¶3. (C) Japan's relations with its neighbors are riddled with territorial and historical problems. Anger over the North Korea abductee issue is palpable, and Japan continues to take a hard line, in cooperation with us, in the Six-Party Talks. Koizumi's annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine make international headlines. The shrine memorializes all Japanese war dead, including 14 convicted class-A war criminals; China and South Korea oppose these visits because they claim the shrine glorifies Japan's wartime aggression. In addition, unresolved disputes over energy rights in the East China Sea and an ongoing freeze in high-level discussions with China and South Korea have led Foreign Minister Aso to say that there is nothing he can do to improve relations. Economics, Oil, and Trade -------------- ¶4. (U) The primary focus of Japan,s relationship with Latin America is economic. Japan first became a significant player in the region in the 1960s and 1970s as it aimed to secure a supply of primary materials for its industries. Large Japanese corporations including Toyota, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Honda made important investments in the region and have played an instrumental role in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) development. But between 1990 and the end of the decade, Japan,s share of total FDI inflows to Latin America have dropped from more than 20 percent to less than ten percent; meanwhile Japan,s investment in China and Southeast Asia grew. After a decade of economic stagnation, Japan is now in its second year of domestic demand-led growth. For CY2005 Japan posted a 2.8 percent real GDP growth rate. However, Japan still faces several challenges including a debt/GDP ratio that is the largest of the G-8 countries and a rapidly aging population. ¶5. (SBU) Japanese oil and gas companies do not invest in Latin America because of the geographic distance to the region and the relatively higher cost of refining; they prefer instead the higher quality grade coming from the Middle East. ¶6. (SBU) Japanese industry is behind the government,s recent moves to secure bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Since NAFTA, Japanese firms have pressed their government to address the disadvantages faced when competing in markets with multinationals who enjoy preferential access to foreign markets as a result of other countries, FTAs. Japan concluded its second Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) -- which is similar to an FTA but includes provisions that provide economic assistance to micro enterprises and joint research activities -- with Mexico in 2005. This was the first of its kind between Japan and a LAC country. Both Mexican Embassy officials and Japanese government officials publicly have acknowledged that the Japan-Mexico Agreement facilitates Japanese manufacturers, access to NAFTA markets, because the agreement reduces duties on parts and components shipped to Mexico for final assembly at Japanese-invested plants and sale in the U.S. and Canada. Bilateral trade between Mexico and Japan from April 1 to September 30, 2005 increased by 24 percent, over the same period in 2004. ¶7. (SBU) The Japanese government also is moving forward on trade agreements with other Latin American countries. According to Japanese government contacts, the first round of FTA talks with Chile progressed well. This agreement, they hope, will serve as a gateway to South American markets for Japanese businesses. While the private sector is anxious to conclude FTAs with Brazil and Argentina, the Japanese government has been slow to move. A MOFA official said his government is waiting to see what type of FTA proposal from the United States Brazil will accept. The Japanese, then, would use that agreement as a model in negotiations for a Brazil-Japan FTA. ¶8. (SBU) Japan engages multilaterally with Latin America through Mercosur. But the Japanese find it difficult to deal with Mercosur on any specific initiatives, complaining that it,s hard to deal with four countries that can,t get along themselves. Despite this, the Japanese stay engaged in the region because they hope, long-term, Mercosur will constitute a solid group like the EU. Nevertheless, the Japanese hold a dialogue once yearly with Mercosur countries to discuss general economic matters, ways to enhance relations and technical cooperation. Sometime early this year, Japan will attend the seventh round of the Mercosur Dialogue, headed by MOFA Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic Affairs Mitoji Yabunaka. ODA --- ¶9. (C) Japanese ODA to Latin America aims to get the biggest bang for the buck. The percentage of ODA to Latin America has decreased since the 80s and 90s, from ten percent of Japan,s entire ODA budget to five percent. Japan sees this as both good and bad ) good because it reflects a relative increase in the standard of living in the region (Japan cuts off its aid when per capita GNI rises above 4,000 USD),but bad because Latin America still faces a number of development problems. A budget shortfall has forced Japan to re-prioritize to: Asia, countries in conflict, and post-conflict countries in Africa, in that order. Of the aid going to Latin America, Bolivia is the largest recipient. Other countries not qualifying for traditional grants receive technical cooperation assistance and aid for grassroots projects determined by the Japanese Embassy within the LAC country. Increasingly, the Japanese government is looking to fund projects that will affect an entire region, rather than just one country. Not to be forgotten, remittances from the approximately 400,000 Latin Americans working in Japan amounted to three billion dollars in 2003, second only to the United States as a source of remittances to the LAC region. Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Peru and Venezuela -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) To the Japanese, the electoral process that witnessed Morales emerge victorious in Bolivia is a sign that democracy in the country is advancing. Shortly after Morales took office, Japan relayed to the new government that it would tie its aid to implementation of constructive policies. They believe Morales has a chance if he aligns his country with Brazil and Argentina ) which support good governance and democracy -- rather than Venezuela -- which supports Bolivia,s radicalization policy. Recent Japanese government actions make clear, however, that there is no real link between performance and aid. Within the last two months, the Japanese government gave USD 100,000 to the Morales government before he had accomplished a single constructive objective. ¶11. (C) The Japanese have built a mutually beneficial relationship with the Colombians. Japan continues to support the agenda of President Uribe, who they believe will win the upcoming elections. Currently Japanese aid in Colombia funds rehabilitation and training centers for demobilized forces. On trade, Japan exports approximately 700 million USD worth of goods (car parts, heavy machinery, chemicals, steel, and electrical machinery) to Colombia each year. It imports approximately 300 million USD worth of products. Coffee accounted for half that amount, followed by emeralds, fish and industrial products. The unstable security situation prevents greater investment in Colombia. ¶12. (C) Japan,s policy is to engage with Cuba. They believe this offers the best way to promote human rights and economic change in the country. MOFA Latin America DG Sakaba has an ongoing dialogue with Cuba,s Vice Foreign Minister. They also maintain high-level dialogue through Japan,s Parliamentary Friendship Association, which visits Cuba regularly. In 2004, ex-Prime Minister Hashimoto was a part of this group; ex-Prime Minister Hata went in 2005. The Japanese remain grateful to the Cuban regime for its help in resolving the Japanese Embassy incident in Peru. ¶13. (C) Cuban Minister of Government for Trade Affairs was in Japan last week to re-schedule Cuba,s nine billion dollar debt with the Japanese private sector. The private sector wants Cuba to speed up its re-payments of loans dating back to the Soviet era. The Japanese Ministry of Economics and Trade, together with Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, handles Cuba,s public debt which amounts to approximately 600 million dollars. 85.5 million dollars is short-term debt; 514.5 million dollars is long-term debt. Not surprisingly, the negotiations have not been moving forward. Trade relations between Cuba and Japan are growing. In 2004, Japan exported approximately 94 million dollars worth of products (machinery, electric parts, medical machinery) to Cuba. Japan imported cigars, coffee, nickel and seafood from Cuba. ¶14. (C) The only reason Japan cares about Haiti is because the United States brings it up at virtually every major international conference, according to a MOFA official. The Japanese believe Haiti is so underdeveloped they have no idea where to start helping. Japan is the fourth largest aid donor to Haiti, not including the 1,060,000 USD contributions for the recent elections. Japan further contributes indirectly through the World Bank and the United Nations. The Japanese government currently contributes 20 percent of the financial cost of the United Nations, peacekeeping operation there, something they plan to continue indefinitely. ¶15. (C) Japan,s relations with Peru are on the upswing following a prolonged period of tension resulting from ex-President Fujimori,s stay in Japan. Following Fujimori,s abrupt November 6 departure, the Japanese government has made attempts to normalize relations. In the last month, Japan donated 92,250 USD to the Organization of American States in support of the electoral process there. Japanese companies are interested in mining, but security issues have slowed investment. ¶16. (C) Venezuela is one of the few countries in Latin America where Japan takes its cues from the OAS and EU missions, not the United States. Japan,s political agenda in Venezuela is fairly straightforward and naive ) to encourage the Chavez government to deepen their understanding of international affairs so it doesn,t always act in the context of its bilateral relations, but rather for the greater good for the international community. The Japanese have taken the stance that they must deal with Chavez because he was democratically elected. ¶17. (C) Japan, however, remains worried that two phenomena could lead to widespread instability in Venezuela: a drop in the price of oil and the upcoming December elections. If crude price falls and Chavez cannot support his social programs, civil unrest may result. In the lead-up to the December elections, the Japanese government also is concerned there will be a backlash from the people,s inability to form opposition political parties and Chavez,s strict control of the economic, media and legislative systems. Instability, they believe, could hurt Chavez, ability to maintain the oil flow and thus upset world oil prices. That could be devastating to the Japanese economy which is 100 percent dependent on energy imports. The China Factor -------------- ¶18. (C) The "China factor" is barely a factor at all. China,s activities in Latin America simply do not play into Japan,s foreign policy calculations. The Japanese Foreign Ministry believes the dynamics of the Japan-Latin America and China-Latin America relationships are fundamentally different. China has a greater need for natural resources and Latin America is a logical place to exploit them, government officials have expressed. Otherwise Latin America and China are competing for the same developed-country FDI and the same developed-country markets, a dynamic that helped Japan win concessions from Mexico during the negotiation of their trade agreement. By contrast, the Japanese economic relationship with Latin America is more complementary and diverse, trading in goods where each country has a comparative advantage. It,s obvious the Japanese Foreign Ministry has thought little about the long-term strategic consequences of China gaining a foothold in that region. And while GOJ energy officials closely monitor China's energy diplomacy world-wide, they do not look to the Latin America region as a hedge against getting cut off from Middle Eastern oil. Your Meetings -------------- ¶19. (C) In order to cover the spectrum of Japan,s relationship with Latin America, we have requested meetings with your counterparts in Japan,s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry and Environment. You will also have a separate meeting with the MOFA Economic Cooperation Bureau Deputy Director General Nobuki Sugita to discuss aid. We have arranged roundtable discussions with academics, journalists, and business leaders to give you an opportunity to engage non-government officials on issues related to Latin America. We at Embassy Tokyo look forward to briefing you further on your arrival and stand ready to do all we can to make your trip productive. SCHIEFFER