LDP'S NAKAGAWA AND KYUMA ON DPRI, CHINA, IRAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001655 SIPDIS SIPDIS PASS USDA FOR U/S PENN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2010 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD MARR CH JA SUBJECT: LDP'S NAKAGAWA AND KYUMA ON DPRI, CHINA, IRAN AND BEEF Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph R. Donovan, reasons 1.5 ( b, d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a wide-ranging discussion with the DCM March 29, ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) heavyweights Hidenao Nakagawa and Fumio Kyuma shared their views on alliance realignment negotiations, Sino-Japanese relations, Iran and beef. Policy Affairs Research Council Chairman Nakagawa, fresh from a trip to China, said Beijing had begun to moderate its criticism of Japan over wartime history, but cautioned against any effort to mediate the Yasukuni dispute. General Affairs Council Chairman Kyuma, former head of the Japan Defense Agency, focused on alliance realignment discussions, asserting that a Futenma replacement facility had to be located as close to shore as possible, or environmental protestors could blockade construction. On funding the Marines move to Guam, Kyuma emphasized that while Japan could probably fund housing, combined use structures, runways and harbors, paying for core operational facilities would be "very difficult." END SUMMARY. DPRI -------------- ¶2. (C) During a March 29 luncheon meeting with the DCM, LDP General Affairs Council Chairman Kyuma argued the case for a Futenma replacement facility located as close to shore as possible. The biggest obstacle to a resolution, he said, was not local politicians, but environmental protestors. The further offshore the new facility was located, he said, the easier it would be for protestors to block construction. Opposition to the new base would be a magnet for environmental activists from outside Okinawa, including overseas, he said. The Prime Minister had made clear, and Defense Minister Nukaga agreed, that the facility would have to be on the shoreline, or "it couldn't be done," Kyuma said. To defuse environmentalists' opposition, he said he had advised JDA to construct the landfill for the new base using aluminum piping to ensure sufficient sunlight for the sea grass that protesters claim would be killed off by the project. ¶3. (C) On moving Marines to Guam, Kyuma expected Japan would be able to fund (or at least finance) new housing on the island, as well as facilities for combined use with the Self-Defense Forces, and harbors and runways. It would be "very difficult," however, to win public understanding to fund core operational facilities for the Marines on Guam. The U.S. should focus on cutting the cost of those facilities, he suggested, perhaps by importing cheap labor from Indonesia or the Philippines. The DCM replied that without Japanese funding for operational facilities the Marines would not be able to leave Okinawa. ¶4. (C) Costs for the Guam move could be offset in part by cuts in Host Nation Support (HNS) as the Marines leave Okinawa, Kyuma said. The U.S. should insist to the Okinawans, he advised, that until Futenma replacement was resolved, there would be no move of Marines off the island. The Okinawans are masters of "getting but not giving," he grumbled. The DCM noted there should be no reduction in HNS until the Marines actually leave Japan and the funds are no longer needed. ¶5. (C) On Japan's overall defense budget, Kyuma said the only realistic way to get around the one percent of GDP spending cap would be to fund high price tag items, such as realignments on Okinawa, through separate, supplemental budgets. China -------------- ¶6. (C) Beijing seemed to be moderating its criticism of Japan, said Nakagawa, referring to his February 19-23 visit to China. Government-controlled Chinese media were now sending the message that relations with Tokyo could not be based solely on recent wartime history. This was a welcome change, he said. The Sino-Japanese relationship had over two thousand years of history; one brief period should not be looked at in isolation. Vietnam was a good model, suggested TOKYO 00001655 002 OF 002 Kyuma, in the way it had restored good relations with Washington and Japan as well, despite painful memories from the Vietnam War and World War II. ¶7. (C) Nakagawa voiced concern that PRC President Hu Jintao might raise the Yasukuni issue when he visits Washington in April. For Japan, this was a domestic issue, he said, and it would be unhelpful if the U.S. sought to mediate. The more China pounded on the Yasukuni issue, the more Japanese public opinion was souring against China. Some of those upset at Chinese criticism were also anti-American. It would be in U.S. and Japanese interests to keep "ultra-nationalists" under control. The Japanese media had falsely reported that President Bush had asked Prime Minister Koizumi not to visit Yasukuni Shrine, he said, urging that nothing be done to fuel this wrong impression. ¶8. (C) Nakagawa said he had been surprised by the candor of some of his Chinese interlocutors on the subject of democracy. At a think-tank in Beijing, researchers had talked openly about the need for democratization rising as the country's economy developed. Turning to Taiwan, he noted some concern that the opposition Kuomintang was "leaning a bit far towards the mainland." ¶9. (C) Kyuma said he had a keen interest in changes in the Chinese military, particularly in the demographics of their senior commanders and enlisted men. PLA officers and soldiers seemed to come mainly from the rural hinterland, he noted. Kyuma speculated that PRC soldiers may resent the income disparity they witness between coastal and rural provinces. Like Japan in the 1930s, this might one day become a source of political unrest within the military, he observed. Iran -------------- ¶10. (C) On Iran, Nakagawa said he was worried Japanese public opinion would not agree to the government's support of a tougher stance against Iran along with the U.S. On Iraq, Koizumi had been able to take a firm stance, despite stiff domestic criticism. If Iran were perceived as the "next" on the list, it would put the government in a difficult position. Countries dependent on Iranian oil, such as the Europeans, might have to endure "a couple of cold winters," he feared. The DCM emphasized that Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons was unacceptable, and the U.S. believed it was time to move this issue to the UN Security Council. Beef Imports Ban -------------- ¶11. (C) The participation of Japanese experts in stateside inspections of U.S. beef bound for Japan was the only solution to the current impasse, said Nakagawa. He had stressed that within the LDP and the Diet, he said, and would continue to do so. Ministry of Agriculture experts were worried about "being held responsible" for problems in the U.S. inspection system, he said. The incident that had caused a reimposition of the ban on imports had been unique, agreed Nakagawa. When Japan had first exported beef to U.S. markets, American experts had inspected Japanese plants. Japanese experts should now do the same, he said. The DCM stressed that U.S. beef is safe and that we need to come to closure on resuming imports, and quickly. SCHIEFFER