DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/10/06

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 001300 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 03/10/06 INDEX: (1) LDP presidential race 2006 (Part 2): Nationalism in Japan, China, South Korea a challenge to Koizumi's successor; Internet rife with criticism, aspersions (2) Mori faction's presidential candidate -- ABE or Fukuda? Generational change may occur; Faction pressed to steer difficult maneuvering (3) Interview with former Minshuto head Katsuya Okada: Not a good idea for party leader to easily take responsibility (4) Interview with Hiraku Tomizawa, former GSDF chief of staff, on significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Don't be satisfied only with results from dispatch (5) Interview with Yukio Okamoto, president of think tank, on significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Japan should continue contributions for people's livelihood even after withdrawal (6) Interview with Bunroku Yoshino, former Foreign Ministry American Bureau chief, on the secret Okinawa pact ARTICLES: (1) LDP presidential race 2006 (Part 2): Nationalism in Japan, China, South Korea a challenge to Koizumi's successor; Internet rife with criticism, aspersions ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged slightly) March 10, 2006 On March 8, 2-Channel, the popular Internet bulletin board (blog) was filled with messages critical of Japan's "weak-kneed" policy toward China. For instance, messages read: "Japan was completely defeated; soundly walloped"; "What is Japan doing? Japan needs to get going, otherwise China will drill everything out," and "Let's go to war! I'm serious!" Those messages followed media reports that in recent talks with Japan, China had proposed the joint development of gas fields including areas surrounding the Senkaku Islands, known as Diaoyu in China, over which both Japan and China have claimed sovereignty. Criticism is relentlessly directed at individuals, as well. Every time a senior Liberal Democratic Party lawmaker touches on Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine on television, he receives a large number of e-mails from the general public. Last June, the lawmaker visited China as a member of an LDP delegation. As of the end of February, his website received a total of 107 e-mails, mostly anonymous, including the following: "The prime minister should continue visiting Yasukuni Shrine. Taking a resolute stand toward China serves the interests of Japan." "Yasukuni is a Japanese domestic matter, and other countries must not interfere with it. Japan must not kowtow to China." The city of Sakaiminato, Tottori Prefecture, known as the TOKYO 00001300 002 OF 011 unloading port for North Korean crabs, has also received angry e- mails. A total of 50 messages were posted in several weeks last October on the bulletin board on the official website run by the Sakaiminato Tourist Association. One of them accused the city of providing funds to North Korea. Another message read, "North Korean ships often visit out port, and they might abduct Japanese citizens." The association closed its bulletin board in mid-October. Similar messages posted on the bulletin board run by the Sakaiminato Chamber of Commerce and Industry also led to its closure. Since concluding a friendship agreement in 1992, Sakaiminato sent delegations to North Korea's Wonsan, but that tradition ended with the September 2002 Japan-North Korea summit talks. A city official lamented: "For the sake of the local economy, we cannot suspend trade with North altogether. Then again, a resumption of exchanges with the North would give rise to public criticism." Prime Minister Koizumi has repeatedly said that paying tribute to the war dead and renewing one's resolve never to wage war again is a matter of the heart. He did not stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine despite strong protests from China and South Korea, declaring, "Yasukuni is no longer an effective diplomatic card." An LDP member who won a Lower House seat for the first time in last year's general election also noted: "Japan has been reticent and unassertive. Its' good for Japanese lawmakers to speak their minds." An anti-Korean manga comic book titled Kenkanryu 2 ("Hating the Korea boom-2") that went on sale Feb. 22 has become the bestseller on the Internet bookstore Amazon. The manga book condemns Tokyo's position toward Takeshima, known as Tokdo in South Korea, as weak-kneed. According to the publisher Shinyusha, Kenkanryu 1, which went on sale last July, and 2 sold 650,000 copies as of Feb. 28. Kenkanryu 2 was released Feb. 22, the first "Takeshima Day" set by Shimane Prefecture. At a rally held in Matsue, a certain prefectural assemblyman charged that Japan has been shelving the Takeshima issue. He said: "A guilt-ridden Japan has not revealed its mind throughout the postwar period. It is important to say what must be said and make efforts to deepen mutual understanding without fearing confrontation." His words brought to mind the Feb. 8 Lower House Budget Committee session. In response to Social Democratic Party lawmaker Kiyomi Tsujimoto's question on Yasukuni Shrine, Koizumi retorted: SIPDIS "Ms. Tsujimoto, are you saying that in order to visit the shrine, we need the consent of China and South Korea and that we cannot do so because China is against it?" Koizumi stuck to his guns. At the same time, it seems impossible to restrain the national sentiments of Japan and China. TOKYO 00001300 003 OF 011 According to an opinion poll released by the Cabinet Office in December, the answer "I do not feel friendly toward China" marked the highest level ever. Meanwhile, radical messages on anti-Japan websites are believed to have triggered massive anti-Japan demonstrations in China. Koizumi did not fan anti-Japan sentiment. During his visit to China in October 2001, Koizumi visited the Anti-Japan Aggression War Memorial Hall on the side of Lu Gou Bridge. He later said, "I felt sincere regret and deep sympathy to the people of China." Although Koizumi avoided offering a prayer at Yasukuni's inner shrine last October, his "consideration" has not borne fruit. In the Jan. 24 Lower House plenary session, Koizumi declared, "I will advance exchanges at all levels so that Japan-China relations will not be affected by narrow-minded nationalism." But reciprocal visits by top leaders of Japan and China are unlikely until after Prime Minister Koizumi steps down in September. Nationalism must be controlled By Kengo Sakajiri Speaking to the press Mar. 8, LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa underscored the significance of a Japan- China Ruling Party Exchange Council meeting held in late February, saying, "An agreement was reached for Japan and China to work hard to prevent parochial nationalism. It's a great achievement." Nakagawa specifically meant the control of nationalism. Exchanging self-centered views will not help open the door for Asia policy. Politics is responsible to control extreme nationalism. On Mar. 4, I listened to a speech delivered in Mito by former Prime Minister Yasuhiko Nakasone, who said: "Nationalism is emerging in all parts of the world. China is using anti-Japan nationalism to strengthen its solitarily. In Japan, Yasukuni-centered nationalism is gaining ground." Growing nationalism worries even Nakasone, a leading constitutional revisionist who once officially visited Yasukuni Shrine himself. Nakasone also said, "World leaders today must have the wisdom to discuss matters in a way to keep nationalism under control." Growing nationalist will soon test the wisdom of the successor to Koizumi. (2) Mori faction's presidential candidate -- ABE or Fukuda? Generational change may occur; Faction pressed to steer difficult maneuvering SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) March 10, 2006 TOKYO 00001300 004 OF 011 All eyes are now focusing on moves in the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) Mori faction, which has two possible candidates -- current and former chief cabinet secretaries SHINZO ABE and Yasuo Fukuda -- for the LDP presidential election in September, which will choose a successor to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. The prevailing view in the LDP is that the moves of Abe, who is most popular with the public, and of veteran lawmaker Fukuda will determine the trend of the party leadership race. The Mori faction is now being pressed to steer a difficult course in choosing a candidate. Former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori joined meetings of young lawmakers belonging to his faction each and every day in February. On the night of the 15th at a Chinese restaurant in Tokyo, he participated in a meeting of members of the two Diet chambers, who are now serving in their first term in the Diet. He told the junior lawmakers, "Our faction alone can do nothing about the presidential race." Junior and mid-level lawmakers in the LDP have called on ABE to become the next LDP president and prime minister. Veteran legislators, however, prefer the 69-year-old Fukuda to the 51- year-old Abe. There are mixed motives among generations. Given the situation, Mori is desperately trying to put a cap on the leadership race. Mori seemed to think Fukuda is most suitable to serve in the party's presidential post. Mori seems to assume there would be less internal friction if Fukuda served in the post before Abe. He has told faction members favoring ABE that it would be better for the faction to field ABE in a later leadership race. He predicts that bitter fight will take place in next year's Upper House election, even if the LDP wins the election, it won't be able to secure a single-handed majority of the Upper House. Therefore, a competent candidate is not necessary. He has kept in line with Mikio Aoki, the chairman of the LDP Upper House caucus, who places top priority on organizational reform. However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has implied he hopes it will be Abe. Among the Lower House members of the Mori faction, 13 members, including Fukuda, were elected more then six times to the Diet, while 47, including Abe, were elected five times or less. If Mori's group can take the lead in choosing a candidate for the presidential race, it will be able to keep influence over the party. Should a rift appears in the faction, its influence may weaken. Mori once considered having Fukuda head the faction. If the faction picks ABE as a presidential candidate, it will then choose Fukuda as its head, saving his face. If ABE does not run in the race, the faction will field Fukuda in the race. However since Fukuda turned town such an offer, Mori's scenario hit a roadblock. Since then Mori has refrained from making comments favoring either one of the two. The Mori faction, however, is beginning to lose all restraint. In a general meeting of the faction on March 9, Mori openly criticized LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa, who proposed an idea of selling housing for government workers as a pillar of the squeezing of government-owned assets. Nakagawa then rebutted: "We should implement administrative reforms before debating a consumption tax hike." A gulf was seen between Nakagawa, who tends to support Abe, and Mori. TOKYO 00001300 005 OF 011 On the night of Feb. 13, Fukuda showed up at a small Japanese restaurant in Shinbashi, Tokyo, where nearly 11 Mori faction lawmakers, who were elected for the first time to the Diet the same year as Fukuda. One of the participants said to Fukuda, "You are now a famous face from the political world." Fukuda, however, made no response without expression. But he has recently held meetings with other faction members. Another participant said: "Mr. Fukuda is full of drive. I appear to be considering the possibility that he will run in the presidential race." Former LDP Vice President Taku Yamasaki sent out positive signals to Fukuda, noting, "I feel sympathy for Mr. Fukuda's views." A group composed of lawmakers who were elected for the first time to the Diet when they were 50 years old or over plans to pick Fukuda as its head and start activities as early as this month. Those supporting Fukuda have distanced themselves from the Koizumi government. LDP forces critical of Koizumi's foreign policy prefer Fukuda, who puts much faith in Asia diplomacy rather than Abe, who is a hawk. Fukuda has, however, no intention of starting to slander Koizumi. Meanwhile, although ABE has devoted himself to the job of government's spokesman, he has recently strengthened his own views on such issues as a revision of the Imperial House Law and Japan's perceptions of its historical past. His supporters are now growing in the Tsushima and Niwa-Koga factions. "If Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Mori discuss the issue, its direction will be decided," said Aoki in late January. He then added, "Both (the prime minister and Mori) have made remarks even though they know each other's feelings." Koizumi put on a grin at Aoki's remark as if to say the two have shared the same view. There is no guarantee whether Fukuda will be elected as president of the LDP as Mori planned since the Mori faction is losing its significance. (3) Interview with former Minshuto head Katsuya Okada: Not a good idea for party leader to easily take responsibility YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full) March 9, 2006 Questioner: Why do you think the e-mail fiasco happened? Okada: I think there were such reasons as the personal problems of lawmaker Hisayasu Nagata himself and (bullish) remarks by executive members. Those reasons created as serious situation for Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan). Questioner: Do you think it was problem that a decision was made by a few executives and President Seiji Maehara's bullish remarks made the situation worse? Okada: Making a decision by limited persons is inevitable. The more the number is increased, the greater chance information will be leaked. However, it is important to deal organizationally with matters. That point was lacking this time. Mr. Maehara's judgment that time was not good at all. However, we cannot blame him in a unilateral way. There are things that only a party in charge knows. I think since the executive had various pieces of information, they might have mixed up desire and reality. TOKYO 00001300 006 OF 011 Questioner: Some party members are still calling on Mr. Maehara to take responsibility. Okada: I think the executives should refrain from commenting on the next presidential race because we are trying to do our best in unison. It is the bad nature of this party to always make the party head take responsibility whenever a bad thing happens. What is important is to offer an apology and take next action. Unless we create circumstance under which the leader can fulfill initiatives, the party will go down. Questioner: The dominant view in the party is that Mr. Nagata should give up his Diet seat. Okada: Although he took hasty action, he did so during Diet deliberations. We should be cautious about snatching the title from a Diet member. It is true that he played a role that other persons did not want. I think he remains someone the party should treat as precious. Questioner: Because of the e-mail uproar, Minshuto has lost public confidence. Okada: It is true that our party suffered serious damage. We have no choice but to fulfill our responsibility inside and outside the Diet in order to regain public trust. Our responsibility is to carry out heated debate in the Diet. I want Mr. Maehara to have a debate with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in the Diet as early as possible. The party should field a candidate for a Lower House by-election for the Chiba No. 7 constituency and fight the election in unison. We should carry out a thorough investigation into the e-mail issue in order to come to a conclusion as quickly as possible. (4) Interview with Hiraku Tomizawa, former GSDF chief of staff, on significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Don't be satisfied only with results from dispatch ASAHI (Page 15) (Excerpts) March 10, 2006 There has not been a single casualty among the Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops dispatched to Iraq. In humanitarian and reconstruction assistance being offered based on the Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support Special Measures Law, Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) members stationed in Samawah have steadily performed their assigned tasks, including supplying water, repairing public facilities, and giving medical guidance. The GSDF units there have also employed about 1,000 local residents a day. In security assistance, the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has engaged in transport operations, winning high marks from other participating countries. SDF troops are not allowed to engage in security-maintaining operations overseas that would entail the use of armed force. In addition, Japan's standards on weapon use are stricter than any other countries'. Under such legal restrictions, the SDF have carried out splendid services in a combat area in corporation with the Foreign Ministry. Their activities should be highly evaluated. Such services should not be seen only from the context of support TOKYO 00001300 007 OF 011 for the US. Japan's personnel assistance in addition to financial aid, will contribute to boosting its international position and also its influence, as well as to ensuring the security of trade- oriented Japan. Nonetheless, I do not want the government to make the case of the SDF Iraq dispatch as a precedent for its international contributions. Besides Iraq, there are many more countries filled with destabilizing elements across the world. It is fully conceivable that Japan would have to participate in rehabilitation assistance in even more dangerous countries in the future. On such occasions, if the government entrusts everything only to the SDF without altering relevant laws or its interpretation of the laws, Japan will find it impossible to offer satisfactory personnel contributions. When I was GSDF chief of staff, GSDF troops were dispatched to the Congo (formerly Zaire) on the mission of rescuing Rwandan refugees. I was surprised at that plan because I had never thought of sending our units to the interior of Africa. Now the world is becoming smaller and smaller. If reconstruction assistance is need, making a delay response will no longer be inexcusable. Fortunately, Japan has had the valuable experience of working as a member of the multinational force in Iraq. The members of the multinational force determine responsible missions for each nation and construct everything on their own while acquiring other countries' assistance. This process is quite different from that of United Nations' peacekeeping operations (PKO). I think opportunities for such type of activities will increase in the future, so I hope (the SDF) will try to find better ways of contributions while making use of the assets it has gained in Iraq. On the question of whether to withdraw SDF troops from Iraq, it would be desirable to keep them in the nation a little longer, given that the security situation in Iraq remains bleak. But if the British and Australian troops, which are responsible for maintaining local security, withdraw, it will become impossible for only the SDF to stay behind. I hear that the government is considering the possibility of leaving senior liaison officers of GSDF in Iraq and continuing ASDF activities. I expect this plan will be translate into action without fail. If all troops joining in the multilateral force are pulled out, Japan's influence and amount of information will unavoidably decrease sharply. In order to use best the results it attained so far, it is important for Japan to continue to offer possible personnel contributions also in the future. For the time being, there will be no other means for Japan but to watch the security situation in Iraq carefully while continuing assistance based mainly on the official development assistance (ODA) program. Once the security situation there improves, Japan will be able to offer civilian aid. If the situation becomes worse, Japan should look into a dispatch of SDF troops again. To do so, it would be undesirable to give the impression that SDF troops flied back. I want to see the government leave the judgment on the best timing for SDF withdrawal to the commander in Iraq and map out every possible security measure, for instance, continued hiring TOKYO 00001300 008 OF 011 of local residents and promising to come back in times of emergency. These commitments are extremely important for Japan to continue to be involved in Iraq on its own initiative. (5) Interview with Yukio Okamoto, president of think tank, on significance of SDF Iraq deployment: Japan should continue contributions for people's livelihood even after withdrawal ASAHI (Page 15) (Full) March 10, 2006 The major significance of the dispatch of Self-Defense Force (SDF) troops to Iraq is that Japan has shared a due level of risk in order to ensure the security of the world. In other words, should Iraq become a destroyed nation, the nation would become a base for terrorists to launch attacks. In such a case, an unfathomable threat will be inevitably posed to the world. As part of antiterrorism efforts, it is important to stabilize Iraq as soon as possible. On the occasion of the Gulf war, Japan offered as much as 13 billion dollars, but the international community evaluation of Japan was that "Japan avoided risk by providing only money." Learning from this bitter lesson, the government came to the conclusion that Japan must bear a due level of risk by the sweat of its brow. Many persons opposed the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq, but the main reason for their opposition was that Iraq was dangerous. SDF personnel have received training to protect themselves. If a decision had been made not to allow SDF personnel to go to Iraq for the reason of their risk, diplomatic groups and NGOs naturally should have been sent back to Japan. In such a case, any Japanese would not have been allowed to go to Iraq. I think Prime Minister Koizumi made a bold decision. The Iraqi people also had strong expectations for Japan's assistance. By carrying out humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Al Muthanna Province, such as repairing schools and medical institutions, supplying water, and offering power generation equipment, I think that Japan achieved invaluable results in relations with local residents. Of course, relations with the US have also constituted a major element. Despite strong criticism of the US in the international community, Britain, Australia and Japan persistently showed a willingness to support the US. Their relations with the US are the closest ever. Now that Japan might fall in a state of drift in the international community, Japan has been held fast by Japan- US relations. The relations have served as the anchor. In this sense, too, the decision was proper. If SDF troops complete their mission without any trouble, it may be no exaggeration to define their achievements as the greatest results in Japan's diplomacy in the postwar era. There are endless needs on the Iraqi side for reconstruction assistance, so it might be ideal, in a sense, for SDF troops to continue to stay until Iraq becomes a completely stabilized state. Even so, it is necessary to give consideration to ethnic TOKYO 00001300 009 OF 011 sentiments in neighboring countries. Some persons in such countries have reacted to the stationing of foreign troops in their brother country Iraq. When considering this, it might be undesirable only for Japan to take outstanding action. It may be reasonable for Ground Self-Defense Force troops to pull out of Iraq with England and Australia. The US rushed too quickly to form a political framework. Before doing that, the US should have made utmost efforts to stabilize the people's livelihood. Japan is expected to make up for what is lacking in US policy toward Iraq. It is essential for Japan to continue to send the message that "Japan will continuously be supportive of Iraq" even after SDF troops withdraw from that nation. Unfortunately, it is impossible to send Japanese citizens to Iraq under its current security situation. However, there must be ways to assist Iraq in cooperation with its neighbors and by offering our knowledge and funds. For instance, Japan has implemented a project under which Japan sends some hundreds of Iraqi doctors and nurses to Cairo University in Egypt with Japan's funds to receive retraining with modern medical technology and equipment. This project has been greatly appreciated among local people. Based on such experiences, Japan should offer contributions to stabilize the people's livelihood. (6) Interview with Bunroku Yoshino, former Foreign Ministry American Bureau chief, on the secret Okinawa pact ASAHI (Page 37) (Abridged slightly) March 8, 2006 The following is a gist of an Oral History interview with former Foreign Ministry American Bureau chief Bunroku Yoshino, 87, by the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies: Interviewer: You were chief of the American Bureau in 1971. What were your duties? Yoshino: I was chiefly responsible to finalize a couple of items for the planned Okinawa pact to get them approved by the Diet. One of the most memorable events is that Japan was supposed to have Okinawa back without paying compensation, and we all believed in such a deal. (Prime Minister Eisaku) Sato also publicly spoke about it. The biggest obstacle was the Voice of America. America was sending out messages to all parts of the world via the VOA Okinawa station. The problem was enormous costs required for relocating facilities and the like, and the US Treasury Department said, "We are not going to foot the bill anymore. Let Japan pay for it." But word had been spread that the US would return Okinawa to Japan for free, so Japan was not prepared to make payment. I believe the Finance Ministry held talks one day with the US Embassy, in which the US said, "OK, we need this much money." Japan was now in trouble. How could Japan conclude an agreement that included such terms? Needless to say, the government couldn't disburse funds without Diet approval. Interviewer: So the (US) Treasury Department did discuss money TOKYO 00001300 010 OF 011 with the Finance Ministry. Anything else? Yoshino: The US Embassy in Tokyo at first didn't discuss money with us, but because talks with Finance Ministry officials cropped up, they showed us the price tag. And we tried very hard to keep it a secret. But what was discussed between Japan and the US -- something like cables to the Japanese Embassy in Washington -- was leaked to outsiders. I believe it was around March 1972, lawmaker (Takahiro) Yokomichi grilled me: "The Japanese government did all those things behind the scenes. You also said, 'There was no secret deal. The US would return Okinawa to Japan unconditionally.' How do you explain that?" In November or December 1971, the Treaties Bureau chief and I had answered questions in turns, saying, "Japan will not have to pay for Okinawa, and there is no secret deal." I also said, "Such a cable does not exist, and we didn't discuss such things." And Mr. Yokomichi read a cable before me and said, "Did you hear what I just read?" So I said, "I can't tell if the cable Mr. Yokomichi has is authentic or not. Let us compare it with the cable we wrote." Then I hurried back to the Foreign Ministry and checked out the cable sent out by the ministry. The cable carried the signatures of the drafter and division director, and I though that the cable Mr. Yokomichi just read had probably leaked from the Foreign Ministry. But I still denied it. Several hours later, I received a call from the personnel division director, who said, "Deputy Director General (Takeshi) Yasukawa said he was going to quit to take responsibility because it become clear that his secretary had leaked the cable." Around that time, there was a political reporter named (Takichi) Nishiyama at the Mainichi Shimbun. I thought he was a rather good reporter. But he was having an affair with (Yasukawa's secretary) and he got the cable from her. I immediately called on Mr. (Susumu) Nikaido and (Noboru) Takeshita of the Liberal Democratic Party and told them, "We are in trouble." But they said to me nonchalantly: "Mr. Yoshino, you are too naive. Foreign Ministry cables have been leaking from long before." I said "No way!" to myself. But the fact was that cables had been leaking by the same method. Speaking of those days, after asking for the return of Okinawa, Mr. Sato explained: "Japan will have Okinawa back without paying compensation. There is no better deal than this." In my view, such an explanation was bad. The US said that it would return Okinawa and seek nothing in return, but that country was strapped for money back then. Japan tried to settle the matter artificially and that was the problem. When it comes to returning bases, Japan and the US use every TOKYO 00001300 011 OF 011 bargaining chip available, and I think there was every reason for America to use such a bargaining chip in those days. At a time like this when antidumping duties usually follow growing imports from Japan, it's hard to imagine that the US would return Okinawa unconditionally. The US returned Okinawa to Japan, but there are still many US bases on the island. The matter is closely associated with the security of Japan. Things are not that simple. Interviewer: What about the Nishiyama incident? Yoshino: Newspapers had all been critical of the Foreign Ministry until the incident came to light. Their tone has now completely changed, and that helped me. The Criminal Affairs Bureau asked me to testify. I replied: "I cannot disclose anything because talks are still underway. I must think of the credibility of Japan, and if I disclose anything, Japan will not be able to continue talks with the US. Therefore, everything is secret, and therefore, I will deny things even at the Diet, telling lies." Interviewer: And that's what you did at the Diet. Yoshino: I denied things too strongly. I should have said, "I cannot discuss anything that is connected with the bilateral talks." Instead, I flatly denied everything, and that has raised some questions. SCHIEFFER