SENIOR LDP PARTY OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 001151 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2031 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD CH JA SUBJECT: SENIOR LDP PARTY OFFICIAL PESSIMISTIC OVER JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER BEIJING VISIT REF: TOKYO 01010 TOKYO 00001151 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons:1.4(b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior LDP Party official Hidenao Nakagawa said he remained pessimistic over Japan-China relations despite press reporting there had been a positive atmosphere surrounding his recent visit to Beijing. Although the Chinese received him warmly and appeared willing to deal constructively with other bilateral issues, the Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine are still an inordinately important issue to the PRC, he lamented. Nakagawa's call on PRC Foreign Minister Li was cancelled, presumably to signal China's continued dissatisfaction over Yasukuni. Nakagawa urged the Chinese to adopt a more forward-looking policy toward Japan, recognizing Japanese efforts to promote peace and prosperity during the past 60 years. In a separate meeting, LDP Diet Member Ito, who accompanied Nakagawa, expressed similar views, noting that China's emphasis on Yasukuni had encouraged the growth of Japanese nationalism. Like many in Japan, these two LDP stalwarts believe China should put the Yasukuni issue aside and work on improving relations with Japan. End Summary. Ruling Coalition Delegation Visit -------------- ¶2. (C) In discussing his February 19-23 China visit accompanied by six LDP and Komeito Diet Members, LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Hidenao Nakagawa told the Political Minister Counselor on February 27 that he remained fairly pessimistic over a near-term breakthrough in Japan-China relations. Nakagawa, otherwise in a good mood, seemed rather glum and resigned when discussing his Beijing trip. Although his delegation was warmly received in Beijing by State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan, and CCPCC International Liaison Division Director Wang Jiarui, among others, Nakagawa thought the growing anti-China sentiment in Japan and the recent lack of high-level meetings between the two countries made it difficult to put relations between the two competing Asian powers back on track. China pointedly cancelled a Nakagawa delegation meeting with the PRC Foreign Minister. Proud of having taken the political risk of visiting China at such a difficult juncture, Nakagawa cited the importance of exchanges between Japanese and Chinese political leaders. Despite his lack of optimism, Nakagawa felt that both countries recognized the need for Japan-China cooperation, not only for peace and stability in the region, but for the entire international community. ¶3. (C) Noting that his meetings in Beijing coincided with a China visit by METI Minister Nikai (reftel),Nakagawa said that Japan's approach to the relationship was to put aside the history issue, while dealing constructively with such substantive bilateral issues as joint development of hydrocarbon resources in the East China Sea. China seemed receptive to that approach, recognizing that China stood to gain from improving the bilateral relationship. No PRC Flexibility on Yasukuni Shrine -------------- ¶4. (C) There was no flexibility in China's stance opposing the Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, an issue that remained foremost in the minds of his interlocutors, Nakagawa observed. Many of those he met with claimed that Japan would be isolated internationally unless the issue was resolved. Nakagawa rejected that argument, saying it seemed to be more wishful thinking on China's part than reality. The Yasukuni problem has become a highly emotional issue for the Japanese people, he observed. The more insistent China becomes, the greater the negative Japanese response. Citing a recent poll, Nakagawa noted that anti-China feeling in Japan had risen to 80 percent in the past year. Although he strongly disagrees with the shrine's history museum's (Yushukan) portrayal of Japan as a victim of the war, Nakagawa stressed that Yasukuni and its museum were not under the government's control. He thought it would take a considerable time before the issue of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni is resolved. TOKYO 00001151 002.2 OF 002 Academic Review of Japan-China History -------------- ¶5. (C) Nakagawa was pessimistic about the possibility of conducting a review of the history of Japan-China relations by academic experts. He thought it would be difficult to find appropriate scholars willing to engage in the study and questioned whether China would make available the relevant documents under its control or that key documents in Taiwan from the KMT era in China could be accessed. Nonetheless, Nakagawa believes that the endeavor is worthwhile, and that it deserves the full cooperation of both governments, provided the study is conducted in a "non-political" manner. Asked about the possibility of third-country involvement, Nakagawa opined that it would be preferable to handle the matter bilaterally. Urging China to Reform its Japan Policy -------------- ¶6. (C) Nakagawa urged China to move beyond the history issue and adopt a more forward-looking policy toward Japan that recognized Tokyo's post-war efforts to promote peace and prosperity. In frank exchanges with his interlocutors, he stressed that China could learn much from Japan's devotion to the principles of peace and democracy over the past 60 years. He related a question posed to him at a think tank concerning whether Japan was colluding with the United States to contain China. Nakagawa countered that by opposing Japan's efforts to obtain a seat in the UN Security Council, China was forcing Japan to move even closer to the United States. Unless Japan was allowed to play an independent role in the international community, it would have no choice but to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance to ensure its protection, he argued. Nakagawa underscored his view that China's attitude toward Japan would significantly affect the chances for improving Japan-China relations under PM Koizumi's successor. ¶7. (C) In a separate meeting, fifth-term LDP Diet Member Tatsuya Ito, who accompanied Nakagawa to China, told Embassy Tokyo political officer that the Chinese Communist Party officials with whom they met seemed to want to establish a channel of communication with PM Koizumi and the LDP through Nakagawa. Ito, who has visited Beijing many times, said it was his strong impression that the Chinese would gauge the Japanese public reaction to the positive atmosphere of the talks with METI Minister Nikai and Nakagawa before deciding on next steps. ¶8. (C) The Japanese delegation stressed the need for China to re-think its policy toward Japan, Ito said. He related that Nakagawa emphasized that during the past 60 years Japan had done much to promote Asia's peace and prosperity. Moreover, by continuing to focus on the Prime Minister's visits to Yasukuni, China would not improve bilateral relations, but would contribute to the growth in Japanese nationalism. Although concerned that Yasukuni remained such an important issue for the PRC, Ito saw some glimmer of hope in China's newfound willingness to take up non-political issues -- as expressed to both Nakagawa and Minister Nikai. However, like Nakagawa, Ito thought it would take some time before the PRC would significantly change its Japan-relations policy. Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Like many in Japan, Nakagawa and Ito assign much of the fault for the recent downturn in bilateral relations to China's manipulation of the history issue. They agree with PM Koizumi that Yasukuni is but one issue in a complex relationship and that it should not be allowed to stymie progress on more substantive bilateral matters. SCHIEFFER