JAPAN'S CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001136

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP IAEA JA IR ECON ENER PGOV
SUBJECT: JAPAN'S CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
DOMINATE IRAN FM MOTTAKI'S MEETINGS IN TOKYO

REF: TOKYO 1064

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki met with FM
Aso for two hours on February 27 and thirty minutes with PM
Koizumi on the 28th. The discussions focused primarily on
the nuclear impasse but also covered a range of other
bilateral issues. During the meetings, FM Aso and PM Koizumi
made it clear to Mottaki that Iran should comply with all
IAEA regulations and resolutions and must stop its enrichment
activities. Mottaki stuck to Tehran's hardline and argued
that Iran was responding to the current situation on the
basis of "peace" and "justice" and cannot renounce its
sovereign right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Mottaki said that there would be no "nuclear apartheid."
Regarding the Russian proposal, Mottaki said that several
outstanding "minor" issues remain including where it should
take place, the time period, and participation in the scheme.
He also claimed Iran would not agree to prohibit all
enrichment activities. Tokyo is under the impression that
Iran does not want the nuclear issue to be further discussed
at the UNSC even though Tehran has publicly said Iran does
not care. Officials at MOFA feel it might be useful to
re-look at the conversion issue in the future if Tehran were
to accept the Russian proposal. During the two days of
meetings, Mottaki only referred to the issue of the Azadegan
oil fields and Koizumi avoided the topic altogether.
Mottaki's meeting with METI Minister Nikai was very brief and
the lengthy discussion of the nuclear issue left no time for
other economic topics. End Summary.


2. (C) On March 1, EST M/C, POL Deputy and ESToff met with
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Disarmament, Non-Proliferation,
and Science Bureau Director-General Takeshi Nakane at his
request to receive a readout on Prime Minister Koizumi and
Foreign Minister Aso's meetings with visiting Iranian Foreign
Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. Nakane reported that FM Aso met
with Mottaki for two hours on February 27 and thirty minutes
with PM Koizumi on the 28th. The discussions focused
primarily on the nuclear impasse but also covered a range of
other bilateral issues. During the meetings, FM Aso and PM
Koizumi made it clear to Mottaki that Iran should comply with
all IAEA regulations and resolutions and must stop its
enrichment activities. Japan hopes that negotiations based
on the Russian proposal will offer a breakthrough to the
impasse.


3. (C) On February 27, Aso explained to Mottaki that the
Japanese public is very sensitive to nuclear issues,
understandingly, since it is the only country that has
experienced a nuclear attack. Therefore, Japan is committed
to strengthening the non-proliferation regime to ensure the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. No one denies Iran the
right to peaceful use of nuclear energy, but in order to
exercise this right, Iran has to restore the international
community's confidence. Aso told Mottaki that Iran should
take seriously the resolution adopted on February 4 by 27
countries. As long as Iran insists on conducting enrichment
activities within its territory, it will be difficult to come
to a resolution. Japan hopes that negotiations based on the
Russian proposal will offer a breakthrough to the impasse.
Aso also stressed that Japan expected Iran to make a wise
decision regarding enrichment activities and to come back
into compliance with IAEA resolutions.


4. (C) Mottaki said that Iran's enrichment activities are
only for R&D purposes and on a laboratory scale. Aso
responded that Iran needs to understand that Japan does not
see an essential difference between laboratory scale and
full-scale commercial activities. Mottaki said that Iran has
been a member of the NPT for thirty years and that Tehran has
been applying voluntary measures for quite some time. The
new government in Iran is responding to the current situation
on the basis of "peace" and "justice" and cannot renounce its
sovereign right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Mottaki said that there would be no "nuclear apartheid."


5. (C) Regarding the Russian proposal, Mottaki said that
several outstanding "minor" issues remain including where it
should take place, the time period, and participation in the
scheme. Iran will not stop its enrichment activities as this
is something that the central authorities have already
decided and is a policy the Iranian people support. Mottaki
told Aso that it was not good to use the Security Council as
a tool to create threats against Iran.

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6. (C) Nakane told EST M/C that both FM Aso and he were under
the impression that Iran does not want the nuclear issue to
be further discussed at the UNSC even though Tehran has
publicly said Iran does not care. Nakane said that Iran is
still negotiating with the Russians, but that he was not too
optimistic on the outcome. Nakane did not see any signs of a
policy shift in Iranian thinking. In the discussions,
Mottaki gave the impression that Iran would be able to agree
with the Russian proposal on the joint-venture project.
However, in response to a question from FM Aso, Mottaki
clarified that this does not mean that Iran would suspend its
enrichment R&D efforts. In Iran's view, the Russian joint
venture would be additional, rather than a replacement for
Iranian enrichment.


7. (C) Nakane told EST M/C that most of what Mottaki said at
the meetings was already known to Tokyo, but that there was
one new point. Iran had previously said that enrichment
activities in Russia could be carried out for two years. Aso
said that this was too short of a period of time, and that it
should continue for five to six years. Mottaki responded
that this was unacceptable and that the two-year period would
not work because Tehran would have to consider a new formula
that would carry Iran through until the next reactor was
built. (Note: Under the proposed agreement with Russia,
Iranian scientists would be trained in Russia on enrichment
techniques and Iranian fuel would be enriched in Russian
facilities for a set period of time; the work would then
transfer to facilities in Iran. In this case, Aso is arguing
in favor of the activities staying in Russia for a
significantly longer period of time than the Iranians. End
Note.)


8. (C) During the subsequent thirty minute meeting with
Koizumi, Mottaki played up the importance of the
Japanese-Iranian relationship and tried to connect with the
Japanese PM by talking about his time as Iranian Ambassador
to Japan from 1995 to 1999. Koizumi responded that the
relationship between the two countries was important not only
in the area of oil, but also in regard to Iran's potential to
play a constructive role in the Middle East peace process.
Koizumi then went into a lengthy discussion of how Japan was
in the past defeated in a war in which Japan fought against
the rest of the world. He said that Japan now regrets the
decisions that led up to that war and that Tokyo would never
again be isolated from the international community. Koizumi
said that the international community is closely watching the
Iranian nuclear situation and counseled Tehran to make a wise
decision. Mottaki told Koizumi that he would convey this
message to his superiors in Iran.


9. (C) In response to a question, Nakane told EST M/C that
Mottaki only referred to the issue of the Azadegan oil fields
and that Koizumi avoided the topic altogether. He confirmed
that Mottaki did not offer any deals to Tokyo regarding the
fields.


10. (C) Nakane referenced a message from Victor Cha of the
NSC received by the Japanese Embassy in Washington, in which
Cha had said Japan should make it clear to Iran that Tehran
must stop its enrichment and conversion activities in
Esfahan. Nakane explained that the EU3 and President Bush
had both said they support the Russian proposal, which allows
activities up to conversion but not enrichment. Nakane
perceived some inconsistency between Cha's message and the
President's. He said that he was not sure if an Iranian
agreement would be reached on the Russian proposal, but
explained that the GOJ feels that if it is reached, then it
would be wise to reopen the issue of conversion activities.
Nakane underscored that he understood that the United States
could not accept such a position now, but explained that he
personally felt it might be useful to re-look at the
conversion issue in the future. (Note: We do not know the
content of the message passed from the NSC to the Japanese
embassy in Washington. There may have been some
misunderstanding of what Cha was saying, or some mix-up in
communication between Japan's embassy in Washington and
Tokyo. This is a point worth clarifying. For our part, we
confirmed that the President has gone on record as supporting
the Russian proposal. End Note.)


11. (C) Nakane concluded the meeting by saying that he had
recently talked to his counterpart Anatoly Antonov in Russia,
who had told him very clearly that Moscow would not allow
enrichment activities within the territory of Iran. Antonov

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said that Russia would neither agree to negotiate
indefinitely nor go forward in the negotiations with the goal
of defending Iran.


12. (C) According to MOFA's Second Middle East Division's
Koichi Nakao, who interpreted at the Koizumi and Aso
meetings, press reports that the Aso meeting was a tense
"exchange of barbs" were inaccurate. Nakao described Aso as
delivering a strong message that Iran's behavior risked
isolating it from the international community, and said
Mottaki replied by promising to pass the message back to
Tehran, but added that while the tone was serious, at no time
did it stray from an atmosphere of cordiality. Even as Aso
continued to press for Iran to give up its enrichment program
and Mottaki continued to claim the right to enrich on Iranian
soil was a red line Tehran would not give up, Nakao said the
dialogue remained "a discussion between friends."


13. (C) Nobuyori Kodaira, Director-General of METI's Agency
for Natural Resources and Energy, told EMIN that the meeting
between METI Minister Nikai and Mottaki was very brief and
that the lengthy discussion of the nuclear issue left no time
for economic topics. During the discussion Nikai reminded
Mottaki of Japan's unique position as the only country ever
to have experienced a nuclear bombing and went on to ask that
Iran work with the international community to seek a solution
to the Iran's nuclear development plans. Mottaki mentioned
Japan's investment in the Azadegan field but time did not
allow for a discussion of the issue. (Note: according to a
British Embassy contact, MOFA instructed Nikai to discuss
only the nuclear issue during the Minister's meeting with
Mottaki. End Note.)
SCHIEFFER