JDA BUDGET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 001104 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 TAGS: MARR MCAP PREL JA SUBJECT: JDA BUDGET: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES REF: 05 TOKYO 06772 Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND ( D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Japan's FY 2006 budget, scheduled for Diet approval on March 2, includes a fourth straight year of budget cuts for the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). If this trend continues, Japan will find itself with a less capable force that cannot maintain a defense posture commensurate with its emerging, more active defense, policies and its role as an alliance partner of the United States. Planning the budget for Japanese Fiscal Year (JFY) 2007 -- a draft of which the JDA will provide to the Ministry of Finance in August -- will force the JDA to make tough choices in order to get more bang for the buck. As with the JFY06 budget, we expect the JDA to continue reducing planned procurements vis-a-vis the Mid-Term Defense Program schedule of procurements. Rather than simply cutting planned procurement, which drives up unit costs, the JDA should focus on prioritization of needs and economical program spending, including the cessation of production/procurement of ineffective indigenous weapons systems -- and especially those that do not meet alliance interoperability requirements - as well as winnowing out cases of "pork barrel" procurements that reportedly make up a significant part of the procurement budget. As JDA prepares the JFY07 budget, Embassy Tokyo will continue to encourage JDA to focus on procuring systems that strengthen Japan's defense, advance U.S. alliance interests, and allocate the available budget more efficiently. End Summary. -------------- Budget Cuts: JDA's Choices -------------- ¶2. (SBU) It is expected that the Japan Fiscal Year 2006 (JFY06) budget will pass the Lower house on Thursday, March 2, and will be enacted on March 31st, the final day of JFY05. The JFY06 budget includes a fourth straight year of budget cuts for the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) (Reftel). Facing a steady erosion of its budget by fiscal austerity programs, the JDA faces tough choices as it begins preparation of its JFY07 budget -- a draft of which will be submitted to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in August -- in order to get more bang for the buck. ¶3. (C) LDP draft constitutional revisions, Japanese participation in Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Japan Self Defense Force participation in Peacekeeping Operations are all clear indicators that Japan emergency defense policy is more active and action-oriented. The decreasing defense budget, however, limits Japan's ability to keep up with current challenges of the international security environment. If budget cut-backs continue, Japan could find itself with a less capable force that cannot maintain a defense posture commensurate with its emerging policies or its role as an alliance partner. -------------- Personnel: How Low Can You Go? -------------- ¶4. (C) While personnel and provisions account for a large portion of the budget, JDA should carefully consider whether cutting personnel and salaries is the best way to reduce costs. The National Defense Program Guidelines have already prescribed that more multi-functional, streamlined self-defense forces be developed, that would attain greater results with the limited resources available, and the Council on Economic Development has recommended a reduction in government personnel -- both civilian and uniformed -- by five percent over the next five years. JDA has already cut open positions (due to poor recruitment) from its books, so future cuts would affect occupied positions. Officer's salaries also have been cut by approximately 4 percent; anecdotal evidence points to bonuses having been cut as well. Further personnel and salary cuts could further affect JDA recruitment and the ability to complete the missions at hand. ¶5. (C) JDA will need to weigh carefully how far it wants to continue cutting the Ground Self-Defense Forces to support TOKYO 00001104 002 OF 003 other initiatives, such as BMD. The Mid-Term Defense Program stipulated that active duty strength be reduced from 152,000 to 146,000. General Hayashi (Eastern Army, JGSDF) told a recent visitor that "gaiatsu" (foreign pressure) is necessary to increase the defense budget to two percent of GDP to prevent the Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces from being further cut. The Ground Self-Defense Forces perform natural disaster duties, so a further reduction in personnel (even with the intent of transforming them into a more mobile and expeditionary force for peace cooperation activities) could stretch the force thin and make it difficult to deploy outside of Japan. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force is already at risk of being a hollow force. We hear anecdotal stories about the lack of funds for training. For example, we have been told that the Western Army's Cobra helicopter simulator has been sitting idle for over a year now due to lack of funds for needed repairs. -------------- Procurement Reform? -------------- ¶6. (C) The JDA also will need to reprioritize its needs and engage in procurement reform even if its budget were to increase, if it is to make effective use of its funding. Strategic prioritization would help establish public credibility about the JDA's use of taxpayer money. Every year MOF issues budget guidelines that allow for a budget request in excess of the previous year's baseline. Ministries broadly consider what programs they want, then MOF later forces them to prioritize these programs by demanding budget cuts and negotiating with the MOF where these cuts should take place. JDA has not been particularly effective in explaining its strategic priorities. ¶7. (C) Thus far, the JDA has reacted to budget cuts primarily by reducing planned procurement (Reftel). Thus, not all procurement listed in the Mid-Term Defense Program actually takes place. Rather than simply cutting planned procurement, which drives up unit costs, in the future the JDA will need to focus on prioritization of needs and more economical program spending. ¶8. (C) The budgeted amount to procure Japan's next generation of fighter aircraft is not sufficient to replace the 100 F-4s with the F-22 or the joint strike fighter, Director of JDA's Budget and Accounting Division Daikichi Momma told poloff. He suggested that JDA would eventually choose not to replace the F-4s on a one-to-one ratio. The JDA does not have sufficient budget to buy equipment in bulk in order to take advantage of economies of scale but could consider multi-year procurement as a method to improve acquisition. JDA's traditional desire for indigenous production or co-development also drives up costs. Perhaps the best example is the F-2 program, under which the Japan Air Self-Defense Force procures fighters at about USD 115 million a copy as opposed to the much cheaper and more capable F-16 on which it is based. ¶9. (C) The JDA also needs to cease production/procurement of ineffective indigenous weapons systems -- and especially those that do not meet alliance interoperability requirements -- and winnow out cases of "pork barrel" procurements that make up a significant part of the procurement budget. For example, the Maritime Self-Defense Forces are planning procurement of the FCS-3 shipboard radar system for its new class of Destroyers (19DD),which is reportedly not going to meet the Maritime Self-Defense Forces' own technical requirements for missile guidance capability. The U.S. is competing against the FCS-3 with the AN/SPY-1F system, which is technically superior, meets all of the requirements, and would be priced within budget. These advantages may not override the Maritime Self-Defense Force's desire to award the contract to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to prevent it from losing money on the inferior system. ¶10. (C) Comment. As fiscal austerity forces the JDA to choose between competing programs, JDA will make decisions with a profound and long-term impact on U.S. alliance interests. As JDA prepares the JFY07 budget request, Embassy Tokyo will use the climate of fiscal austerity as an opportunity to encourage the JDA to adjust its procurement to be more efficient and strategically focused. We also will TOKYO 00001104 003 OF 003 stress to Japanese leadership that it will be increasingly difficult for Japan to meet its current alliance commitments, much less face new challenges in the future, within the confines of Japan's current policy of capping defense spending at 1 percent of GDP. End Comment. SCHIEFFER