CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TAIWAN AND CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000982 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, EAP/CM, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): TAIWAN AND CHINA Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, Permanent Representative to t he OPCW, Reasons: 1.4 (B, D) This is CWC-38-06. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On the margins of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council meeting in mid-March, Washington-based delegation officers discussed the question of Taiwan's relationship to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) separately with representatives of the local Taiwan representation and the Chinese delegation. Both expressed flexibility on modalities for making an arrangement on the issue, but indicated no particular drive emanating from their capitals for doing so. Discussions with the two sides and delegation research indicate that there are formulas by which both Taiwan and China in the recent past have joined or cohabited international organizations. Discussion with a key aide to OPCW Director General Rogelio Pfirter, indicates that he may be willing to suggest a way forward with Beijing in a trip later in the year. ¶2. (C) Del believes that it is desirable that a formula be found that brings Taiwan into the global chemical non-proliferation regime sooner rather than later. As things stand now, Taiwan--which reportedly has the world's 14th largest chemical industry--is a potential proliferation risk. If Pfirter is willing to help the process, that would offer the potential for a constructive way forward. -------------- Meeting with Taiwan Reps -------------- ¶3. (C) Robert Mikulak, ISN/CB Director, and Washington-based deloff Robert Blum, met Taipei Representative Office Director of Economic Division Mark K. ¶N. Tseng and Commercial Attache Jennifer P.C. Hsieh at lunch in The Hague on 14 March. The meeting was part of the ongoing U.S. outreach to Taiwan's representation in The Hague and in Washington on CWC matters. In the course of the discussion, Hsieh said that she had worked in Taipei on Taiwan's joint accession with China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. (Note: China joined the WTO December 11, 2001, and Taiwan joined January 1, 2002. End Note.) Taiwan came in as the "Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu." Hsieh said that the deal for Taiwan's entry into the WTO resulted from a combination of U.S. and EU pressure and work of the WTO Secretariat. ¶4. (C) Tseng said that there had been recent contact between the OPCW Technical Secretariat (TS) and Taiwan figures. I Yuan, a Chinese Institute of International Relations figure active on behalf of Taiwan's government, had met informally with a TS public affairs officer in recent months. The TS Director of Administration, Ron Nelson, had also sponsored a lunch with Director General Pfirter's chief of cabinet, Rafael Grossi, and the then-head of the Taipei Representative Office, Katherine Hsiao-yueh Chang. Chang, according to Tseng, has returned to Taipei to be a Vice Minister who, in her capacity of overseeing European issues, would be in charge of issues associated with OPCW. Tseng said that if there were to be forward movement on Taiwan entering OPCW, Chang would be in a position within the government to help. ¶5. (C) (Note: Del hosted a lunch between Grossi and Taipei representatives in 2003. At that time, Grossi said the DG and the TS could play a middle man role in brokering a deal between the two parties, but could not, in the first instance, take actions that would be deemed offensive in Beijing.) ¶6. (C) Tseng thought that Taiwan might be flexible on modalities of implementation of the CWC under a China umbrella, but he offered no specifics. He said that IAEA safeguard arrangements for Taiwan offered a potential model. Deloffs observed that technical aspects of the IAEA model made it difficult to use for the CWC, but to the extent that it demonstrated flexibility on both sides, the model might be useful. ¶7. (C) Meanwhile, Tseng said, Taiwan remains concerned by being outside OPCW, in large part because States Parties are not permitted to sell Schedule 2 chemicals to non-member states. An even greater worry is that the OPCW would eventually ban the sale of Schedule 3 chemicals to non-members and if Israel were to join the Convention, the impetus for a Schedule 3 ban would increase. -------------- Meeting with Chinese Representative -------------- ¶8. (C) Deloff used the occasion of a dinner on 14 March with Kang Yong, China's Deputy Permanent Representative to OPCW, to get China's perspective on de facto Taiwan accession to the CWC. Kang noted that the two sides had in the late 1990s discussed the issue, but to no avail. Taiwan's current leadership has a two China policy, which is unacceptable, said Kang. Much of the conversation that followed dwelt on the close relationship China had with Taiwan commercially. China in fact wished the Taiwanese chemical industry well, said Kang. China was open to a variety of formulas that might allow its participation in the Convention as long as it did not offend China's position on sovereignty. Taiwan had to operate under the Chinese umbrella. A formula in which Taiwan was identified as "China Taipei" would potentially work. Kang (please protect) said that if the U.S. wished to pursue the subject, it might do so informally on the margins of bilateral talks on implementation of the convention. He did not wish that it be known, however, that the suggestion came from him. -------------- -------------- Meeting with OPCW Director General Special Assistant Grossi -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) Deloff paid a courtesy call on Rafael Grossi on 15 March where the focus of discussion was CWC universality issues, including Taiwan. Grossi noted that Director General Pfirter was contemplating a trip to China later in the year. After discussing the conversations Deloff had with the Taiwan representatives and China's Kang, Grossi volunteered that it might be desirable for the Director General to provide China with a notional detailed program of how Taiwan could engage the CWC and under what rubric this could be accomplished. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Del notes that Taiwan's chemical industry is reputedly the fourteenth largest in the world and heavily dependent on exports. With the CWC now at 178 member states, the absence of the Taiwan chemical industry from the global chemical nonproliferation regime is increasingly anomalous and a significant potential source of chemicals for chemical weapons programs in other countries. ¶11. (C) If Taiwan's chemical industry is somehow to come under the global chemical weapons nonproliferation regime, clearer thinking is needed, particularly in both Taipei and Beijing, on how this might be arranged. With respect to the CWC, the primary goal for Taiwan now appears to be an ability to trade in Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals on the same terms as if it were a CWC member state. Taiwan officials seem to have accepted the fact that Taiwan cannot join the CWC and have informally suggested that an inspection regime for Taiwan's chemical industry could provide reassurance to the international community. This greater confidence would then somehow translate into lifting the trade restrictions to which Taiwan, as a non-member state, is now subject. The "IAEA model" for inspection, which has been raised by Taiwan's experts informally over the last couple years, will not work for the much different situation of the chemical industry. The IAEA, in effect, subcontracts safeguards inspections to the U.S., which has a supplier relationship to Taiwan. In the case of the chemical industry, however, the basic issue is Taiwan's own production, rather than the use of imported materials. Furthermore, neither China, nor other CWC States Parties, are likely to accept such an arrangement for inspection of Taiwan's chemical industry. ¶12. (C) One approach would to bring Taiwan under the global chemical non-proliferation regime would be for Taiwan, as a "province" of China, to have a quasi-independent status under the CWC, but under a Chinese umbrella. Taiwan would make declarations and accept inspections and would be treated the same as a State Party with respect to chemical trade. The provisions of the CWC would be reflected in domestic implementing legislation. Drawing on other international arrangements in which Taiwan participates, Taiwan might be called "Chinese Taipei" or something similar and deal directly with the OPCW Technical Secretariat on such issues as declarations and inspections. More problematic would be the legal and political status of Taiwan under such arrangements. What would be Taiwan's legal obligations and political role under a Chinese umbrella? Would Taiwan be able to send a representative to OPCW meetings? What role would such a representative be allowed? ¶13. (C) Given the possibility that Taiwan, for political reasons, might reject coming in "under a Chinese umbrella, an alternative approach would be for Taiwan to enter into a "relationship agreement" (i.e., short of being a full State Party) with the OPCW, either directly with the Taiwan government, or, if this is unacceptable to China, with a non-governmental entity on Taiwan, such as the Taiwan Chemical Industry Association (TCIA). Under such an agreement, which would need to be approved by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties, the Taiwan government or TCIA might commit to measures that mirror those in the treaty, such as "information reports" (declarations) and "technical audits" (inspections). Taiwan's renunciation of chemical weapons would be established either directly, or by TCIA forwarding "for information" official acts of Taiwan's governing authorities, including special implementing legislation. (Comment: We will also likely have to consider how to address questions about possible past CW-related activities.) Representatives would be allowed to attend OPCW meetings as observers, but would have no role in decision making. Under this approach, the trade privileges would require a technical change in the Verification Annex to remove trade restrictions on entities that accept monitoring measures equivalent to those in the CWC. ¶14. (C) Del defers to Washington on whether and how it wants to try to bring Taiwan under the global chemical non-proliferation regime reflected in the CWC. But our sense is that there is a deal potentially awaiting. But all of this would require, in the first instance, political will on the part of Taipei and Beijing, and we detect little of that so far in The Hague. ¶15. (C) If there is to be a deal--and if political will is to be generated in either Taipei or Beijing--clearer thinking than we have seen so far is needed for both sides. Taiwan's political, as well as industry authorities, need to have a full understanding of key CWC requirements. They need to know what their responsibilities would be, what their opportunities would be, and whether their concerns are valid or imagined. China, too, needs to think, beyond professions of flexibility, to the precise terms of how an arrangement might work. ¶16. (C) Key to a deal would be third party help. Shopping ideas to both sides on terms for implementation that did not cross either side's political red lines is probably critical to the process. If there is to be a middleman, OPCW Director General Pfirter, with the resources of the Technical Secretariat (as well as U.S. ideas and support) behind him, SIPDIS might show some promise, though the Chinese del should be consulted on this in advance. Whoever makes the effort, discussion of an arrangement with either side should emphasize that the international community--for compelling nonproliferation reasons--needs to bring the Taiwan chemical industry into a relationship with the CWC. Taiwan's industry outside the CWC constitutes a significant loophole in the global chemical weapons and precursor control regime and thus a proliferation threat. This needs to be fixed. ¶17. (U) Javits sends. ARNALL