CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): U.S. SUBMITS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 THE HAGUE 000912

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): U.S. SUBMITS
REQUEST TO EXTEND STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION DEADLINE

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y
This is a corrected copy of The Hague 00896 it includes
additional addressees.

This is CWC-33-06.

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SUMMARY
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1. (U) U.S. presented its extension request for the maximum
allowable extension of the deadline for finishing destruction
of 100% of its chemical weapons (CW) stockpile to the OPCW
Executive Council this week. Del made it clear that the U.S.
remains committed to complete elimination of its CW
stockpile, and will strive to complete destruction by the
treaty deadline of April 29, 2012, or as soon as feasible
thereafter. Formal request submission was followed by a
detailed program briefing, presented by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of the Army for Elimination of Chemical Weapons

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Dale Ormond. U.S. del notified key delegations and members
of the Technical Secretariat prior to the briefing, and gave
delegations the opportunity to ask questions and provide
initial feedback at several informal sessions. In general,
member states welcomed U.S. transparency, but were clearly
concerned about eventual legal and political implications for

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the Convention. The availability of a program expert to
address questions was invaluable, and will also be critical
at the next Executive Council meeting in mid-May. End
Summary.

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ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS
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2. (U) U.S. delegation scheduled meetings with key
delegations and TS staff in advance of the formal extension
request submission and briefing. Del first met with the
Director General and Deputy Director General on 18 April to
discuss not only the extension request, but also press
coverage of the SECDEF's letters of notification to Congress.
DG Pfirter urged strongly that the U.S. not categorically
state its inability to meet the extended 2012 deadline, and
clearly caveat numbers provided as projections. Pfirter
stressed that a message along these lines would give him the
political latitude to acknowledge U.S. commitment to the
Convention.


3. (U) Drawing on general talking points in del's
instructions, Ambassador Javits explained the extension
request, reassured delegations of continued U.S. commitment
to the Convention, and introduced Dale Ormond, Deputy

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Assistant Secretary of the Army for Elimination of Chemical
Weapons (DASA/ECW). Reaction from the close allies in the
advance sessions was predictable; France and Germany
encouraged the U.S. to soften its message about potential
inability to meet the 2012 deadline, while the UK was
surprisingly supportive, and shared its thoughts on ways to
counter criticism of U.S. efforts. Germany in particular
emphasized the difficulty the U.S. would likely experience
from now on in advancing initiatives outside of CW
destruction, and potential damage to the credibility of the
Convention.


4. (U) EC Chairs/Vice-Chairs, as well as regional group
coordinators, were generally supportive of U.S. transparency,
and looked forward to further information provided in the
briefing. Iran noted there would clearly be legal, as well
as political, implications for extending the deadline beyond

2012. (In earlier discussions, Iran also raised the
possibility of amending the Convention, and of addressing the
subject during the 2008 Revcon if not sooner. Iranian del
also implied the U.S. was saving its most usable weapons for
the end of its destruction schedule; U.S. del corrected this
notion of a "secret stockpile.") Possessor states also
welcomed U.S. transparency, but showed a keen interest in how
much of the stockpile would remain at 2012, and when the U.S.
anticipated completing destruction. Russia expressed an

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understanding for the U.S. situation, but also clearly noted
that this would likely be very damaging to the Convention.
States Parties also inquired about the reasoning behind such
an early announcement of potential non-compliance; U.S. reps
explained the mandated notification of Congress, and the
public disclosure of accompanying information.


5. (U) Senior Secretariat staff also welcomed U.S.
transparency, and stated that the U.S. message was not
surprising, but encouraged continued transparency, especially
in light of TS need to accurately project resources necessary
in future years of U.S. destruction facilities. Amb. Onate,
TS Legal Advisor, pointed out that although the CWC only

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legally addresses destruction through 2012, it does provide a
"way out" through Article XV (Amendments to the Convention),
although he later made clear he was not advocating this
approach. Ambassador Javits replied that it is premature to
consider amending the Convention, with the U.S. still in
compliance until 2012.


6. (U) U.S. delegation met with WEOG member states just prior
to presenting the detailed briefing. WEOG states were
generally very appreciative of U.S. transparency. The
Netherlands, Sweden and New Zealand all voiced concerns about
the U.S. destruction program extending beyond 2012, and New
Zealand thought a treaty amendment might be needed. France

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and Germany stressed that the U.S. was providing projections,
and that it was thus premature to draw conclusions. UK
expressed an understanding of challenges the U.S. faced, and
a disappointment in its slower-than-expected progress, but
emphasized that the extension request was within the CWC's
terms (by clearly requesting the maximum allowable extension
under the Convention),and echoed the sentiment that drawing
conclusions about other measures now would be premature.
Italy also expressed concerns about the potential impact of
U.S. actions on the Russian destruction program. Australia
questioned the wisdom of revealing "projections" so far in
advance of the deadline, after which U.S. del clearly
explained Congressional notification requirements and public
disclosure of program information. Finally, Ireland welcomed
the strong U.S. political commitment and transparency, and
inquired as to whether any part of current or projected
delays could be attributed to insufficient resources. U.S.
del also met briefly with the Eastern European Group (EEG),
but due to limited time, was only able to deliver general
talking points and introduce DASA Ormond. EEG Chair Bulgaria
encouraged member states to support the U.S. request.

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U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST BRIEFING
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7. (U) Detailed U.S. presentation on the status of the U.S.
chemical weapons destruction program and the challenges we
face, given by DASA Ormond, was well received. Few
delegations had questions following the briefing, although
Russia asked about "legal implications" of the extension
request, and South Africa expressed concern (and some
confusion) at the presentation of various challenges posed by
CW stockpile destruction. In a later meeting, South African
Ambassador Mkhize (who will assume the role of EC Chair in
May) expressed her concern that the U.S. had undermined its
traditional leading role in the organization, citing previous
examples where the U.S. had been instrumental in furthering
progress or achieving consensus (e.g. Article VII). South
Africa also noted that while generally one would expect
faster progress as the U.S. gained more experience with CW
destruction, the opposite seemed to be occurring. Finally,
Amb. Mkhize pointed to the value of having objective
standards, such as deadlines, in
assessing performance of states, and the difficulty in trying
to apply subjective standards.

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INITIAL FEEDBACK
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8. (U) U.S. del held an open-ended, informal question and

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answer session on April 21, 2006. Session was attended by
France, Australia, Sweden and Russia. Only France came
prepared with questions; French reps had clearly studied the
table the U.S. provided in the extension request, and asked
for clarification on several instances where processing rates
changed dramatically from year to year at certain sites.
Ormond explained that the differences were due to changes
between types of munitions being processed, changeovers from
munitions to bulk agent, and other technical processing
details. France also requested further information on
reasons for delay in construction of the final two facilities
and asked several pointed questions about current processing
rates, and how the U.S. planned to increase these rates in
future years.


9. (U) In a follow-on bilat, Russia's deputy rep said that
the U.S. request does not meet the requirement to provide a
detailed plan for complete destruction during the extension
period. U.S. rep responded that the U.S. request does in
fact meet the requirement to provide detail on planned
destruction activities during the requested extension period.
Russian del rep inquired as to how a decision could possibly
be taken on an extension request to 2012 that was accompanied
by projections indicating completion of destruction in 2017.
He actually suggested that the only legally correct approach
would be for the U.S. to submit a "plan" under which all U.S.

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stocks are destroyed by the 2012 deadline; whether or not it
was realistic was not important. U.S. del rejected this
scheme to submit different plans to the Congress and to the
OPCW. Russian rep said that the Russian National Authority
was probably quite relieved at the U.S. presentation, and
would no longer feel pressure for Russia to complete its CW
destruction in accordance with Convention timelines.
Finally, Russian del implied that Russia would be unable to
approve the current U.S. request. Russia also confirmed its
intent to submit its updated (20-page) detailed plan for
destruction on Monday, which del will forward upon receipt.

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COMMENT
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10. (SBU) Extensive series of "preview" sessions with key
players before the formal presentation was effective in
setting the stage for the detailed U.S. briefing to Executive
Council members. While clearly concerned that the U.S. is
unlikely to meet an extended 2012 deadline, many dels
expressed appreciation for the transparency displayed by the
U.S. presentation and the U.S. commitment to destruction.


11. (SBU) Not surprisingly, many dels, particularly in the
WEOG, have latched on to the idea that the projected

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destruction levels in the U.S. paper "are just projections"
and noted our statements that the U.S. will try hard to
accelerate its destruction activities to meet the 2012
deadline, conveniently ignoring the "or if this is not
possible, to complete destruction as soon thereafter as
feasible." We will need to be very careful not to mislead
dels into believing that the 2012 deadline can be met.
Intellectually, many recognize that it cannot, but
emotionally, they have not accepted this.


12. (SBU) A common informal reaction is that a treaty
amendment needs to be considered. If not now, then perhaps
at the 2008 Review Conference. Del has responded that
discussion of changing the 2012 deadline now is premature,
but we can expect that the perceived need to "do something"
will persist.


13. (SBU) While the paucity of immediate questions from
delegations is somewhat surprising, we can expect much more
active discussion as soon as dels receive instructions from
capitals. In particular, we need to be prepared for probing
questions at the mid-May Executive Council meeting. Del
strongly recommends that a senior DOD policy official attend
to make clear the U.S. commitment to complete destruction as
soon as possible, and that DASA/ECW Ormond present a
streamlined version of the briefing and answer additional

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program questions delegations may have.


14. (SBU) The Russian del argument that the U.S. request is
not legal because it does not meet Convention requirements is
most likely only a local invention and not based on any
instructions. While we believe this argument is unlikely to
gain much traction, the Iranians and a few others may latch
onto so-called "legal" arguments to create mischief. Del
will need to be well-armed with appropriate talking points to
rebut these arguments.


15. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL