NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: RESPONSE TO U.S. KOSOVO POLICY

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000895 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV YI EU NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/KOSOVO: RESPONSE TO U.S. KOSOVO POLICY DEMARCHE REF: STATE 59894 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The GONL greatly appreciated the oral brief on U.S. Kosovo policy, but is concerned that the USG might be "tipping its hand" by trying to influence the status process in favor of Kosovar independence. MFA Senior Policy Advisor for Kosovo Sebastiaan Messerschmidt said that the Dutch remain strongly in favor of a negotiated settlement, and questioned whether the USG intended for Belgrade and Pristina to learn of its views by going to all EU capitals on the matter. He also noted Dutch plans to travel to the region in early May, and offered to deliver any messages back-channel, should Washington find it helpful. Polmiloff discussed reftel points with Messerschmidt on April 21. End summary. ¶2. (C) Messerschmidt said he appreciated the brief, and reaffirmed strong Dutch support for ICTY conditionality and the arrest of Mladic. But he focused mainly on the point referring to the USG's "private view" that Kosovar independence is the only realistic option, and worried about the political message of talking to all EU capitals on the issue. He reiterated that the Dutch continue to support a negotiated settlement, and said that while the Dutch appreciate continued U.S. support for the status process, they would not be surprised to learn that the U.S. intended to push for independence. ¶3. (C) While the oral brief diluted the formality somewhat, Messerschmidt said the message was clear that by talking to all EU capitals the USG was trying to influence the status process. He questioned if the USG intended for Serbia and Kosovo to learn of these points -- by talking to all EU capitals, Belgrade and Pristina will likely hear about the USG's private views. Polmiloff asked for clarification; Messerschmidt assured him that the Dutch will handle the information discretely, but that the EU is a "sieve," something the USG knows all too well -- perhaps that was the USG's intent, Messerschmidt cynically queried. ¶4. (C) Messerschmidt said the Dutch understand the significance attached to reaching a settlement by the end of this year, and remain entirely supportive of a negotiated settlement. However, the economy is doing poorly, Messerschmidt argued, and the government is still in the formative stages. Successful completion of some confidence building measures would also be helpful, he added. Plus, some road-blocks such as Mitrovica may require more time to resolve -- if a settlement were to be reached by the end of this year, then perhaps it might be best to leave the question of Mitrovica open, Messerschmidt said. ¶5. (C) On Serbia's EU prospects, he noted that EU enlargement questions and criteria have changed following the "big bang" of 10 new members. He stressed that there is both a political and technical process for EU enlargement. This is not to suggest that the Dutch advocate backing away from promises made at Thessaloniki in 2003, he said. However, there is greater scrutiny within the EU on criteria for enlargement. Messerschmidt said that from this perspective, FM Bot is very reluctant to engage on the possibility of newly independent states in the Western Balkans with membership aspirations. ¶6. (C) On the other hand, Messerschmidt acknowledged the need for greater regional security in the region -- that cannot be ignored. He added that points made on assisting both Serbia and Kosovo resonate with the Dutch, especially those regarding respect for human rights. The Dutch will continue to try and find niche areas in which their relatively modest financial assistance can be maximized for the best results. He also questioned U.S. plans for "reconsolidating" KFOR, and under what capacity would the U.S. be involved in a civilian presence. He said it would be good to know what Washington had in mind regarding the disbursement of resources during post-settlement implementation to ensure cohesion and effectiveness. ¶7. (C) Messerschmidt emphasized that he greatly appreciated the brief; "it's always good to know where the USG is heading." The Dutch are planning a trip to the region in early May, he said, but want to see what progress is achieved at the May 4 status meeting. He added that although the Dutch are not on the UN Security Council or the Contact Group, they still maintain a good network of contacts in the Balkans and would be happy to bring a message to Belgrade or Pristina through back-channels, if Washington thought that would be helpful. ARNALL