Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06THEHAGUE806
2006-04-11 15:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy The Hague
Cable title:  

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

Tags:  PARM PREL CWC 
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VZCZCXYZ0021
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0806/01 1011502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111502Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5376
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000806 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR
APRIL 7, 2006

This is CWC-30-06.

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U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000806 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR APRIL 7, 2006 This is CWC-30-06. -------------- U.S. EXTENSION REQUEST -------------- ¶1. (U) Del confirmed that, during the proposed week of the U.S. extension request submission and briefing, EC Chair Dastis, DG Pfirter, most senior Verification staff, Amb. Onate, and Amb. Khodakov will be available in The Hague. Del continues to field questions concerning U.S. intent (both timing and content of extension request) ) most notably from Russia, who stated their del has heard from sources in Washington and the TS that the U.S. may reveal information that clearly shows operations past 2012. EU President Austria continues to request the status of the request, while France and Germany work behind the scenes to express concern about the ability of &all possessor states8 to meet 2012. UK has been supportive, both in their significantly decreased volume of unhelpful questions and their willingness to share a draft statement they hope will be helpful in steering a constructive approach following the U.S. submission. -------------- Article VII -------------- ¶2. (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) led a 6 April 2006 informal consultation, supported by Lisa Tabassi (TS/OLA). Tabassi provided an update: over the past week, the TS received notifications from seven states designating or establish National Authorities (NA): Niue, Grenada, Haiti, Madagascar, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and Suriname. A press release will be issued, noting this positive development. There now remain 18 states without NAs, 12 of which adhered to the Convention after 2003. The remaining difficult cases are Papua New Guinea (PNG),Guinea, Mauritania, Tanzania, Micronesia, and Nauru. Tabassi noted that eight missions of the 18 had received visits from either Legal Advisor Onate or Head of ICA John Makubalu. Another seven states have been contacted via phone in capital. Three are represented only in New York, and Tabassi noted that Onate is willing to travel there to hold discussions. Finally, the Ts will hold an 18 April meeting to review the situation and to recommend actions the DG should take between then and EC-45. Note: The next consultation is Monday 10 April, and Magda
Bauta will present IPB's plan of Article VII-related activities. ¶3. (U) Delegations then noted their activities. Portugal noted that it had contacted Timor Leste and Cape Verde, emphasizing the importance of establishing their interim or permanent NAs by EC-45. Finland noted its willingness to use its long-term bilateral relationship with Tanzania to push it to establish a NA. Australia noted that PNG has made only limited progress since the July 2005 TAV. Tabassi noted that Makubalu had met with the PNG mission, which informed him that PNG was awaiting promised, follow up from Australia and (a surprise to us) the US. Australia also noted that Cambodia is expected to establish its NA by Parliamentary decree by the end of 2006. Australia, on behalf of New Zealand, reported that New Zealand made a voluntary contribution of 10,000 euros to support Keith Wilson's implementation assistance efforts in Fiji, Nauru, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. Canada reported that it was considering supporting implementation efforts in Antigua and Grenada (but noted happily that apparently Grenada has already established its NA),but had no specifics on what steps Ottawa intended to take. The UK noted its willingness to demarche Sierra Leone, Antigua, and Tanzania. The UK also called for better coordination among assisting SPs, wanting to know the US, for instance, had sent TAV teams. Japan relayed that it would assist with outreach efforts in PNG and Timor Leste. Mexico reported that its MFA had contacted Honduras, offering assistance with establishment of its NA and drafting its implementing legislation. Colombia reported it had made a general offer to support implementation efforts of GRULAC states. France noted that Paris had established a network of experts from those attending its training courses. On this basis, France could reach out to the DROC and Dijbouti. Belgium intends to work with the Central African Republic and the DROC, which are significant because of their significant chemical industries (and pooh-poohed efforts in the tiny island states as far less significant). Finally Iran noted that it had contacted Kabul to encourage it to establish its NA. Kabul responded that it might take some time to finish elaborating its national legislation, which also established the NA, but expects the legislation to be enacted expeditiously. ¶4. (U) The facilitator then asked about the status of the remaining states. Tabassi noted that Onate visited the Guinean mission in February 2006, and received a request for a TAV, noting that the US also was in discussions with the TS and Guinea regarding a joint mission. Mauritania has been difficult to contact, and so far the TS has been unable to arrange a visit to its mission. However, the US also is attempting to arrange a TAV to Mauritania. Afghanistan's Consulate General is in Amsterdam, but its relationship with Kabul is difficult so the TS directly contacted the MFA that reported that it had waited election results before finalizing its legislation. As of February, the MFA informed the TS that its legislation was being readied for submission. The TS is in regular contact with Bhutan, and expects rapid progress because the local interlocutors are responsive and eager. Onate visited the DROC mission, but was informed that due to upcoming elections, it is unlikely that it will meet the deadlines. The DROC requested a TAV, which might be done jointly with the UK. For Liberia, EIF was 25 March 2006. The TS is in contact with its Ministry of Justice, who representatives just completed the NA training in Paris. Quick progress is expected once elections are over. It also is a candidate for a US/TS TAV. ¶5. (U) Anand Dhavle (ICA/IPB) presented a six-page plan of activities (scanned and e-mailed to ISN/CB) noted that unless a state formally asks for a TAV, the TS could not initiate it. There are a number of states in discussion with the TS regarding a TAV: Dijbouti, DROC, Rwanda, Malawi, Bhutan, Mongolia, Laos, Honduras, Haiti, Guatemala, and Uruguay. If all of these come to fruition, the TS will face a funding shortfall of 125,000 euros. Finally, Tabassi noted that the US was considering supporting TAVs to Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Antigua, and possibly Mozambique. ¶6. (U) Canada, supported by the US, noted the facilitator's proposal to focus our efforts on establishment of NAs, but noted concerns that states had not yet submitted their plans for implementation by EC-47 (November 2006). Canada encouraged states reaching out to those in the process of implementing the Convention to note the requirement for submitting plans and finalizing legislation as well as establishing NAs by EC-45. -------------- FINANCIAL RULES -------------- ¶7. (U) Financial Rules consultations were held on April 6. The facilitator Richard Snelsire (U.S.) began the meeting using the Facilitator's Update on the proposed amendments to the draft Financial Rules dated 3 April 2006 (this document should be on the OPCW external server today). Discussion centered on four of the still outstanding amendments. ¶8. (U) 1.1.01 - Authority and Applicability Germany did not approve of the additional wording requiring approval by the Executive Council to the rule, saying it was repetitious, noting that this is already covered in rule 16.2 and 16.2.01. Iran, who made the suggested addition, defended it by saying legal text usually has cross-references, it is not a bad idea to make this reference in each set of rules to identify who has approval. Eventually this was deferred to the next meeting. ¶9. (U) 1.1.03 - Personal Responsibility/Liability - Accepted without comment. ¶10. (U) 2.2.01 - Interpretation of the Financial Rules There was little comment here, but apparently some delegations feel it might be discussed once more... ¶11. (U) 3.2.01, 3.3.01 (B),4.1.01 (A) (B),4.2.02 (B), 4.5.01 (B),4.12.02, Articles 5 to 8 and 9.1.01 (B) were accepted without comment. ¶12. (U) 9.3.01 (B) and (C) - Income from Investments The wording of (B) was changed because delegations felt a need for a more logical step-by-step progression for reporting in case of an investment loss. Which the TS had to say for the umpteenth time was not likely happen because the investment strategy is to put funds into short-term interest bearing accounts. Italy was particularly dense during the discussion of (B) and (C). ¶13. (U) The new wording of (B) is: "Any investment losses must be reported at once by the Principal Financial Officer to the Director General. The DG shall prepare a detailed report concerning these losses, and any required follow-up action. This report shall be provided immediately to the External Auditor and Member States through existing reporting mechanisms." ¶14. (U) 10.3.04 (B) (C) and 10.4.01 - Accepted without Comment ¶15. (U) 10.6.04 (D),10.6.05(C) and 10.6.06 - Procurement - These were deferred to the next meeting. ¶16. (U) 11.1.02, 11.1.03 and Articles 12-16 - Accepted without comment. ¶17. (U) The facilitator said he and the TS will make the changes suggested at this meeting and requested delegations be prepared to discuss 1.1.01 and 10.6.04, .05 and .06 at the next meeting. ¶18. (U) After the consultation the Iranian delegation approached the facilitator and asked if it would be possible to meet with interested delegations shortly before the next consultation on the 13th, to try and arrive at a compromise on the procurement section of the rules. The facilitator believes that the Iranians would not propose such a meeting unless they were willing to make an effort to arrive at a compromise on the procurement language. -------------- Geneva Group Meeting -------------- ¶19. (U) The two new co-chairs of the Geneva Group (Angela Peart - Canada and Sonya Koppe - Australia) convened a meeting on April 7, 2006. The primary focus of the meeting was the preparation of the Geneva Group report submission for the OPCW. Members also gave their views on the 2007 budget, the financial rules consultation, the regularization of arrears consultation, the possible creation of an exchange rate mechanism, and tenure policy. ¶20. (U) During a &tour de table8 members of the Geneva Group members began by providing suggestions for, and asking questions about, the annual Geneva Group report on the OPCW. Several delegations asked why there were only two direct recruitments listed for the last twelve months. Angela Peart explained that &direct recruitments8 referred to positions that were not advertised and for which there was no competitive recruiting. She said the two cases in the last twelve months were the Deputy Director General position and the Special Advisor to the Deputy Director General position. The Swiss suggested that this should be listed under the comments section of the report along with a note explaining that the lack of competitive recruiting for these two positions was an accepted practice by SP,s. ¶21. (U) The Japanese suggested that the references to gender equity be removed from the report, as this could lead to more questions regarding geographical representation that would not be appropriate because the CWC does not allow for geographical quotas. Angela Peart responded by noting that the Geneva Group questionnaire asked specifically about gender representation and therefore it would be acceptable to include references to gender representation. Sonya Koppe noted that the percentage of women working at the OPCW was the second lowest of any international organization, with only the IAEA having a lower percentage of women. Members agreed to keep the references to gender representation in the report. ¶22. (U) France asked that a reference to maintaining the balance between Chapter One and Chapter Two expenditures and the importance of realizing cost savings in Chapter Two be added to the Recommendations for Future Action. The UK and Italy supported the proposal. Italy asked that reference to the unofficial 11-12 million Euro surplus for 2005 be included in the Overview section of the report. Members agreed to include a reference to the surplus. Italy asked that the agreement between Germany and Pakistan to share the next term as the External Auditor be deleted. The UK, Germany, and France opposed deleting the reference and it will be retained especially as it was already included in the CSP decision on the External Auditor. ¶23. (U) Italy and the U.S. asked that the assertion that procurement delays had occurred because of late payments of assessed contributions. The UK pushed back and said they had been told directly by the Directors of BFB and Administration that delays had in fact occurred. Italy said it had never been officially notified that such delays had occurred and the U.S. noted that it had remained in close contact throughout the year to ensure that no TS operations, including procurement, had been impeded as a result of liquidity problems. The UK finally agreed that as there was conflicting information from the TS, the references to procurement would be dropped. (Note: Del rep later confirmed with the TS and the UK that they in fact had never been told that any procurement delays had occurred as a result of funding problems.) Language stating that late receipts did create practical problems, including planning, was retained, as the DG had made references to these issues in his statement to the CSP and past EC,s. ¶24. (U) The co-chairs reported to members that Rick Martin (BFB) had reported to them that TS division heads would now have to have their budget submissions in by late-April and that the draft budget would be released shortly after the July EC. The TS was then hoping to hold at least one or two consultations introducing the 2007 budget and would then work on information papers based on SP,s questions during the July August break. Martin indicated to the co-chairs that the DG was now strongly leaning towards a zero percent nominal growth budget, although there were some concerns about a likely UN salary increase and its impact on the budget. Martin also said, according to the co-chairs, that the other two variables, inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, appeared to be stable for the time being and were not a major concern for the TS. Reportedly, Martin also said that he would continue to work to refine RBB. ¶25. (U) The UK, France, and the U.S. were generally supportive of the TS approach as outlined by the co-chairs. Germany cautioned that the TS should be more careful this year in making any changes in agreed performance indicators in order to avoid some of the confusion experienced last year. ¶26. (U) Del rep gave a brief presentation on the progress made to date in the financial rules consultations. He noted that there was only the procurement issue as well as one other minor language issue in rule 1.1.01 outstanding. He said that the TS had placed his most recent facilitator,s paper on the external server on Friday and that he was hopeful that an agreement could be reached at the next scheduled consultation on April 13. He noted that the Iranian delegation had suggested that interested delegations meet shortly before the consultation on the 13th to work towards a compromise on the procurement language. Del rep opined that it would not be likely that Iran would agree to do this, unless they were interested in reaching an agreement. Other members agreed but noted that it would be better for the process to take longer than to agree to problematic language. ¶27. (U) On repayment plans, Germany urged that the process be kept simple and focused. The Japanese suggested that any potential plan should allow for repayments of arrears to be credited towards the most recent year, even if this necessitated making changes in the financial regulations. France agreed but noted that the process could become more complicated if it were necessary to amend the financial regulations. Italy said they viewed the process as a lot of work for a potentially minimal inflow of cash. They were skeptical about the process as a whole. ¶28. (U) Japan said that as facilitator, they were disappointed that the EC Chair gaveled through the noting of the report on the Implementation of the Recommendations of the External Auditor, despite the fact that no consultations had been held on it, the report had only been issued days earlier, and the facilitator had not even read the report. Other delegations agreed that this should not have happened and should not be allowed to happen again. (Note: This begs the question, why didn,t the facilitator (Komuro - Japan) speak up during the EC and prevent this from happening.) Komuro also told dels that the new OIO report should be out the week of April 17. ¶29. (U) On possibly creating a mechanism to address exchange rate fluctuations, the Swiss asked that this be included on the next Geneva Group meeting agenda. Japan said that they believed there was a Geneva Group report out of New York that came out against using surpluses to create an exchange rate mechanism. The Japanese delegate said she would try to obtain a copy of the report to share with other dels. Del rep said that at this time the USG was not inclined to support the creation of a mechanism to address exchange rate fluctuations that use the surplus. ¶30. (U) As the meeting ran longer than expected, Del rep remained after the meeting with other interested members to provide input for the Geneva Group report and questionnaire. The co-chairs agreed to use the stronger language proposed by the U.S. concerning studying tenure. Del rep was able to remove the language concerning delayed procurement activity as a result of late payments. The co-chairs told dels that the responses to the Results Based Management Questionnaire were based both on answers provided by the TS and their personal knowledge. ¶31. (U) On question 4, the co-chairs confirmed that they were referring to ABAF as the independent audit advisory committee. Del rep questioned whether ABAF really served as an independent audit advisory committee other than the fact that they do review the External Auditor,s report. The co-chairs agreed to note in the comment section that they were referring to ABAF. On question 5, the co-chairs and others felt that the question was more of an objective and not subjective nature and therefore did not require a qualitative answer. On question 9, the co-chairs said that they had been told by the TS that OIO has since 2004 conducted periodic program reviews. On question 13, the co-chairs agreed that there was a non-prioritized program plan or strategy. They agreed to note that the Medium Term Plan is not prioritized in the comments section. On question 15, the answer provided reflects the fact that officially individual program managers are accountable for program delivery. On question 20, the co-chairs agreed that there is no EC or CSP approved HR strategy. The co-chairs also agreed to correct the report and state that the Dutch government does not own the OPCW building as originally stated. ¶32. (U) The UK suggested that members consider, for the next Geneva Group meeting, ways in which the TS could achieve savings in Chapter 2 activities, specifically in Administration. The next Geneva Group meeting will likely be in early June. -------------- LIBYA -------------- ¶33. (U) Del rep met with Libyan delegate and TS to inform all parties of Washington,s recommendation to move forward with two national papers (request to establish dates for intermediate deadlines and 100% extension request) and one draft decision. Del rep also suggested revisions to the Libyan submission of March 31, 2006 ) an expanded version of Libya earlier request to establish dates for intermediate deadlines based on U.S. suggestions (initially discussed at EC-44). TS expressed appreciation for continued cooperation between U.S. and Libya, and will use March 31, 2006 (original submission) as the official date for subsequent edits, thus ensuring EC members are aware that Libya technically fulfilled its commitment to provide more detailed information by March 31, 2006. -------------- KAMBARKA AND MARADYKOVSKY -------------- ¶34. (U) Del rep met with TS CDB office Yaugen Ryzhykau to clarify points on current operations at Kambarka, and the status of documents for both Kambarka and Maradykovsky. On Maradykovsky, no progress on documents is expected until the final engineering review in May. TS confirmed there are two identical mobile destruction units operating at Kambarka, and provided a copy of the slides they use to brief inspectors rotating to Kambarka. TS also explained that reaction mass at Kambarka is processed in an evaporator, and the remaining salts are being stored in drums for later shipment to Gorny. The incinerator on site is used for processing wastewater and solid wastes only. TS and Russia have agreed on final text for the Kambarka FA and VP, but are awaiting confirmation from Moscow before distributing the documents. ¶35. (U) Ryzhykau explained that in resolving remaining issues on the Kambarka documents, Russia agreed to declare the storage buildings as temporary holding areas, and the TS agreed to use the equipment list from the Gorny FA/VP. Camera positions in the buildings have not been changed, with the Russians arguing that it is unsafe to make modifications in buildings already involved in destruction operations. Del read is that Russia is unlikely to change camera positions in the remaining three buildings, and that the TS will have to continue to compensate with a more elaborate sealing plan. TS noted that Russian officials pressured TS to sign SIPDIS certificates of destruction, which TS has refused to do. TS and Russia also came to an agreement on reconciliation of agent quantity fed to the reactor, but TS continues to express concerns over the lack of dedicated instrumentation (specifically the flow meter). Ryzhykau pointed out that verification of agent quantity entering the reactor is challenging, partly because all movement of agent is through piping (versus individual munitions or ton containers) and partly because the TS believes readings from the flow meter can be manipulated at several points before reaching the inspector data screens. Overall, TS is skeptical that measures agreed in the FA/VP will be fully implemented. -------------- OPTIMIZATION -------------- ¶36. (U) TS also shared thoughts on possibilities for an optimized verification regime at Russian facilities. Ryzhykau emphasized that the approach to optimization at Russian facilities has differ significantly from that at U.S. facilities, primarily due to the lack of opportunity to directly observe (through observation windows or safety corridors) operations at Russian facilities. Manpower savings on night shifts in Russia may be challenging because of a lack of dedicated instruments; currently inspectors have to simultaneously view readings in the inspector and facility control rooms. The TS predicts that, due to cost, Russia is unlikely to build better observation capabilities into future facilities. In future, when most or all of the Russian facilities are operational, non-optimized verification will require a significant increase in Inspectorate resources. ¶37. (U) JAVITS SENDS. ARNALL

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