NETHERLANDS: PLANS TO EXPAND PEACE AND SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000762 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/E (E. REDDICK),AF/C (AMB J. LEADER AND J. GAFFNEY),AF/RSA (M. BITTRICK AND C. BECK) OSD FOR OASD/ISA/AFR (COL K. LANGDORF, C. IKINS, T. WONG) EUCOM FOR MAJ T. RAYMOND MOLESWORTH FOR S. HRICIK NAIROBI PLEASE PASS TO CDC (T. BOO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016 TAGS: PREL KGHA KHIV KPKO MARR MASS MOPS BE BY CG FR, NI, NO, RW, SF, SU, UG, UK, US, NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: PLANS TO EXPAND PEACE AND SECURITY PROGRAMS IN AFRICA REF: GENEVA 706 THE HAGUE 00000762 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew J. Schofer; reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 6. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: The GONL is paying increasing attention to African Peace and Security Architecture and is ready to commit additional resources. The GONL wishes, in cooperation with the Belgians, to take a lead on Burundi Security Sector Reform (SSR). It is considering contributing a small contingent of headquarters staff to the European Union,s DRC election mission. On SSR, DDR and an African Standby Force, the GONL is taking a comprehensive look at possibilities for multi-donor or unilateral programs. It is interested in contributing specialized personnel to our ACOTA and, possibly, HIV/AIDS programs. End summary. Background: growing support for Africa initiatives -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Embassy officers met March 23, 29 and 30 with specialized Dutch MOD and MFA colleagues, to discuss Dutch interest in SSR, DDR, HIV/AIDS, peacekeeping, and related programs in sub-Saharan Africa. For much of the past year, the GONL has signaled an interest, but its goals have been vague. With the increasingly likely prospect of a Labor-led government in 2007, interest now appears to be solidifying. Regardless of whether Labor wins, Dutch interest in Africa is likely to grow, as the GONL seeks domestically popular alternatives to its commitments in Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere. Poloff held follow-on discussions April 6 with Africa researchers from the Netherlands Institute for International Relations ("Clingendael") and received insight entirely consistent with what GONL officials are saying. ¶4. (SBU) Embassy points of contact are Colonel John Gross (DAO, grossjd2@state.gov),Ted Burkhalter (political officer, primary for Africa, burkhaltereb@state.gov) and Jason Grubb (political-military officer, back-up for Africa, grubbjb@state.gov). 
 Dutch propose taking lead, with Belgium, on Burundi SSR -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) The GONL has proposed taking a lead, with the Belgians, on Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts in Burundi. The program would start with the drafting of a white paper, followed by staff level assistance. SSR implementation would be some time off and would require multiple donors. The Dutch have stressed they were heavily involved in early demobilization efforts in Burundi. For this reason, the Dutch parliament is more comfortable with direct assistance to the Burundian military and police than to those of other Great Lakes countries. ¶6. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST: The GONL would welcome U.S. participation. However, it wants to be sure the Dutch/Belgian lead role is maintained. It therefore seeks full U.S. buy-in, before moving ahead. Post requests cleared points from Washington, informing the GONL that we welcome the Dutch/Belgian SSR leadership role in Burundi and look forward to discussing further at the next meeting of the Great Lakes Contact Group. END ACTION REQUEST. Great Lakes Intelligence Fusion Cell -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Dutch provided the initial funds for Burundian participation in the Great Lakes Intelligence Fusion Cell. They are willing to consider providing some additional funds but need Burundian budget estimates ASAP. They would appreciate any help and note positively our DATT,s and their THE HAGUE 00000762 002.2 OF 003 DATT,s persistent efforts in Bujumbura. ¶8. (SBU) The Dutch say the Burundians need, ultimately, to fund the continuing costs of the fusion cell on their own. We suspect the need might materialize sooner rather than later. ACOTA -------------- ¶9. (SBU) The GONL has overcome initial reservations, which may have been fueled by inaccurate NGO reports on ACOTA's goals. The Dutch are eager to provide specialized military personnel, on a case-by-case basis. They request that ACOTA program coordinators inform them 2-3 months in advance of personnel needs. They are unwilling to work with ACOTA civilian contractors, unless uniformed U.S. officers are present. ¶10. (SBU) Post, after consulting with ACOTA coordinators, suggested the GONL also consider independently funding PSO "bricks and mortar" projects in Mozambique, Nigeria, and elsewhere. According to the MFA, funds for this are not currently available. We suggest this issue be raised again, following next year,s election. Lord,s Resistance Army -------------- ¶11. (S) MFA representatives noted the Geneva core group meeting (reftel) and said that the GONL fully supports an integrated political/military/security/development approach to the LRA. However, because of Dutch concerns about the human rights record of the UPDF, the GONL is unlikely to participate in any military component. Poloff followed up March 28 and 29 with MFA political and political-military advisors, who stressed, though, that the possibility is not entirely ruled out. Development Minister van Ardenne (who plays an influential role in Dutch Africa policy) reiterated to Ambassador Arnall on March 29 that the GONL supports core group/UN/MONUC/UNMIS efforts to capture LRA leaders. ¶12. (S) The Dutch have asked, repeatedly, whether the U.S. has reached any decisions on military options for assisting the UPDF against the LRA. They have asked that we consider sharing this information with them as soon as is possible. ASF and African security architecture -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The Dutch had several questions and comments stemming from the March London clearinghouse conference. They are likely to raise these at the next contact group meeting. First, they will participate in C3IS workshops, but to learn, rather than to lead. Second, they are interested in African Standby Force (ASF) buildup but want to be clear that it must be done in a multi-donor framework. Third, they asked whether we had any thoughts on the modalities of the ASF. Fourth, they would like to know whether there are any specific areas of ASF in which the U.S. would like Dutch assistance. They suggested a strong preference for logistics assistance. Finally, what is our thinking with regard to positioning of schools? Will every regional grouping (i.e., ECOWOS) have its own school(s)? The Dutch did not indicate whether they are contemplating anything beyond the current Burundi PKO training center. Congo (DRC): EU election mission and DDR -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The GONL will not contribute ground troops to the European Union,s election mission in Congo (DRC). It may, however, contribute a staff contingent to the proposed Operational HQ in Potsdam and a "very small number - 3 or 4" THE HAGUE 00000762 003 OF 003 of officers to a forward HQ in the DRC. This remains under discussion and is contingent on the success of the German proposal. MFA colleagues have told us they are frustrated that the MOD (and Defense Minister Kamp) remain wary of sending ground troops to Africa. They believe that, if Labor wins the 2007 elections, this will change. ¶15. (SBU) The MFA again emphasized the GONL view that a premature international withdrawal from the DRC would have dire consequences. They urged us to press this point within the administration and with members of Congress. They predict a continued need for a strong international presence well beyond the last round of elections, likely to be held in late September or October. ¶16. (SBU) The MFA stressed that future DRC DDR efforts will require large sums of money and must therefore be conducted in a multi-donor setting. The Dutch will participate in such efforts but will not take a lead. They are finalizing preparations on existing integrated brigades programs, in conjunction with the South Africans. MFA representatives explained the Dutch position, saying the GONL had already provided several hundred thousand dollars of "tailor made" assistance for joint MONUC-FARDC operations. They are interested in knowing the scope of possible U.S. contributions. HIV/AIDS in the SSR context -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The Dutch military has still not grasped the necessity of HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment in SSR and peacekeeper training programs, according to MOD and MFA officers. The MFA has a rough conceptual plan, but, as one of their representatives told us, "The U.S. is way ahead on that." The Dutch expressed interest in sending military health officials (whether uniformed or civilian) to visit, or even participate in, U.S. HIV/AIDS programs with African militaries. Although the idea has not received high-level consideration within MOD, the officers with whom we met felt it might be helpful in generating greater awareness. We passed the Dutch a summary of ODC Pretoria,s programs with the South African military (prepared by Pretoria for Dutch consumption). We also told them about U.S. programs in Nigeria and suggested they contact our HIV/AIDS coordinator in Abuja (Nina Wadhwa). Sudan/Darfur -------------- ¶18. (C) Netherlands Sudan policy is currently coordinated by the MFA Sudan Task Force, which operates outside the Africa Department. The issue was therefore not discussed. In brief, though, the Dutch hold positions similar to our own and are very active in support of the Abuja talks and UNSC action. Should NATO or EU technical or logistical support to an eventual rehatted force be needed (as seems probable),the Dutch are likely contributors. They have a small military and police presence in UNMIS and have provided logistical support to AMIS. Conclusion: Encouraging the Dutch -------------- ¶19. (SBU) Dutch interest in African Peace and Security programs is genuine and largely altruistic. The GONL is constrained, however, by three factors: acute human rights sensitivities, a relative lack of experience, and hesitancy among its military leaders. We can significantly increase Dutch expertise, as well as support among the military, by inviting MOD specialists to observe or participate in our HIV/AIDS programs with African militaries and our ACOTA peacekeeper training programs. ARNALL