FOLLOW-UP ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ:NETHERLANDS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 000591 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UBI - FALLS STATE FOR S/CT - WORMAN/HAWTHORNE STATE FOR NEA/I - OLSON/EVANS STATE FOR EB/ESC/TSF - SALOOM E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2011 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PINR PINS PREL PTER IZ NL SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ:NETHERLANDS REF: SECSTATE 35709 Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY GLOBAL ISSUES CHIEF SUSAN GARRO FOR REASON S 1.5(B) AND (D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The Netherlands has taken internal and external steps in recent years to prevent its citizens from traveling to Iraq and other conflict areas to train or participate in jihad. Closer cooperation between Dutch intelligence and police authorities has yielded concrete results, including the arrest of three suspected jihadists. Counterterrorism officials believe that the number of would-be jihadists from The Netherlands is low, a "trickle rather than a flood," but that jihad recruitment activity has picked up in recent months. Police and intelligence services closely monitor suspected recruits and recruiters. END SUMMARY. -------------- Cooperation and Direct Action -------------- ¶2. (S) In recent years, Dutch security services, including the AIVD (domestic intelligence) and MIVD (military intelligence),police, immigration, and national prosecutors, have worked more cooperatively to stop potential jihadist recruits from going to Iraq or other conflict areas, and they have experienced successes at interdicting would-be terrorists. The Dutch police, in cooperation with AIVD, apprehended in late December three Dutch youths in Baku, Azerbaijan whom they suspect were en route to Chechnya or Iraq to participate in jihad. The three had been missing since mid-November 2005. They denied having been recruited for jihad and instead claimed to have been on vacation in Turkey and Azerbaijan. The youths all attended the radical As Soennah mosque in The Hague from which Dutch authorities believe jihad recruiters operate. National Counterterrorism Coordinator Tjibbe Joustra told the DCM that the government is closely monitoring the mosque and the teens. The Dutch National Police (KLDP) also continue to investigate the incident in an effort to build a solid case against the suspected Netherlands-based recruiter who facilitated their travel. ¶3. (C) The Director of the Office of National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb) Policy staff told Emboff March 8 that, to date, only a handful of people are suspected of trying to travel to Iraq or elsewhere for the purposes of participating in terrorist activities. He said that there is always the possibility the problem is greater than authorities suspect since "we don't know what we don't know." NCTb Coordinator Joustra confirmed in a subsequent conversation with the DCM that the number of Dutch fighters in Iraq is believed to be low. He added, however, that there are indications that recruiting activity has picked up in recent months. He said that the AIVD was expected to complete a report on jihadist activity in the next few weeks. ¶4. (U) The 2004 Terrorist Crimes Act made recruitment for jihad a criminal offence in the Netherlands, punishable by up to four years imprisonment. A Dutch court in mid-February sentenced a 21-year old Dutch Muslim, Bilal Lamrani, to three years imprisonment for recruiting jihadists. Lamrani is the first person to be convicted of "preparations with a terrorist purpose and recruitment" under that law, according to the press. ¶5. (C) Dutch authorities have adopted a policy of overt surveillance, known as "direct action" or "disturbance" operations, to monitor certain key radical suspects. In cases where a Dutch citizen or resident alien is suspected of engaging in suspicious conduct that falls below the threshold for arrest, the appropriate Dutch agency, such as the police or immigration, will go to the person and inform him or her that the government is watching, with the expectation that the undesired behavior will stop or the person will face future arrest. ¶6. (SBU) The GONL is focused on the use of the internet for radicalization and recruiting for jihad, and has taken steps to try to counter this. As part of the government's recently launched counterterrorism public information campaign, the government established a special website, www.meldpuntcybercrime.nl, to which residents are encouraged THE HAGUE 00000591 002 OF 002 to report radical sites. ¶7. (C) Externally, the Dutch are cooperating with EU counterparts and others on information sharing, joint operations, and best practices to increase region-wide effectiveness against would-be terrorists seeking to travel from Europe. In particular, the GONL has closely engaged with its counterparts in Brussels, Paris, London, Madrid, and Berlin on terrorist finances and other cross-border operations in order to shut down jihadist pipelines to Iraq and other conflict areas. ¶8. (C) Comment: The Dutch are committed to ensuring that the Netherlands not become a haven for would-be jihadists to Iraq or elsewhere. Its central location in Europe and its open ports, airports, and borders, however, make it an attractive location for home-grown jihadists as well as those seeking to transit through The Netherlands en route to Iraq. The Dutch have had tangible successes in countering jihadist activity because of their cooperative efforts and are expected to continue to cooperate both internally and externally to assist in the fight against terrorism. ARNALL