CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000534 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR WEEK ENDING MARCH 10 This is CWC-23-06. -------------- P-5 MEETING ON UNIVERSALITY -------------- ¶1. (U) Russia hosted a March 7 meeting of the P-5 ambassadors. The Director General made a presentation on universality-related efforts of the OPCW. He noted that much has been achieved, membership now stands at 178 states, and the organization rapidly is being faced with approaches to just the hard cases: Angola, North Korea, Syria, Egypt, and Israel, whose adherence is of critical importance to achieve the objective and purpose of the CWC. States believed close to adherence are the Bahamas, Central African Republic, Comorros Islands, and the Congo. Angola is particularly difficult and is nowhere close to joining. The DG noted he had a good meeting on January 24 with the Angolan Foreign Minister, but results since then have been lacking. ¶2. (U) The DG reported that in Asia, Myanmar is showing good signs and is actively interacting with the Technical Secretariat. However, historically, Myanmar always appears SIPDIS receptive but like Prometheus' rock, it always falls back down the hill. Iraq possibly will join soon. The TS training for Iraq has been successful, but it needs to fully understand CWC requirements. North Korea is the hardest case of all: it has no interest in communications with the TS; it has never responded to TS initiatives. The DG will continue his efforts, focusing on his visit to the UNGA to try to meet with the ambassador from North Korea. ¶3. (U) The DG noted that States Party must avoid legitimizing the Middle East stand off. SPs must actively engage the non-SPs, whether by demarche or other means, and have not done enough to assist. Slow progress is being made, via the Mediterranean workshops. The DG met with the Egyptian Foreign Minister during his Africa trip. The Egyptian Ambassador in The Hague requested a meeting with the DG, where they discussed the possibility that Egypt might send an observer to Executive Council or Conference of States Parties meetings or OPCW workshops. Under discussion was how Egypt might increase its presence generally. The DG reported that he has had no recent contacts with Lebanon or Syria. The DG noted that he had been invited as a guest speaker to an April 3 WMD-related meeting at Hebrew University in Israel where he will take the opportunity to press Israel regarding its accession. ¶4. (U) With respect to the Mediterranean workshop schedule for June 2006, the DG reported that he had been waiting for a response from the Turkish ambassador regarding Ankara's willingness to host the meeting. Unfortunately, he received a firm no on March 6, and the TS had no alternate venues under consideration. ¶5. (U) The P-5 ambassadors thanked the DG for his presentation, and stressed the importance of adequately preparing the Mediterranean workshop. Finding an alternate venue with a view towards a meeting in June would not be practical, recommending the second half of the year instead. The DG agreed, but the schedule is very full, making that time period impractical. The DG suggested March 2007 as an alternative, expressing his hope that Turkey might be willing to play host at that time. The DG further noted that the TS would need three to four months to prepare the workshop. The UK and Russia commented that it would be best to keep pressure on Egypt, to keep the process moving. China also stated that Egypt will be the key to Middle East accessions. (After the DG departed, China remarked that the DG is overly optimistic about Egypt's willingness to join the Convention. The P-5 ambassadors agreed to consider meeting the Egyptian ambassador in The Hague, to keep up the pressure.) ¶6. (U) China noted that it is important to continue pressing Myanmar, regretting the recent EU/ASEAN splits in decisions affecting Myanmar. China urged the EU to reconsider. It is important to take a cautious approach and not give up too soon. The UK responded that the OPCW is a small piece of the complex issues that arise from the military government. EU members hold strong opinions about the Myanmar government, and change in policy is unlikely. China retorted that when the target is the regime itself, no communication is possible with the government. This is beyond Beijing's comprehension; Myanmar must be part of the ASEAN summit. ¶7. (U) France noted the importance of regional groups such as SADEC in any effort to pressure Angola to join the CWC. Especially if the other African states adhere in the near-term, Angola will feel the pressure. This also would make the situation more uncomfortable for Egypt. ¶8. (U) Finally, the ambassadors briefly discussed the upcoming March 10 consultation on rationalization of the EC, chaired by the Russian ambassador. Russia noted it had tried, without success, to find a facilitator, so that the meeting would be more of a brainstorming session. Delegations noted concerns over the South African proposals, which may not have come up recently but could arise in the future. Items should not be carelessly taken off the EC work program. There is no cost to leaving items on the list. The alternative might result in endless discussion, distracting delegations from the real work of the EC. -------------- INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - GENERAL DISCUSSION -------------- ¶9. (U) The vice-chair for the industry cluster, Ambassador Guillermo Fernandez de Soto (Colombia) chaired this session, with Bill Kane, head of the Industry Verification Branch, directing the TS input. In his opening remarks, de Soto stated that the purpose of this meeting was "to give new impetus to this cluster." Mohamed Daoudi (IVB) made a presentation on past achievements of the industry cluster since EIF, for historic perspective. The three current facilitators - Steve Wade (2A/2A*),Arya Sandeep (Schedule 3 transfers),and Luis Garcia (OCPF site selection) - presented the status of their facilitations. Ken Penman (Declarations Branch) made a brief presentation summarizing three TS recommendations for potential future industry cluster topics: late submission of declarations, improvement in the submission and handling of industry declarations, and transfer discrepancies. Daoudi made a brief summary presentation on 12 other outstanding industry issues. ¶10. (U) Del rep deployed the talking points received as guidance: there is U.S. interest in the topic of late declarations and willingness to consider facilitating such discussions. There is also interest in seeing the TS report its ongoing efforts to clarify declarations that are incomplete or internally inconsistent. De Soto was supportive of U.S. facilitation on late declarations and stated he would bring this to the Bureau; other SPs were also supportive of moving forward (e.g., France, Germany, Japan, Australia, Netherlands). In addition to the topics the TS raised, the Netherlands suggested that TS efforts in the area of sampling and analysis may raise other topics for the cluster. Iran stated that they felt the DG's paper on facility agreements was not very promising and reminded the group that SPs cannot decide whether facility agreements are needed. -------------- -------------- INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - 2A/2A* LOW CONCENTRATION LIMITS -------------- -------------- ¶11. (U) Steve Wade (UK) led a facilitation on the topic of low concentration limits for declarations of Schedule 2A/2A* chemicals. He provided an updated draft (dated March 2006) of his paper during the consultation, which included the following changes to OP 13 (all in brackets): (1) specification of the concentration at "30" percent; (2) specification of the quantity threshold at the "verification" threshold; and (3) clarification that this quantity is the "annual" amount produced, processed or consumed. Wade stated that he had had a discussion with the TS Legal Advisor regarding the provisions of this proposal, and that he felt the provisions were legally viable. France asked that the Legal Advisor prepare something in writing to this end, which Wade committed to request. ¶12. (U) Wade also gave several statistics about the fluoropolymers industry (which generates PFIB as an unwanted byproduct). He stated that between 2004 and 2009: (1) growth of the PTFE industry was estimated at about 6 percent annually; and (2) growth of the other fluoropolymer industries was estimated at about 5.3 percent annually. He also stated that the range of capacities of PTFE facilities was 1,500 to 16,000 tons per year, which meant that facilities would have to drop production below 200 tons per year in order to avoid declaration under this proposal. ¶13. (U) The discussion centered on OP 13 and PFIB. India still favors 1 percent without a quantity threshold and requested more clarification on this proposal. Switzerland, the UK, and Norway all favor a low concentration but would support this proposal. France still seems very confused on what OP 13 accomplishes and requested clarification. Germany requested that we return to discussion on Option C from the October 2005 facilitator's paper, at which point Italy left the meeting. Germany also referred to its paper on BZ and asked that the rationale for a low concentration level for BZ be discussed. Japan supported Germany's proposal to return to the October 2005 paper. ¶14. (U) Ken Penman (Industry Information Evaluation) stated that, currently, six SPs declare 12 PFIB plants under Schedule 2. From open source information, the TS estimates that this proposal would bring in about 12 new plants for declaration, some of which would be in the U.S. Later, Penman provided del rep a copy of an October 2005 report compiled by CEH Marketing Research Reports on the fluoropolymer industry. He also recommended the discussion on this topic in the Report of the Fourth Session of the Science Advisory Board (SAB-IV/1, dated 6 February 2001). With these documents and current SP declarations, we should be able to get a better feel of the actual impact of this proposal. ¶15. (U) Wade promised to provide the additional legal and clarification information requested. He also committed to providing a new draft of his paper in the near future. -------------- INDUSTRY CONSULTATIONS - SCHEDULE 3 TRANSFERS -------------- ¶16. (U) Arya Sandeep (India) led a facilitation on the topic of transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals. The basis of this discussion was the existing facilitator's paper from January 19, 2006. However, at the meeting, Iran dropped a paper of proposed amendments to the facilitator's paper. The facilitator opened discussion on Iran's proposed amendments, but there was no expectation of any acceptance of these proposals until delegations have received reactions from capitals. ¶17. (U) Del rep deployed guidance as received. The proposed change to OP1 was supported by Germany, Sweden, Russia (who proposed the language changes),and Iran (who proposed more positive language than the Russians). ¶18. (U) France, UK, Switzerland, and the Netherlands were concerned with the phrase "show restraint" in Iran's proposal as addressing transfers that could be for prohibited purposes, language Iran insists is similar to that of the facilitator's earlier (October 6) paper. ¶19. (U) It is important to note that, despite its compromise proposal, Iran still prefers a total ban on transfers to non-SPs. They see the five year period discussed in para 27 of VA Part VIII to be in line with the three year delay in implementation of the Schedule 2 ban discussed in para 31 of VA Part VII. However, a version of Iran's proposed changes may be the facilitator's best chance of success for a decision. -------------- OCPF SITE SELECTION METHODOLOGY -------------- ¶20. (U) Luis Garcia (Spain) led a facilitation on the topic of how the TS should select Other Chemical Production Facilities (OCPFs) for industry inspections. First, the TS presented its latest round of modeling (the Highly Protected documents were made available the day before the consultation),showing what would happen in all 73 cases if 20 countries colluded by putting the maximum number of points on one country and the remainder of their points on the PSF facilities in the regional group of the country being targeted. In general, this changed the expected number of inspections by only one or two per year. Italy opened discussion by pleading for simplicity, noting that it was difficult to explain to his capital, and he had given up (a number of delegates nodded in agreement). Italy begged the facilitator to make the concepts more comprehensible and move towards simplifying the proposals. ¶21. (U) The facilitator then introduced a draft decision. Several delegations (UK, Iran, India) noted that this introduction was premature because delegations are nowhere near consensus on a methodology. The facilitator needs to focus on the methodology, not draft decisions. Iran supported by Brazil stated that the facilitator's proposed methodology is unacceptable because it allows states to nominate other states; it is unacceptable to bring political elements into the process. New Zealand and Norway noted that the current methodology is unacceptable, and that change is needed now. Even with political elements, and collusion by half the nominating states, the expected number of inspections increases only by one or two per year, a minimal impact. ¶22. (U) Delegations raised concerns regarding operational paragraphs (OP) 4-6. OP4 recommends that the TS provide all states upon request the nominations made by each state. Switzerland, supported by Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK, recommended that if nomination information is provided to requesting states, it should be done in the following year so that states cannot predict where the inspections might be carried out. Sweden wondered how a state that feared it had been a victim of collusion would know and what information would be available to distinguish between collusion and multiple nominations made without collusion. France, noting that nominations will be incomprehensible anyway, supported the facilitator's approach. The facilitator closed this discussion by telling delegations that the TS should not hide any information from anyone. ¶23. (U) In addition, delegations were concerned about the 90-day lag for submitting annual declarations (OP3). France, supported by Italy, noted that this would be the same time period states would have to prepare ADPA declarations, and many would be unable to do both by the end of the 90 day period. With respect to OP5, delegations wondered why the facilitator proposed to review the methodology after four years rather than three or five years. The TS responded that if a four-year time period was chosen, three inspection cycles would have been completed, allowing for a more fulsome debate on its experience. ¶24. (U) Delegations worried about immortalizing the A14 methodology as currently described in OP6. New Zealand noted that a number of delegations believe that A14 is not the best, and that in a separate consultation delegations should consider what technical characteristics might better describe the work at OCPF sites worldwide. The key issue for the selection methodology is that it increases the probability that facilities relevant to the CWC are selected for inspection. ¶25. (U) The U.S., supported by a number of delegations, pressed the TS to provide a listing of the inspectable OCPF sites with the relevant A14-related information. The TS requested that interested delegates meet with Per Runn to determine how best to move this request forward. ¶26. (U) Finally, delegations debated how best to proceed. Colombia, as Vice Chair for the cluster, noted that delegations needed to move faster. Only three consultations remain before CSP-11, and if a method is to be finalized prior to the CSP, more meetings are necessary. Several delegations supported holding consultations outside the industry intersessionals. Iran said that it favored holding two or three OCPF meetings during the industry weeks so that experts from Tehran could attend. -------------- COMMERCIAL SCHEDULE 1 FACILITY AGREEMENT -------------- ¶27. (U) Del rep recently proposed to the TS that we return to discussions on the draft facility agreement language for the one U.S. commercial Schedule 1 facility that is declared. In the past, discussions had stalled because of significant differences on the Schedule 2 boilerplate language. Now that those differences have been narrowed to just one topic (sampling and analysis),it seems appropriate to return to the Schedule 1 effort. The TS agreed with this proposal and anticipates preparing a draft summarizing the current state of discussions shortly after the meetings of the EC. -------------- FINANCIAL RULES -------------- ¶28. (U) Consultations on the Financial Rules were held on March 7, and were sparsely attended. Overall it was a productive meeting, with only two financial rules and one amendment remaining pending. There will be no decision ready for the upcoming EC, however delegations foresee a decision at the May EC, assuming capitals are on board with decisions made at this and preceding consultations. The facilitator (Snelsire, U.S.) opened by asking if delegations had further comments on the amendments. ¶29. (U) Rule 9.3.01 (b) Germany suggested adding that investment losses should be reported to the DG, as well as the Principal Financial Officer and that the DG will prepare the report. This was supported by delegations. ¶30. (U) The facilitator noted that the amendments to financial rules 10.6.04(d),10.6.05(c) and 10.6.06 (all relating to procurement) are still being considered in capital. Discussion then began on the overall financial rules, article by article. ¶31. (U) Article 1 - Rule 1.1.01 - Iran suggested replacing the word "issued" with "prepared" to more accurately reflect reality (1st sentence). They further suggested adding that after DG "and approved by the Executive Council" to that sentence; and to end the final sentence with "and Executive Council." They linked this suggestion with rule 16.2. Germany disagreed with adding the EC to this paragraph, arguing that it is not needed. Japan requested deferring this item. Germany agreed and noted that this would add an unnecessary redundancy to the financial rules. ¶32. (U) Article 2 - Rule 2.2.01 - Iran noted that the same body who approves the financial rules should interpret the rules, therefore the DG should not make that interpretation; instead the EC should. Thus Iran wants to change DG to EC in both places. The TS noted that in general that is true, but during deliberations and debate of the draft financial rules in 1998, the EC delegated it to the DG. Other delegations felt that to change this to reflect Iran's concerns could lead to micromanagement by the EC and be more trouble than it is worth. ¶33. (U) Japan suggested adding "shall bring the case to the attention of the EC for its consideration" after ...the DG shall.... Italy suggested keeping Japan's suggestion and adding as a first sentence, "Daily interpretation of the financial rules are by the DG." then the rest of the paragraph. Germany preferred the original wording, noting that the EC can change any interpretation whenever it decides. The UK supported Germany and noted that these rules have been discussed and agreed upon since 1998 and asked whether there was a value into going back through the rules so minutely. The facilitator suggested keeping the paragraph as-is except for changing "and" to "but." Iran reiterated that it wanted to keep its suggestion as is and suggested deferring the question to later. ¶34. (U) Article 3 - Rule 3.2.01 - Italy noted the second sentence is a redundancy and that it should be deleted. This was agreed and the article passed without further comment. ¶35. (U) Article 4 - Rule 4.12.01 - Germany suggested adding "generally" before 60 days, for flexibility in case of a vendor having trouble getting their invoices out in this time frame. Delegations agreed and the article passed. ¶36. (U) Articles 5 through 16 garnered little substantive comment and were passed. ¶37. (U) The facilitator will incorporate all the changes into a new version of the document for delegations to send to capitals. The next meeting will be held after the March EC with a hope to completely approving the Financial Rules at that time. -------------- HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT -------------- ¶38. (U) EC Chairman Dastis arranged a March 3 meeting of the OPCW working group on the HQ Agreement and MFA Protocol chief Peter Lohman. Lohman outlined changes at Schiphol to address the concerns raised by Ambassadors, but conceded that there are problems ensuring that all airport staff are aware of the procedures. He asserted that the MFA would continue making the point to airport supervisors. On difficulties delegations have had with police, Lohman said that the MFA will meet with some 50 senior officers in the near term. He added that the mayor of The Hague had expressed publicly his general concern about how the police are dealing with the public. ¶39. (U) On financial matters, Lohman noted the large policy paper that had been prepared by the MFA. He also noted that a steering group would be set up which would deal with assistance to diplomats, schools and health care. The group would also address tax issues. Finally, Lohman said that the MFA desk handling international organizations will be expanded to handle these issues. ¶40. (U) Javits sends. ARNALL