NETHERLANDS/ISAF: WALKING A FINE LINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000041 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM, SA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/09/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR NATO NL AF SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/ISAF: WALKING A FINE LINE Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Chat Blakeman, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: PM Balkenende hosted a strategy session January 9 to develop a compromise that would allow the debate on ISAF III to move forward to Parliament. D-66 Ministers Pecthold and Brinkhorst had announced over the weekend they continue to oppose an official Cabinet decision to support the mission. Fellow coalition party VVD, meanwhile, is holding up Parliamentary debate until there is a decision. Balkenende plans additional consultations this week. End summary. Walking a Fine Line -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Director General for Political Affairs Hugo Siblesz told Charge January 9 that the GONL was "walking a fine line" between a Cabinet breakdown and a decision to participate in ISAF. Balkenende hosted a strategy session with FM Bot, DM Kamp, Deputy PM/Finance Minister Zalm -- representing VVD -- and Deputy PM/Economic Affairs Minister Brinkhorst -- representing D-66. He will hold additional consultations this week to seek a compromise agreeable to both D-66 and VVD in order to move the debate out of Cabinet and into Parliament. Siblesz said that avoiding a Cabinet crisis was in everyone's best interests; there would be "no deployment anywhere" if the government collapsed. ¶3. (C) Charge told Siblesz that comments made by former U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands Paul Bremer over the weekend regarding the ramifications of a negative Dutch decision were made by a "private U.S. citizen," and were not arranged by the USG. He said that Washington was considering a press briefing to set the record straight; Siblesz was grateful. Siblesz also encouraged Post to continue outreach to parliamentarians on a private basis, and hoped that Sen. Landrieu would have the opportunity to make helpful comments on Stage III during her upcoming visit. Largest Coalition Party Divided -------------- ¶4. (C) Polcouns pressed Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) Foreign Policy Spokesman Henk Jan Ormel January 9 over his party's call for an impossible two-thirds parliamentary majority in favor of deployment. Ormel insisted that because the divisions within the CDA -- roughly 10-15 out of the 44 members oppose the mission -- demanding a broad majority in favor would provide necessary political cover for the CDA to vote in favor. Unfortunately, Ormel said, it was no longer possible to separate the mission from politics. The deployment, he added, is not a vote-winner for the CDA. ¶5. (C) Ormel blasted coalition partners D-66 and VVD for making it impossible to hold a substantive debate in Parliament. He noted that polls actually were running in a positive direction -- only 70 percent of the public opposes the mission now compared to 85 percent a few weeks ago. He argued that a public debate in Parliament would have helped shift the focus back to the merits of the deployment itself, where the case could still be won. ¶6. (C) Ormel readily acknowledged the damage being done to Dutch credibility and said he was "embarrassed" by the current situation. He was deeply pessimistic that Dutch troops would go to Uruzgan for ISAF III, but suggested that a "way out" of the current crisis could be found if NATO would consider alternative scenarios for the Dutch troops and/or allow more time for the Dutch to reach a decision, i.e., after the local elections in March. Views from an Elder Statesman -------------- ¶7. (C) Former Foreign Minister and PvdA member Max van der Stoel told Charge and Polcouns January 9 the political realities of the mission were getting lost in the political food fight within the Cabinet. Van der Stoel argued that doubters needed to be convinced that relevant reconstruction work would be possible during the mission. He indicated that PvdA was split over the mission, and that Balkenende's CDA was also having serious misgivings. Charge stressed the importance of reconstruction work and urged van der Stoel to use his influence as an elder statesman to persuade Labor and other naysayers to support the mission. Post will continue to reach out this week to similarly influential opinion makers. Danes, Brits Ready to Engage -------------- ¶8. (C) The Danish Ambassador told Charge January 9 that the Danish Prime Minister is expected to approve shortly the deployment of several hundred Danish troops to Helmund Province in partnership with the British ISAF III deployment. According to the Danish Ambassador, parliamentary debate would follow the announcement with a decision expected on or around February 26. Charge pushed the Danish Ambassador to use this news to encourage the Dutch; she agreed. ¶9. (C) In addition, the British Ambassador told Charge January 9 that the British Embassy will engage parliamentarians involved in the debate. Both the British Ambassador and Charge will push D-66 Minister Brinkhorst when they meet with him separately on January 11. Dutch Military Raring to Go -------------- ¶10. (C) While the debate has turned decidedly political, the Dutch military remains steadfast in its support of the mission to Afghanistan. A current television commercial favorably depicts Royal Netherlands Air Force personnel -- including F-16s, pilots and technicians -- in Afghanistan as a recruitment pitch. MOD contacts told poloff January 9 that while the Cabinet decision still looked grim, Kamp has given marching orders to proceed as if the deployment will happen. BLAKEMAN