NETHERLANDS: BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA, EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF IN PK NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO THE
HAGUE FOCUSES ON AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: During his December 6 visit to The Hague,
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs
Richard Boucher highlighted the strategic importance of a
stable Afghanistan in a zone of potential stability
stretching from Central to South Asia. He stressed the
results of a recent interagency policy review emphasizing
better coordination of military, governance, and
reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan, and praised
the Dutch for their military-reconstruction efforts in
Uruzgan province. He discussed support for the Karzai
Government, relations with Pakistan, and the outcome from the
NATO Summit in Riga. He also questioned the necessity of a
Contact Group or High Representative role for Afghanistan,
given London Compact commitments already made by the
international community. Regionally, he discussed Pakistani
President Musharraf's domestic plans, the U.S.-India Civilian
Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and Kazahkstan's bid to chair
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A/S
Boucher met with the Dutch interagency, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs' public affairs section, and Dutch
parliamentarians, and also participated in a press
roundtable. End summary.

Dutch Interagency Serious on Afghanistan
--------------


2. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher participated in a December
6 roundtable discussion led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Director of Security Affairs Robert de Groot. Dutch
attendees included Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime
Minister Karel van Oosteroom, Ministry of Defense Deputy
Director for General Policy Affairs Jan Geerts Siccama, and
from the Ministry of Affairs: Director of the Asia and
Oceania Department Joop Scheffers, Head of Reconstruction and
Good Governance Louisa Anten, Head of the Americas Department
Jos Schellars, and Deputy Director of the Uruzgan Task Force
Dewi van de Weerde. Ambassador Arnall, Air Attache Colonel
Miller, and Political Military Officer Jason Grubb attended
for the U.S. side.


3. (C) Boucher began discussion with an overview of the
region, and the strategic importance of a stable Afghanistan
as a central area of transit and exchange in a zone of
potential stability stretching from Central to South Asia.
He noted the importance of stabilizing both Afghanistan and
Pakistan, especially in connection to the global war on
terrorism -- this will take a persistent and real effort. He
cited two main problems in this effort: 1) the inability of
the Afghan Government to deliver democratic governance to
southern Afghanistan; and 2) Pakistan's failure to secure its
side of the border, and prevent Taliban forces from crossing
into Afghanistan.


4. (C) Boucher said the U.S. Government has reviewed its
policy in Afghanistan over the past few months, seeking to
identify how best to deliver the benefits of good governance.
Achieving this requires coordinating military, governance,
and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan, and not
merely in a few select locales. He said the U.S. is
committed to success in Afghanistan, and will soon be
announcing a large funding increase as part of its
comprehensive strategy to better coordinate military,
governance, and reconstruction efforts. The U.S. has also
agreed to fund Pakistani President Musharraf $750 million
over the next five years -- and hopes Allies will follow our
lead.


5. (C) Boucher pointed to the importance of commitments made
in the London Compact, especially in terms of bolstering
failing police and justice efforts. He expressed concern
that NATO as an institution does not have an assistance arm
to work in coordination with its military operation -- as
such, we must rely on national efforts, and some Allies
coordinate reconstruction and military efforts better than
others. On that note, he praised the Dutch for their very
serious, and well-coordinated military-reconstruction mission
in Uruzgan province.


6. (C) On Pakistan, de Groot suggested too much focus was
being paid on the northern region of Waziristan, and not on


the south in Baluchistan. He understood the inclination to
target Waziristan, given its proximity to Kabul and NATO
forces. However, he argued that Kandahar in the south was
the real danger, and traffic flow from Quetta to Kandahar
province was flowing freely. He acknowledged that a proposed
fence along the 2,000-mile border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan was unrealistic. But perhaps checkpoints in the
south along the Kandahar-Baluchistan border would inhibit
Taliban forces from crossing into Afghanistan. Boucher
explained that Musharraf was focused on providing better
economic incentives to the tribes in the north.
Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to pressure Musharraf to
address the situation in Quetta, Boucher said, and Musharraf
appears willing to do more.


7. (C) De Groot acknowledged that the Brits, Canadians and
Dutch were already looking at options with respect to the end
of their two-year deployment commitments, i.e., to extend or
find an ally to replace them. De Groot said the Dutch
political landscape had changed significantly following the
November 22 parliamentary elections. It was important now
more than ever to demonstrate real progress to the Dutch
public -- especially with regard to reconstruction efforts --
by next spring if the Dutch Government has any hope of
persuading its Parliament to approve an extension of the
two-year mission. Boucher acknowledged that this would be
difficult, and anticipated another tough spring offensive by
the Taliban. However, he argued that unlike this past year,
necessary components -- such as NATO forces and improved
police training -- will be in place to help ensure progress
by the end of 2007.


8. (C) Turning to training issues, de Groot commended
U.S.-led efforts to train the Afghan National Army (ANA); all
graduates of U.S. training that the Dutch have worked with
have been "top-notch," he said. The problem, de Groot
explained, is that there are too few trained soldiers --
Dutch equipment for Afghan soldiers in Uruzgan is sitting
unused in crates. He lamented that Afghan Defense Minister
Wardak had promised the Dutch Government 1,000-2,000 ANA
troops in Uruzgan by the end of this year -- instead, they
got 240 soldiers. Boucher said the U.S. is working to train
auxiliary policemen, starting with several hundred and the
goal of training 11,000. He noted, however, that training
was slow-going due to the high illiteracy rate. It has
proven difficult to explain sophisticated surveillance
operations or equipment to a person who cannot read, Boucher
said -- training will take some time.


9. (C) Turning to the Afghan Government, de Groot said Karzai
was doing a "lousy" job of public diplomacy. Dutch officials
travel frequently to Uruzgan, and have never seen a Kabul
official in Tarin Kowt -- an unusual circumstance, given the
significant number of officials who have their roots in
southern Afghanistan. Kabul is "not visible, not engaged" in
Uruzgan, de Groot averred -- Karzai needs to engage with the
public, and especially with tribal leaders in the south who
have steadily lost power over the past 30 years. Boucher
said the U.S. is working with Karzai on strategic
communication and public relations efforts. He said Karzai's
natural inclination is to fall back on warlords for support
-- this alienates the democratically-appointed governors and
police chiefs. More thought needs to be given to integrating
tribal leaders, he said, and suggested the jirga might be
used to get clans more involved.


10. (C) On the NATO Riga Summit, Boucher said Allies made
clear their political commitment to Afghanistan. But he
questioned the utility of the proposed Contact Group or a
High Representative position to coordinate reconstruction
efforts. Boucher argued that the international community had
already agreed to a coordinated approach through the London
Compact and the comprehensive national development strategy
-- why do we need a new strategy? Moreover, he questioned
which countries would belong to the proposed Contact Group,
and what exactly would it do?


11. (C) De Groot said the Dutch were surprised by the French
proposal, and had similar concerns. That said, de Groot
suggested the excellent job being done by NATO was not enough
-- the UN and EU must become more involved. He noted that
the UN is now more focused on Africa, while it was very

difficult to get Afghanistan in the recently released EU
seven-year budget. De Groot wondered if a High
Representative might be helpful in attracting more attention
and coordinating international community efforts. Boucher
strongly argued that Karzai should fill this role along with
the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. He said
military operations will always get more attention than
reconstruction efforts -- Karzai and the Monitoring Board can
and should become the symbol for reconstruction. De Groot
concurred; while he hadn't seen much of the Board, he
suggested it was just getting up to speed now, and we should
not seek to replace it.


12. (C) Boucher raised the necessity of better coordination
among Allied efforts, and suggested a reinforced North
Atlantic Council meeting on Afghanistan. De Groot was
skeptical this would be helpful; most NATO business is
conducted at the Permanent Representatives coffee or lunch,
while the North Atlantic Council is used to read "stale"
talking points from capitals. Instead, he suggested a
Council reinforced with troop contributors might be taken
more seriously. At the same time, de Groot said, we should
consider an informal, regular meeting of troop contributors
to improve coordination and strategy for military and
reconstruction efforts -- the southern troop contributors are
already meeting on an informal basis. De Groot suggested
giving these informal meetings some political structure to
grant them authority. Boucher said he would discuss these
ideas further with USNATO.


13. (C) De Groot concluded discussion by noting that detainee
issues and the International Security Assistance
Force/Operation Enduring Freedom composite headquarters will
continue to be sensitive issues for the Dutch. He said the
Dutch Government must continue to demonstrate to the Dutch
public and parliament that NATO and Operation Enduring
Freedom have separate mandates, and the composite
headquarters blurs the line between the two. Boucher noted
that integration was important for the U.S., especially with
more U.S. troops -- 12,000 in Enduring Freedom, and 12,000 in
NATO -- in Afghanistan than ever before. He stressed that
the command was integrated among allies, and was not just a
U.S. command.

Afghanistan and More at the Foreign Ministry
--------------


14. (C) In a tour d'horizon discussion with Ministry of
Foreign Affairs' Deputy Political Director Wim Geerts,
Boucher reinforced earlier points made on Afghanistan and
commended Dutch efforts in Uruzgan. Geerts said the Dutch
deployment is going well, and reiterated that the Dutch will
honor their two-year commitment to Uruzgan despite the
changed Dutch political landscape. He expected Dutch Prime
Minister Balkenende to lead the next Government -- the
question will be which parties from the left are apart of the
new coalition. He also recognized that the effort in
Afghanistan will take time, and hoped the Dutch could be
there for the long-haul. He noted that the Canadians are
already "on thin ice" with their public due to the tough
casualties taken in Kandahar province, and suggested the
Dutch Government could easily be in the same position.


15. (C) On Pakistan, Boucher described efforts to pressure
Musharraf to go after Al-Qaida, the Taliban and Kashmiri
rebel groups. Geerts questioned Musharraf's strength
domestically; Boucher expected Musharraf to prevail in the
elections next year, and outlined U.S. efforts to transform
the Pakistani education system from a radical to a more
moderate institution. Geerts inquired about Musharraf's
latest proposal on Kashmir; Boucher thought it had the
makings of a possible deal, and noted that the U.S. has
encouraged India and Pakistan to talk frankly about
Afghanistan in order to dispel Pakistani beliefs that India
is aiding rebels in Baluchistan through its consulates in
Afghanistan.


16. (C) Geerts raised the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement, noting that the Dutch Government was
now "favorably inclined" toward it, provided it does not
jeopardize the Nonproliferation Treaty and could be done "in
harmony" with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He said the

Dutch still remain skeptical to a lesser extent that India
will be able to implement International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards. Boucher said it was clear that India would never
give up its fissile material program, and described the
agreement as a way to bring India alongside the
non-proliferation regime. He said the agreement improves
India's strategic relationship with the West, and has
actually transformed in a favorable way Indian views on the
Nuclear Suppliers Group. Geerts asked if the results of the
recent U.S. elections would influence Congressional support
for the agreement; Boucher said it has broad bipartisan
support, so the mid-term election results should not have any
effect.


17. (C) On Central Asia, Geerts questioned why the U.S. had
opposed Kazakhstan as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe chair in 2009. Boucher said the U.S.
could support a Kazakhstani chairmanship in 2011 provided the
Kazakhstanis make some necessary reforms, including and
especially its election law. He said the U.S. had been very
frank and open with the Kazakhstani Government on this score,
and was disappointed they continued to push for the chair.
Nevertheless, Boucher said the U.S. is willing to engage with
Kazakhstan again next year, with the goal of a Kazakhstani
OSCE chair in 2011. Geerts suggested granting Kazakhstan the
chairmanship earlier as a catalyst to more reform, much like
granting Partnership for Peace to Serbia at Riga.

"Here's What You Should Say..."
--------------


18. (C) Boucher met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Director of Information (DVL) Han Peters and his staff on
December 6. Peters, who is responsible for the Ministry's
public affairs efforts, explained the first month of Dutch
press coverage on the Dutch deployment to Afghanistan had
gone "fairly well," but recent press coverage has been more
critical. He noted doubts in the press that the Dutch would
be able to achieve its reconstruction goals for the province.
Peters suggested the biggest challenge for the Government
was trying to convince the Dutch public that the goal of the
deployment is to improve the lives of the Afghan people, and
not "appeasing Americans by killing Taliban."


19. (C) Boucher noted this problem was prevalent within
publics of Allies deployed in Afghanistan, who have forgotten
that Afghanistan was the origin of the war on terrorism, or
cannot remember the repressive society imposed by the
Taliban. In the United States, Boucher argued, the debate on
Afghanistan is focused on determining the correct strategy to
pursue. In Europe, he said, publics need to remember why we
deployed to Afghanistan. He said too much press coverage
focused on enemy body counts and allied casualties -- more
needs to be done to highlight the successful reconstruction
projects -- the schools, roads, and dams -- that are on-going
and making a difference in Afghanistan.

Strong Opinions from Parliamentarians
--------------


20. (C) Ambassador Arnall hosted a lunch in honor of
Assistant Secretary Boucher, including three Dutch
parliamentarians: Arend Jan Boekesteijn (VVD) and Roland
Kortenhorst (CDA) from parties in the current caretaker
coalition government, and Mariko Peters (Green Left)
representing the opposition.


21. (C) Boekesteijn was supportive of Dutch and U.S. efforts,
but highly critical of European resolve and expressed
concerns that NATO would fail in Afghanistan. Citing private
conversations with the UK's General Richards, Boekesteijn
argued Uruzgan was "close to collapse," and questioned
whether democracy was viable in southern Afghanistan. He
characterized the NATO summit in Riga as a "scandal" due to
the inability to raise additional troops in the south. He
argued Karzai had no authority outside of Kabul, while
regional neighbors and moderate Taliban forces should be
included in talks to find a solution.


22. (C) Peters acknowledged that political and reconstruction
goals will take time, which conflicted with the intense
pressure to show quick results now. She suggested there was

a lack of urgency in the Afghan Government and international
community, and did not expect much from military efforts in
Afghanistan. Unlike her party, she was not critical of the
U.S. approach, but believed more needed to be done to promote
good governance. Peters was critical of the Karzai
Government, however, especially recent Karzai appointees that
were known for corruption and human rights abuses.


23. (C) Kortenhorst asked about the border security with
Pakistan, and what more can be done to fight Taliban coming
from Quetta. Peters agreed, suggesting a precarious
political situation in a nuclear-armed Pakistan facing human
rights problems and unrest in Baluchistan. Boekesteijn
argued that Musharraf wanted a Taliban-controlled neighbor.
Boucher replied that it was important to avoid the "blame
game" between Afghanistan and Pakistan; both Karzai and
Musharraf need to focus on their respective sides of the
border. He said the White House has worked hard to stress
the importance of working together. Territorial issues like
the Durand Line were not insurmountable, he said. In
response to criticism from Boekesteijn, Boucher said
Musharraf remains in control in Pakistan, and the U.S. will
continue to help provide economic opportunities. The key, he
said, was for Pakistan to become more moderate -- this will
take time.


24. (C) Boucher reiterated that context was important when
dealing with Afghanistan -- most efforts were "construction
vice reconstruction." He said the U.S. "knows what needs to
be done," and will match this resolve with both investment
and energy -- the question is whether Europe will match these
efforts. He agreed that delivering good governance to the
Afghan people was a top priority, and must be integrated and
coordinated in conjunction with military and reconstruction
efforts. He emphasized better training and equipment for the
Afghan Police, especially given the high illiteracy rate. He
defended Karzai's appointments, noting only 14 of the 84
appointed police chiefs were problematic, and these
individuals were vast improvements over their predecessors.


25. (C) Boucher agreed that the EU does need to do a lot
more, and the portion of the recently released EU seven-year
budget devoted to Afghanistan was disappointing. He again
questioned the necessity of creating a Contact Group or High
Representative position to coordinate international community
and reconstruction efforts. Moreover, the UN and
international community should honor their commitments when
they signed the London Compact. Ambassador Arnall suggested
that anti-American sentiment pervasive in Europe had
negatively influenced European allies' willingness to do more
in Afghanistan; Peters and Boekesteijn agreed, but offered no
solutions.

ARNALL