NETHERLANDS: BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002587 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA, EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO AF IN PK NL SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO THE HAGUE FOCUSES ON AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Ambassador Roland Arnall, reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During his December 6 visit to The Hague, Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher highlighted the strategic importance of a stable Afghanistan in a zone of potential stability stretching from Central to South Asia. He stressed the results of a recent interagency policy review emphasizing better coordination of military, governance, and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan, and praised the Dutch for their military-reconstruction efforts in Uruzgan province. He discussed support for the Karzai Government, relations with Pakistan, and the outcome from the NATO Summit in Riga. He also questioned the necessity of a Contact Group or High Representative role for Afghanistan, given London Compact commitments already made by the international community. Regionally, he discussed Pakistani President Musharraf's domestic plans, the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and Kazahkstan's bid to chair the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. A/S Boucher met with the Dutch interagency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' public affairs section, and Dutch parliamentarians, and also participated in a press roundtable. End summary. Dutch Interagency Serious on Afghanistan -------------- ¶2. (C) Assistant Secretary Boucher participated in a December 6 roundtable discussion led by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Security Affairs Robert de Groot. Dutch attendees included Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Karel van Oosteroom, Ministry of Defense Deputy Director for General Policy Affairs Jan Geerts Siccama, and from the Ministry of Affairs: Director of the Asia and Oceania Department Joop Scheffers, Head of Reconstruction and Good Governance Louisa Anten, Head of the Americas Department Jos Schellars, and Deputy Director of the Uruzgan Task Force Dewi van de Weerde. Ambassador Arnall, Air Attache Colonel Miller, and Political Military Officer Jason Grubb attended for the U.S. side. ¶3. (C) Boucher began discussion with an overview of the region, and the strategic importance of a stable Afghanistan as a central area of transit and exchange in a zone of potential stability stretching from Central to South Asia. He noted the importance of stabilizing both Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in connection to the global war on terrorism -- this will take a persistent and real effort. He cited two main problems in this effort: 1) the inability of the Afghan Government to deliver democratic governance to southern Afghanistan; and 2) Pakistan's failure to secure its side of the border, and prevent Taliban forces from crossing into Afghanistan. ¶4. (C) Boucher said the U.S. Government has reviewed its policy in Afghanistan over the past few months, seeking to identify how best to deliver the benefits of good governance. Achieving this requires coordinating military, governance, and reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan, and not merely in a few select locales. He said the U.S. is committed to success in Afghanistan, and will soon be announcing a large funding increase as part of its comprehensive strategy to better coordinate military, governance, and reconstruction efforts. The U.S. has also agreed to fund Pakistani President Musharraf $750 million over the next five years -- and hopes Allies will follow our lead. ¶5. (C) Boucher pointed to the importance of commitments made in the London Compact, especially in terms of bolstering failing police and justice efforts. He expressed concern that NATO as an institution does not have an assistance arm to work in coordination with its military operation -- as such, we must rely on national efforts, and some Allies coordinate reconstruction and military efforts better than others. On that note, he praised the Dutch for their very serious, and well-coordinated military-reconstruction mission in Uruzgan province. ¶6. (C) On Pakistan, de Groot suggested too much focus was being paid on the northern region of Waziristan, and not on the south in Baluchistan. He understood the inclination to target Waziristan, given its proximity to Kabul and NATO forces. However, he argued that Kandahar in the south was the real danger, and traffic flow from Quetta to Kandahar province was flowing freely. He acknowledged that a proposed fence along the 2,000-mile border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was unrealistic. But perhaps checkpoints in the south along the Kandahar-Baluchistan border would inhibit Taliban forces from crossing into Afghanistan. Boucher explained that Musharraf was focused on providing better economic incentives to the tribes in the north. Nevertheless, the U.S. continues to pressure Musharraf to address the situation in Quetta, Boucher said, and Musharraf appears willing to do more. ¶7. (C) De Groot acknowledged that the Brits, Canadians and Dutch were already looking at options with respect to the end of their two-year deployment commitments, i.e., to extend or find an ally to replace them. De Groot said the Dutch political landscape had changed significantly following the November 22 parliamentary elections. It was important now more than ever to demonstrate real progress to the Dutch public -- especially with regard to reconstruction efforts -- by next spring if the Dutch Government has any hope of persuading its Parliament to approve an extension of the two-year mission. Boucher acknowledged that this would be difficult, and anticipated another tough spring offensive by the Taliban. However, he argued that unlike this past year, necessary components -- such as NATO forces and improved police training -- will be in place to help ensure progress by the end of 2007. ¶8. (C) Turning to training issues, de Groot commended U.S.-led efforts to train the Afghan National Army (ANA); all graduates of U.S. training that the Dutch have worked with have been "top-notch," he said. The problem, de Groot explained, is that there are too few trained soldiers -- Dutch equipment for Afghan soldiers in Uruzgan is sitting unused in crates. He lamented that Afghan Defense Minister Wardak had promised the Dutch Government 1,000-2,000 ANA troops in Uruzgan by the end of this year -- instead, they got 240 soldiers. Boucher said the U.S. is working to train auxiliary policemen, starting with several hundred and the goal of training 11,000. He noted, however, that training was slow-going due to the high illiteracy rate. It has proven difficult to explain sophisticated surveillance operations or equipment to a person who cannot read, Boucher said -- training will take some time. ¶9. (C) Turning to the Afghan Government, de Groot said Karzai was doing a "lousy" job of public diplomacy. Dutch officials travel frequently to Uruzgan, and have never seen a Kabul official in Tarin Kowt -- an unusual circumstance, given the significant number of officials who have their roots in southern Afghanistan. Kabul is "not visible, not engaged" in Uruzgan, de Groot averred -- Karzai needs to engage with the public, and especially with tribal leaders in the south who have steadily lost power over the past 30 years. Boucher said the U.S. is working with Karzai on strategic communication and public relations efforts. He said Karzai's natural inclination is to fall back on warlords for support -- this alienates the democratically-appointed governors and police chiefs. More thought needs to be given to integrating tribal leaders, he said, and suggested the jirga might be used to get clans more involved. ¶10. (C) On the NATO Riga Summit, Boucher said Allies made clear their political commitment to Afghanistan. But he questioned the utility of the proposed Contact Group or a High Representative position to coordinate reconstruction efforts. Boucher argued that the international community had already agreed to a coordinated approach through the London Compact and the comprehensive national development strategy -- why do we need a new strategy? Moreover, he questioned which countries would belong to the proposed Contact Group, and what exactly would it do? ¶11. (C) De Groot said the Dutch were surprised by the French proposal, and had similar concerns. That said, de Groot suggested the excellent job being done by NATO was not enough -- the UN and EU must become more involved. He noted that the UN is now more focused on Africa, while it was very difficult to get Afghanistan in the recently released EU seven-year budget. De Groot wondered if a High Representative might be helpful in attracting more attention and coordinating international community efforts. Boucher strongly argued that Karzai should fill this role along with the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. He said military operations will always get more attention than reconstruction efforts -- Karzai and the Monitoring Board can and should become the symbol for reconstruction. De Groot concurred; while he hadn't seen much of the Board, he suggested it was just getting up to speed now, and we should not seek to replace it. ¶12. (C) Boucher raised the necessity of better coordination among Allied efforts, and suggested a reinforced North Atlantic Council meeting on Afghanistan. De Groot was skeptical this would be helpful; most NATO business is conducted at the Permanent Representatives coffee or lunch, while the North Atlantic Council is used to read "stale" talking points from capitals. Instead, he suggested a Council reinforced with troop contributors might be taken more seriously. At the same time, de Groot said, we should consider an informal, regular meeting of troop contributors to improve coordination and strategy for military and reconstruction efforts -- the southern troop contributors are already meeting on an informal basis. De Groot suggested giving these informal meetings some political structure to grant them authority. Boucher said he would discuss these ideas further with USNATO. ¶13. (C) De Groot concluded discussion by noting that detainee issues and the International Security Assistance Force/Operation Enduring Freedom composite headquarters will continue to be sensitive issues for the Dutch. He said the Dutch Government must continue to demonstrate to the Dutch public and parliament that NATO and Operation Enduring Freedom have separate mandates, and the composite headquarters blurs the line between the two. Boucher noted that integration was important for the U.S., especially with more U.S. troops -- 12,000 in Enduring Freedom, and 12,000 in NATO -- in Afghanistan than ever before. He stressed that the command was integrated among allies, and was not just a U.S. command. Afghanistan and More at the Foreign Ministry -------------- ¶14. (C) In a tour d'horizon discussion with Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Deputy Political Director Wim Geerts, Boucher reinforced earlier points made on Afghanistan and commended Dutch efforts in Uruzgan. Geerts said the Dutch deployment is going well, and reiterated that the Dutch will honor their two-year commitment to Uruzgan despite the changed Dutch political landscape. He expected Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende to lead the next Government -- the question will be which parties from the left are apart of the new coalition. He also recognized that the effort in Afghanistan will take time, and hoped the Dutch could be there for the long-haul. He noted that the Canadians are already "on thin ice" with their public due to the tough casualties taken in Kandahar province, and suggested the Dutch Government could easily be in the same position. ¶15. (C) On Pakistan, Boucher described efforts to pressure Musharraf to go after Al-Qaida, the Taliban and Kashmiri rebel groups. Geerts questioned Musharraf's strength domestically; Boucher expected Musharraf to prevail in the elections next year, and outlined U.S. efforts to transform the Pakistani education system from a radical to a more moderate institution. Geerts inquired about Musharraf's latest proposal on Kashmir; Boucher thought it had the makings of a possible deal, and noted that the U.S. has encouraged India and Pakistan to talk frankly about Afghanistan in order to dispel Pakistani beliefs that India is aiding rebels in Baluchistan through its consulates in Afghanistan. ¶16. (C) Geerts raised the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, noting that the Dutch Government was now "favorably inclined" toward it, provided it does not jeopardize the Nonproliferation Treaty and could be done "in harmony" with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He said the Dutch still remain skeptical to a lesser extent that India will be able to implement International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Boucher said it was clear that India would never give up its fissile material program, and described the agreement as a way to bring India alongside the non-proliferation regime. He said the agreement improves India's strategic relationship with the West, and has actually transformed in a favorable way Indian views on the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Geerts asked if the results of the recent U.S. elections would influence Congressional support for the agreement; Boucher said it has broad bipartisan support, so the mid-term election results should not have any effect. ¶17. (C) On Central Asia, Geerts questioned why the U.S. had opposed Kazakhstan as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe chair in 2009. Boucher said the U.S. could support a Kazakhstani chairmanship in 2011 provided the Kazakhstanis make some necessary reforms, including and especially its election law. He said the U.S. had been very frank and open with the Kazakhstani Government on this score, and was disappointed they continued to push for the chair. Nevertheless, Boucher said the U.S. is willing to engage with Kazakhstan again next year, with the goal of a Kazakhstani OSCE chair in 2011. Geerts suggested granting Kazakhstan the chairmanship earlier as a catalyst to more reform, much like granting Partnership for Peace to Serbia at Riga. "Here's What You Should Say..." -------------- ¶18. (C) Boucher met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director of Information (DVL) Han Peters and his staff on December 6. Peters, who is responsible for the Ministry's public affairs efforts, explained the first month of Dutch press coverage on the Dutch deployment to Afghanistan had gone "fairly well," but recent press coverage has been more critical. He noted doubts in the press that the Dutch would be able to achieve its reconstruction goals for the province. Peters suggested the biggest challenge for the Government was trying to convince the Dutch public that the goal of the deployment is to improve the lives of the Afghan people, and not "appeasing Americans by killing Taliban." ¶19. (C) Boucher noted this problem was prevalent within publics of Allies deployed in Afghanistan, who have forgotten that Afghanistan was the origin of the war on terrorism, or cannot remember the repressive society imposed by the Taliban. In the United States, Boucher argued, the debate on Afghanistan is focused on determining the correct strategy to pursue. In Europe, he said, publics need to remember why we deployed to Afghanistan. He said too much press coverage focused on enemy body counts and allied casualties -- more needs to be done to highlight the successful reconstruction projects -- the schools, roads, and dams -- that are on-going and making a difference in Afghanistan. Strong Opinions from Parliamentarians -------------- ¶20. (C) Ambassador Arnall hosted a lunch in honor of Assistant Secretary Boucher, including three Dutch parliamentarians: Arend Jan Boekesteijn (VVD) and Roland Kortenhorst (CDA) from parties in the current caretaker coalition government, and Mariko Peters (Green Left) representing the opposition. ¶21. (C) Boekesteijn was supportive of Dutch and U.S. efforts, but highly critical of European resolve and expressed concerns that NATO would fail in Afghanistan. Citing private conversations with the UK's General Richards, Boekesteijn argued Uruzgan was "close to collapse," and questioned whether democracy was viable in southern Afghanistan. He characterized the NATO summit in Riga as a "scandal" due to the inability to raise additional troops in the south. He argued Karzai had no authority outside of Kabul, while regional neighbors and moderate Taliban forces should be included in talks to find a solution. ¶22. (C) Peters acknowledged that political and reconstruction goals will take time, which conflicted with the intense pressure to show quick results now. She suggested there was a lack of urgency in the Afghan Government and international community, and did not expect much from military efforts in Afghanistan. Unlike her party, she was not critical of the U.S. approach, but believed more needed to be done to promote good governance. Peters was critical of the Karzai Government, however, especially recent Karzai appointees that were known for corruption and human rights abuses. ¶23. (C) Kortenhorst asked about the border security with Pakistan, and what more can be done to fight Taliban coming from Quetta. Peters agreed, suggesting a precarious political situation in a nuclear-armed Pakistan facing human rights problems and unrest in Baluchistan. Boekesteijn argued that Musharraf wanted a Taliban-controlled neighbor. Boucher replied that it was important to avoid the "blame game" between Afghanistan and Pakistan; both Karzai and Musharraf need to focus on their respective sides of the border. He said the White House has worked hard to stress the importance of working together. Territorial issues like the Durand Line were not insurmountable, he said. In response to criticism from Boekesteijn, Boucher said Musharraf remains in control in Pakistan, and the U.S. will continue to help provide economic opportunities. The key, he said, was for Pakistan to become more moderate -- this will take time. ¶24. (C) Boucher reiterated that context was important when dealing with Afghanistan -- most efforts were "construction vice reconstruction." He said the U.S. "knows what needs to be done," and will match this resolve with both investment and energy -- the question is whether Europe will match these efforts. He agreed that delivering good governance to the Afghan people was a top priority, and must be integrated and coordinated in conjunction with military and reconstruction efforts. He emphasized better training and equipment for the Afghan Police, especially given the high illiteracy rate. He defended Karzai's appointments, noting only 14 of the 84 appointed police chiefs were problematic, and these individuals were vast improvements over their predecessors. ¶25. (C) Boucher agreed that the EU does need to do a lot more, and the portion of the recently released EU seven-year budget devoted to Afghanistan was disappointing. He again questioned the necessity of creating a Contact Group or High Representative position to coordinate international community and reconstruction efforts. Moreover, the UN and international community should honor their commitments when they signed the London Compact. Ambassador Arnall suggested that anti-American sentiment pervasive in Europe had negatively influenced European allies' willingness to do more in Afghanistan; Peters and Boekesteijn agreed, but offered no solutions. ARNALL