NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH ON DECEMBER 11-12 GAERC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 002579

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016
TAGS: PREL EUN NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU: DUTCH ON DECEMBER 11-12 GAERC
ISSUES

REF: A. A) STATE 195944


B. B) THE HAGUE 2564

C. C) THE HAGUE 2550

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew J. Schofer; reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 7, POLCOUNS was briefed by
Jeroen Boender (Deputy European Correspondent, MFA) and Koes
Dijkstra (MFA Department of European Integration) on Dutch
positions for the upcoming December 11-12 GAERC (ref A).
Boender and Dijkstra anticipated enlargement questions,
particularly Turkey, would dominate the meeting. Other
issues on the agenda will include the Western Balkans (the
Dutch will continue to insist on full Serbian cooperation
with ICTY),the Middle East (where the Dutch see some slight
grounds for optimism),Iran (the Dutch hope to send a clear
signal on Iran's need to comply with UNSC and IAEA
obligations),Afghanistan (where the EU can and should do
more "as the EU"),and the China Arms Embargo (no change in
the Dutch position.) END SUMMARY.

Enlargement/Turkey
--------------


3. (C) Dijkstra stressed that the Dutch are, in general,
"satisfied" with the current enlargement strategy, and will
resist moves to add any new states to the list of potential
members without a thorough review of broader EU goals and
capabilities. He said the Dutch will continue to insist that
any states currently in line for possible membership --
including Turkey and Croatia -- will be expected to stick
scrupulously to all existing criteria, but that no "new
obligations" should be created. With regard to Turkey,
Dijkstra noted that Bot was under considerable pressure from
Parliament (ref b) to support a suspension of negotiations
but insisted that the Dutch would not support this
"undesirable" outcome. The Dutch would, however, support
sending a "strong signal" to Ankara on the need to meet its
commitments, which could include a European Council decision
to postpone opening of "some chapters."

Western Balkans
--------------


4. (C) According to Boender, NATO's decision to offer PfP
status to Serbia will not change the long-standing Dutch
demand that Serbia cooperate fully with the ICTY as a
precondition to any movement toward EU membership. In
general, Boender did not expect much progress on Western
Balkans issues at the upcoming GAERC.

Israeli-Palestinian Issues/Lebanon/Syria
--------------


5. (C) Boender said that FM Bot was "slightly optimistic"
regarding the region as the result of his positive
discussions with counterparts at the EUROMED meeting in
Tampere and Hamas' declaration of a ceasefire. At the same
time, however, the Dutch were "realistic" that any windows of
opportunity could close quickly, so would urge the EU to step
up its activity within the Quartet. Boender said the Dutch
would also support measures intended to shore up the Sinoria
government in Lebanon against Syrian pressure.

Iran
--------------


6. (C) Boender anticipated the GAERC discussion on Iran would
be brief, as the major action remains in New York with the
Security Council. He noted, however, that the GAERC provided
another good opportunity to send a clear message to Iran that
it should comply with UNSC and IAEA obligations or face
"inevitable" sanctions, but did not speculate as to whether
such a message would be approved.

Afghanistan
--------------


7. (C) Noting that the EU is already involved in Afghanistan
through the actions of individual member states and the
financial support of the Commission, Boender argued that the
EU should now take a more active and public role "as the EU."
A fact finding mission was in Afghanistan now looking at
possible niches for the EU to fill; according to Boender, the

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area of police training looked particularly promising.

China Arms Embargo
--------------


8. (C) Boender stressed that the Dutch supported approving
the Code of Conduct (CoC) but did not link this directly to
lifting the Arms Embargo on China, as advocated by France.
He observed that it would be "unfortunate" if French
insistence on the linkage made it impossible to approve the
CoC, since the latter was a useful tool in its own right. He
made clear, however, that the Dutch -- "and 23 other states"
-- all viewed any lifting of the Arms Embargo as premature
(see also ref c.)
ARNALL