SCENESETTER FOR A/S BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 002546 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR SA, EUR/UBI, EUR/RPM E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV AF NL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S BOUCHER'S DECEMBER 6 VISIT TO THE NETHERLANDS Assistant Secretary Boucher: ¶1. (SBU) My embassy and I warmly welcome you to the Netherlands. Your visit comes at a time when the Dutch political landscape is undergoing significant change. The November 22 national elections have left the country divided, with no party or group of parties having a clear majority. In the short run, we do not expect any major changes in Dutch policies relevant to the U.S., including especially the Dutch deployment to Afghanistan as part of NATO's ISAF mission. But Dutch voters' dissatisfaction with the status quo could have troubling implications for the long term relationship. Your visit provides an excellent opportunity to reach out to Dutch parliamentarians, officials, and press on Afghanistan, as well as other issues across South Asia, including border security with Pakistan and the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperative Agreement. In addition, your interlocutors will be very interested in hearing your views regarding U.S. positions on Afghanistan, especially following the recent U.S. elections, the NATO summit in Riga, and the recently released DoD-State report critical of Afghan police training efforts. Dutch Elections: Polarization and Uncertainty -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Last June, the fragile coalition government of Jan Peter Balkenende collapsed over the mishandling of the citizenship status of Ayaan Hirsi Ali -- a former member of Parliament and outspoken critic of Islam who now lives in the U.S. -- forcing early elections on November 22. Although Balkenende's Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA) emerged as the putative "winner" of these elections, the 41 seats they control in the 150-seat Dutch Parliament are far too few to command a majority, and there are no obvious partners with which to form a new coalition government. Observers here believe the difficult negotiations could take weeks or months -- if they succeed at all. In the meantime, Balkenende will continue to head a caretaker minority government until a new coalition emerges or new elections are held. ¶3. (SBU) The biggest electoral losers were the Center-Left Labor Party (PvdA) headed by Wouter Bos, and the conservative Liberal Party (VVD) headed by Mark Rutte. Both were supportive of the Dutch deployment to Afghanistan and had been perceived as potential partners in a future Balkenende-led cabinet. But with 33 and 21 seats, respectively, neither now has enough support to reach the necessary 76 seats. The surprising success of fringe parties on the right and left, meanwhile, are pushing both parties away from the center, further complicating the prospects of the sort of centrist government coalition favored by Balkenende. On the left, the formerly Maoist Socialist Party grew from 9 to 25 seats overnight and now poses a serious threat to the PvdA for leadership of the Dutch left. On the right, the new Party of Freedom (PVV) successfully exploited deep-seated anti-immigrant and anti-EU emotions to capture a surprising 9 seats. ¶4. (SBU) The election results reveal a deeply divided Dutch electorate that is becoming even more so. The voters' swing to the fringes reflects the same broad dissatisfaction with the traditional political establishment that shot down the EU Constitutional Treaty in the Dutch referendum in 2005. This frustration is particularly striking at a time when the Dutch economy is performing better than it has in decades, consistently outperforming eurozone averages: GDP is expected to grow by 2.5 to 3 percent this year, and unemployment has fallen to 5.5 percent. Balkenende owes much of his relatively strong performance in the elections to these positive trends. Many have credited his government's implementation of painful structural reforms for this economic turnaround. This positive economic picture, however, was clearly not enough to overcome many voters' concerns in other areas. Your lunch with Dutch parliamentarians affords the opportunity to ask them how the coalition process will unfold, and whether issues like Afghanistan will be affected. Afghanistan: "To The Letter" -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Despite a contentious parliamentary debate last winter and low public support, the Dutch deployment to the southern Afghan province of Uruzgan as part of NATO's ISAF III mission did not emerge as a difficult election issue for the caretaker government. In retrospect, the lengthy debate, THE HAGUE 00002546 002 OF 003 in which the PvdA ultimately voted in favor of the deployment despite serious reservations, effectively neutralized most serious critics of the mission early and locked all major parties into supportive positions. In an effort to destroy this consensus, opposition parties to the left of Labor, notably Green Left and the Socialist Party, continue to argue noisily that the GONL has failed in its promise to maintain a clear line between ISAF and OEF operations, and that the focus of the mission has shifted from reconstruction -- which the public largely supports -- to a far more controversial combat mission. ¶6. (SBU) While PvdA leaders did not take the bait from parties further to the left during the elections, they will be hard pressed by the Socialists' strong election showing and their own disappointed grassroots members to reexamine the Dutch deployment given the perception that the security situation currently makes it impossible to conduct a successful reconstruction mission. Afghanistan could emerge as a coalition formation issue. However, time appears to be on the caretaker government's side -- given the complicated election outcome, coalition formation is expected to be a long, arduous process, allowing the "stay the course" argument to build momentum. GONL officials have told us on several levels that the Dutch will honor their deployment to Uruzgan "to the letter," meaning they will remain in Uruzgan for their two-year commitment, but will most likely not opt to extend the deployment. ¶7. (SBU) Meanwhile, the caretaker government is satisfied with the first phase of its mission in Afghanistan and has sought to address the reconstruction vs. combat mission divide. GONL officials have maintained on all levels that the Dutch deployed to Uruzgan "with their eyes open," knowing that they would be tested by the enemy and will be required to fight. To date, the Dutch have engaged and killed the enemy during combat missions. Nevertheless, the Dutch acknowledge a "difference of opinion" with their NATO allies, notably those deployed to the south. Instead of initiating major military operations, the Dutch emphasize winning "hearts and minds," and have employed an "ink blot" strategy by building secure areas within the province and connecting these areas through reconstruction projects. During a December 1 press conference, Dutch CHOD Gen. Berlijn and Dutch Ambassador to Afghanistan van de Geer noted that the frequency of skirmishes in Uruzgan is decreasing, while the GONL has invested six million euros in reconstruction projects in Uruzgan this year. Dutch Major General van Loon, commander of NATO ISAF forces in the southern provinces, and NATO Senior Civilian Representative Daan Everts -- a Dutchman -- have both stressed that success should not be measured by body counts, but by bolstering the Afghan local government. ¶8. (SBU) This Dutch "dissenting opinion" has led other Allies to question whether the Netherlands has the will to actively seek out and destroy the Taliban, especially after the Dutch assumed regional command of the southern provinces in Kandahar in November. The fact that the Dutch have yet to lose a soldier in combat exacerbates this perception. The Canadians and Brits have suffered casualties in heavy fighting in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, while Uruzgan initially was rather quiet. The Dutch have responded emphatically to these "soft" and "gutless" assertions, claiming they have fought effectively when deemed necessary, and to have actively patrolled in Uruzgan and supported the Canadians in Kandahar. Nevertheless, Dutch concerns about a "negative spiral of violence" has resulted in at least one occasion in which the Dutch policy of not pursuing enemy fighters -- even after having been fired upon -- led to chain of command issues among NATO allies. ¶9. (SBU) The Dutch have differed vocally with Allies on several other issues. They have been highly critical of Afghan President Karzai, and have expressed a willingness to talk to all Afghan parties. During a recent trip to Afghanistan, Dutch FM Bot said NATO should be willing to engage with moderate Taliban forces. The GONL also values its bilateral MOU with Afghan authorities regarding detainee transfers over ISAF policy. According to the Dutch-Afghan MOU, the Dutch will turn over any detainees to Afghan authorities within 96 hours. However, Afghan authorities must obtain Dutch approval prior to transferring detainees to third parties, i.e., the "anti-Guantanamo" clause. Finally, the Dutch are opposed to poppy eradication efforts, unless the poppy crop can be replaced by an alternative. THE HAGUE 00002546 003 OF 003 Riga NATO Summit -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Despite these differences, the Dutch continue to work effectively with Allies in the south. Dutch PM Balkenende and Canadian PM Harper together made a joint plea prior to the NATO Summit, citing the many reconstruction and democratic governance accomplishments, but stressing the need to ensure better security. They called on the Afghan government to extend its reach into remote areas and support governance at the local level, and stressed the importance of the Afghan national army and police force. Most importantly, they called for Allies to consolidate NATO resources, and work with the international community, including especially the UN and EU, to achieve better cooperation and unity of effort. The Dutch joined us at Riga in calling out Allies to contribute more towards the fight in the south. Your roundtable meeting with Dutch MFA, MOD, and the Prime Minister's office presents the opportunity to discuss cooperation and differences in southern Afghanistan, as well as next steps post-Riga in the effort to get other Allies to engage in the south and the recent joint DoD-State report critical of Afghan police training efforts. Pakistan/India -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Much of the Dutch interaction with Pakistan can be seen through the Afghanistan prism. During his recent October trip to the region, Dutch FM Bot harshly criticized his Pakistani counterpart for the lack of security along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Bot also has expressed interest in building a fence along certain portions of the Afghan-Pakistan border in an effort to achieve better security. The Dutch were highly supportive of NATO humanitarian and disaster relief efforts following the earthquake in Pakistan in late 2005. ¶12. (SBU) Most Dutch comment on India has been focused on the US-Indian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The Dutch remain skeptical of the deal, especially regarding India's ability to honor commitments to IAEA safeguards. They also remain concerned regarding how the deal will affect the NPT. However, they have expressed a willingness to listen to USG arguments, and appear ready to play a constructive role. Short-term Continuity; Long-term Questions -------------- ¶13. (SBU) In the short term, the lack of a new national consensus means policies of the previous, pro-Atlantic government will continue -- at least as long as Balkenende remains caretaker Prime Minister. Any new government will also be cautious about overturning or reversing commitments made by the previous government. Over the long run, however, the clear desire for change expressed by Dutch voters cannot be ignored. The traditionally close relationship between the U.S. and the Netherlands is one obvious target of frustration (as are NATO, the EU and the Dutch political establishment), and recent high-profile events -- Abu Gharib, Guantanamo, "CIA Flights," etc., have not made our jobs any easier. We are actively working to develop and maintain solid relationships across the political spectrum in an effort to refocus the relationship back on our core shared values, history, and future potential. Your visit here comes at a crucial stage in this effort, and outreach to Parliament, the current caretaker government, and the press will be very helpful. ARNALL