CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 002289

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN)
NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR
47TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, NOVEMBER 7-10

This is CWC-96-06.

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SUMMARY
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1. (U) If Iran elects to be reasonable and not block
consensus, it should be possible to get agreement on three
critical issues at EC-47: the U.S. extension request, the
2007 OPCW budget and the Director General's proposal for
tenure reform. It will also be possible to approve a
mechanism for payment of arrears and restoration of voting
rights. While Iran's behavior up to this point on these (and
other) issues has been typically unreasonable, their past
practice has been to wait until the end of the EC to finally
do a deal. That is entirely probable for this EC, especially
on the budget. On Article VII, there is little indication
that Iran, India and other NAM delegations will accept more
than a bare-bones decision that will put off any serious
discussion of national implementation to the December
Conference of States Parties. End Summary.

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EXTENSION REQUEST
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2. (U) There have been no overtly critical statements
regarding the U.S. request for an extension of the 100%
destruction deadline, aside from the occasional Russian
return to the argument that the U.S. has not submitted an
"acceptable" destruction plan (read: which completes
destruction by 2012). However, even the Russian delegation,
when pressed on the issue, is not ready to say that this
issue will cause it to object to the U.S. extension request.


3. (U) There has been general murmuring, however, among a
large number of delegations that there needs to be a
"discussion" of some type regarding the U.S. and Russian
extension requests. Iran has flatly stated that "a lot of
delegations" want to have an opportunity to thoroughly go
over these requests before the EC. While we doubt that any
other delegation would request deferral of the U.S. request,
it is very likely that Iran would cite the excuse of
insufficient discussion to defer the issue to a special EC to
be held on the margins of the CSP. For that reason, the U.S.
delegation is working with the EC Chair (South Africa) to
ensure some type of open discussion is held so that Iran in
particular is deprived of this excuse. Delegation will be
prepared to simply reiterate points on the U.S. destruction
program, and provide clarification on the U.S. position on
site visits and the draft decision language, but not/not
enter into a drafting exercise.


4. (U) Del has been bilaterally engaging other delegations
(primarily EC members) to gauge the level of concern going
into, and possible outcome at, EC-47. Among WEOG
delegations, comments regarding the U.S. request have been of
the "what are we doing with the extension requests?" nature
referenced above. WEOG and Eastern European concern tends to
focus more on the Russian destruction program and extension
request. There is a general, slightly paradoxical
expectation that the U.S. is "read in" on Russia's position
-- paradoxical because although WEOG seems to expect the U.S.
to take the lead in engaging Russia, delegations are also
extremely sensitive about a U.S./Russia bilateral deal forced
upon the EC at the eleventh hour. Del has repeatedly made
the case for other delegations engaging Russia on this topic,
particularly regarding site visits.


5. (U) Outside of WEOG, other groups are generally
supportive, but slightly more adamant that member states
should devote more time to discussing CW destruction, and
that there is currently an imbalance in the Organization's
focus (i.e. too much time spent on more "administrative"
issues). Mexico in particular has noted that more discussion
on CW destruction would be useful, not only prior to EC-47,
but also in general. (Del comment: This could be
significant, and gain support, if NAM delegations decide to
press for additional transparency measures beyond site

visits.) Although delegations are also supportive of U.S.
transparency, questions still remain (even in WEOG) as to why
the U.S. made its announcement so early, and whether
additional funding could not make a difference. Del
recommends EC del members be prepared to reiterate answers
previously provided to these questions. Non-WEOG delegations
have also made it fairly clear that if the U.S. expects the
EC to take a balanced approach on CW destruction, it will
have to give careful thought to its approach on Article VII.


6. (U) Above all, regardless of stated positions,
delegations across the regional groups are concerned with the
implications the U.S. possible inability to meet 2012 might
have for the credibility of the Convention. Del has pointed
to draft decision "caveat" language to assure delegations
that approving the extension request in no way indicates
approval of U.S. CW destruction beyond 2012. However, it
will be critical at EC-47 for all delegation members to
emphasize the continuing U.S. commitment not only to CW
destruction at the earliest possible date, but also to
upholding the credibility of the CWC and preserving the
OPCW's reputation as a "multilateral success story."


7. (U) With regard to the Russian extension request, there
is no evidence that any delegation believes the Russian plan
that completes destruction by 2012. However, with the
exception of the UK and a few WEOG delegations, there is also
little stomach on the part of any delegation to challenge the
Russian assertions. Even in the informal discussion noted
above (which the U.S. delegation will ensure is only held
under the condition that both the U.S. and Russian requests
are discussed),it is questionable whether the Russians will
come in for a real grilling. Russia has recently exhibited
greater flexibility regarding site visits, although Moscow is
still standing firm in its refusal to refer to visits in its
draft decision text. An advance copy of Russia's national
paper on site visits has been provided to Washington. Of
note is Russia's recommendation that site visits be imposed
on all possessor states requesting an extension beyond April
2007, and its insistence that visits be prompted by limited
"triggers," as opposed to a set frequency (a concept unlikely
to see much support among advocates of site visits as an
effective transparency measure).

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2007 BUDGET
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8. (U) With a proposed zero nominal growth budget, there has
been little for delegates to discuss. That, however, has not
stopped delegates from focusing in on two issues. The first
is the DG's proposed increase of OCPF inspections from 90 to

130. A handful of NAM delegations, led by Iran and India,
have objected to the proposal, even calling for this "policy
change" to be considered in a separate facilitation. With
WEOG delegations showing exceptional solidarity, the majority
of delegations have held firm to the 130 proposal. Iran has
already informally floated the idea that a restoration of
some Schedule 1 and 2 inspections with a commensurate
reduction in OCPF inspections down from 130 would probably be
the compromise. In all likelihood, this will become the main
negotiating issue at a widely-anticipated budget discussion
on the evening of Nov. 9.


9. (U) The second issue is the NAM push for a greater
increase in international cooperation and assistance. They
have highlighted the fact that the bulk of the currently
proposed increase comes from two P-2 positions in ICA that
are focused on Article VII and actually fall under the
authority of the Legal Advisor. Delegations have noted that
the DG's proposed budget is actually less than ZNG, and that
there are an additional few hundred thousand Euros that could
be added to ICA and still keep the budget at ZNG. Again,
this would be a card that could be played at the Nov. 9
evening budget discussion, although WEOG delegations have
stressed that any additional funds must clearly be targeted
for specific ICA programs (universality, Article VII).
Finally, there has been the customary word-smithing from
Iran, India and other delegations, all of which can be

resolved in what is clearly going to be a long evening
session on Nov. 9.

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TENURE REFORM
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10. (U) There has been overwhelming support for the DG's
proposal for modifying implementation of the tenure policy.
Only Iran has explicitly stated that it has doubts about the
initiative and may not be able to join consensus at the EC.
(Note: The DG's response has been to inform Iran that if it
vetoes the proposal, continuation of current policy will
result in the departure of some 20 Iranian staff members of
the Technical Secretariat. We do not interpret this to mean
that the DG has promised not/not to separate any Iranians if
Iran concurs on the proposal. It was simply intended by the
DG to "clarify" what existing policy would mean for Iranian
TS members.)

SIPDIS


11. (U) With regard to U.S. questions on the tenure
proposal, the DG has made every effort to address those
concerns. Chief of cabinet Rafael Grossi told us the DG has
no problem agreeing to an annual report to the EC on the
status of tenure implementation. Grossi also confirmed that
the DG would also include OPCW laboratory experts along with
the inspectorate and verification divisions as specific areas
in which greater flexibility is needed to retain technical
expertise. The DG has also sought to provide extensive data
on the status of TS staff subject to tenure. Should
Washington have additional questions regarding details of the
DG's proposal, delegation urges that they be submitted
expeditiously so that they can be answered. The goal is to
have Iran isolated as soon as possible so that maximum
pressure is exerted for them not to block consensus.

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ARREARS/VOTING RIGHTS
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12. (U) The co-facilitators will likely put forward an ad
ref decision document on payment of arrears to the OPCW which
addresses U.S. objectives. Iran again is the remaining
hold-out. If Iran intends to block every issue at the EC,
then this will also fall victim to that policy. However, the
arrears issue does not have the significance of the other
items noted above, so if the Iranians want to pick an item on
which to be "reasonable," this may be the most likely
candidate.

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ARTICLE VII
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13. (U) At the opposite end of the scale, national
implementation has long been the issue on which NAM
delegations have been least likely to be reasonable.
Facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) has put forward
decision language that the U.S., UK and other WEOG
delegations have tried to fatten up so that there is some
negotiating leverage for end-game discussions with Iran,
India and others in the NAM. To be frank, it is questionable
whether there is a chance for consensus on anything but a
lowest common denominator text noting the submission of the
DG's report.


14. (U) At the Oct. 19 consultation, Iran highlighted the
fact that the decision text addresses the issue of extending
to 2007 the CSP-10 decision on Article VII. The Iranian
delegate made clear that there is no decision in Tehran on
this matter, and said that his personal view is that there
should be no/no extension. All of which indicates that Iran
and other NAM delegations want to keep Article VII on hold
for a final decision at the December CSP, and the end result
at EC-47 will be a bare-bones statement that punts the issue
to the Conference.

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OCPF SITE SELECTION

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15. (U) There is no/no prospect of a decision on a new
mechanism for OCPF site selection to be considered at the EC.
The facilitator has distributed a proposal that still falls
short of meeting U.S. requirements. However, it is important
to highlight for Washington the movement that is taking place
on this issue. Specifically, it appears at this point that
only the U.S. and UK are wedded to the need for political
nomination points. The EC may well be the venue at which
delegations will press the U.S. and UK to reconsider the need
for such points.

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OTHER AGENDA ITEMS
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16. (U) The following are the items on the annotated agenda
(EC-47/INF.1, Oct. 18, 2006) using the internal numbering
system in that document.

Item 3: DG's Opening Statement. Del will provide the text to
Washington when it becomes available.

Item 4: General debate. Del has E-mailed to Washington a
proposed statement by Amb. Javits.

Item 5: Status of implementation.

5.1: Verification Plan for Indian CWDF. As noted at 5.8
below, the facility agreement for the Indian CWDF has finally
been completed and submitted for EC approval.

5.2: Amendments to the Verification Plan for Pine Bluff
disposal facility.

5.3: Combined plan for the HD facility at Aberdeen. Combined
plan for verification and destruction of the former CWPF at
Aberdeen is submitted to the EC more as a matter of
procedure, as destruction of the ONE remaining building is
complete and will be notified to the TS shortly.

5.4: U.S. Extension Request (discussed above).

5.5: Russian Extension Request (discussed above).

5.6: Albanian intermediate deadline extension request. After
working to overcome significant confusion (caused in part by
subsequent revisions of dates submitted in September) on both
the extension request and draft decision, del has given the
TS approval to distribute both documents as soon as possible.

SIPDIS
It has not escaped the notice of some delegations (Russia,
Germany) that this request is being distributed after the
expiration of Albania's original Phase 1 deadline of October
15, 2006. Del will work with the Albanian delegation to
ensure GOA representatives are adequately prepared to answer
questions at EC-47, and recommends preparing talking points
for GOA delivery at the destruction informals. Despite some
questions locally, del doubts the GOA will encounter
significant obstacles to approval of its extension request,
as any delays in its own program will likely be overshadowed
by those in the U.S. and Russia.

5.7: Facility Agreement on the HD facility at Aberdeen. See
5.3 above.

5.8: Facility Agreement for Indian CWDF. Del has forwarded
the Indian FA to Washington for review and comment.
Expectation from discussions with the TS is that the FA
tracks closely with the Model FA, with the exception of
Attachment 2: HEALTH and Safety Requirements and Procedures
(details provided separately).

5.9-5.10: TS Note on amendments to the FA on Pine Bluff,
submitted to the EC for approval.

5.11: Article VII (discussed above).

5.12: Universality. The EC is asked to note the TS report on

the implementation of the Universality action plan. The
facilitator may report orally on recent consultations.

5.13: Optimization of Verification. The EC is asked to note
the TS note, which has not yet been distributed. Del has
forwarded an advance copy of the sections pertaining to
optimization at U.S. sites to Washington for review, but in
general anticipates this will be a useful overview for
delegations, many of whom lack the technical background to
understand the implications of optimization simply through
changes to facility agreements and verification plans.
Unlike the VIR, this document will apparently go into greater
detail on optimization efforts in all possessor states (with
the exception of Libya).

5.14: DG's Note on Readiness of the TS to conduct a Challenge
Inspection. The document was distributed shortly before the
July EC and delegations had deferred the item in order to
have more time to consider it.

5.15: Schedule 3 Transfers. At EC-46, the EC was asked to
approve a draft decision. This was done based on the
negotiations of a small group of delegations and as an
attempt to conclude this issue before the anticipated
departure of the facilitator. This move by the facilitator
was resented by some delegations and not likely to be
repeated unless consensus is achieved in advance. The U.S.
remains isolated in insisting that additional changes need to
be made in the draft text. Iran opposed U.S.-proposed
changes during the September Industry Cluster meetings, and
this is expected to happen again in the next round of
meetings. Given that U.S. guidance has not changed on this
issue, no progress is expected at this EC.

5.16: Steve Wade (UK) will brief the EC on progress made on
Schedule 2A/2A*.

5.17: DG's Note on Two Items of Approved Inspection
Equipment. The DG issued the note (EC-47/DG.3, 6 September
2006) and if there are no comments, received within 60 days,
the EC will be asked to approve the proposed revisions.

5.18: 2005 Verification Implementation Report. The EC is
asked to consider the 2005 VIR and supplement, and note the
comments received on the document as well as the Chair's
summary of the consultations (the document has yet to be
issued). Del has already noted U.S. appreciation for the
accuracy and consistency of the 2005 VIR in informal
consultations. An initial review of the Corrigendum and TS
Response to U.S. Written Comments indicates almost all issues
have been addressed, with the exception of several numerical
discrepancies on which the U.S. and TS may in the end agree
to disagree.

Item 6: Lists of New Validated Data. This document has been
out since August 2005 and continuously deferred by Iran and
India. Delegation will continue pressing both to finally
join consensus.

Item 7: OPCW Office in Africa. Facilitator Andres Rugeles
(Colombia) held discussions on his new proposal for a
non-permanent presence that piggy-backs onto a UN or African
Union office in Africa. African delegations have held firm
on the request for a permanent office. Rugeles has said he
will continue assessing his options and looking at other UN
or AU offices. He will provide an oral report to the EC.

Item 8 - Administrative and Financial Matters.

8.1: 2007 Budget (discussed above).

8.2: Medium-Term Plan. Should be noted by the EC, but Iran
has indicated that they will ask that it be received as they
were not able to push through any of the many editorial
changes they would like.

8.3-8.5: Arrears (discussed above).

8.6: DG's Note on Implementation of the Office of Internal

Oversight Recommendations. Because Iran has not been willing
to name a facilitator on this issue, no consultations were
held on the report. Some delegations may, therefore, push
for deferral of the item.

8.7: DG's note on Implementation of External Auditor's
Recommendations. As it has not been distributed yet or
discussed in consultations, this may be deferred.

8.8: Tenure Policy Modification (discussed above).

8.9: Report of Security Audit Team IV. The DG's note on the
report of SAT IV has yet to be distributed, so there once
again may be deferral of this item.

8.10: The DG's Report on Income and Expenditure for the
period up to June 30. Will likely be noted by the EC.

8.11: The DG's report on Income and Expenditure for the
period up to September 30 and use of the Working Capital
Fund. The document has yet to be distributed, but could be
noted if distribution is not too close to the EC.

Item 9: Host Country Committee. The DG's draft decision with
a recommendation (required under the decision at CSP-10) to
the CSP on whether to establish a Host Country Committee has
yet to be distributed. The DG has given Deputy DG Freeman
responsibility for this issue, and del will stay in touch
with the DDG's office on what he intends to recommend. The
anger of delegations with the Dutch as host country has
diminished substantially, and meetings of the working group
with the Dutch MFA have become more infrequent. However, a
number of points of friction remain (particularly treatment
by Dutch police and security officials at Schiphol). As a
result, while the DDG probably does not want to establish a
committee, he certainly will need some mechanism to channel
the discontent of a small, but influential group of
Ambassadors.

Item 10: Privileges and Immunities.

10.1: Agreement with Burkina Faso.

10.2: Agreement with Uruguay.

Item 11: Report by the EC on performance of its activities
from July 2005 to July 2006. Should be approved by the EC.

Item 12: EC Sessions in 2007. The DG submitted his work plan
for 2007 (EC-47/DG.6, October 4, 2006) and the EC is asked
simply to review the number and length of EC sessions in
light of this plan. This agenda item will also be the
opportunity to raise from the floor the proposal to hold the
2008 CSP in December. (The World Forum/Congress Center is
unavailable in December 2007.) Ambassador Khodakov, the head
of the Policy-Making Organs, has stressed that only the CSP
can make a decision about CSP dates, so it would be necessary
to raise this issue at EC-47 so that it could be considered
at CSP-11. At present, the TS has a reservation for the week
of November 3-7, 2008 for the CSP. It has an alternate
booking, constituting a second option, for December 2-5. As
with CSP-11, it would entail a four-day Conference due to an
ICC event held the preceding week. If Washington wishes to
have a sequence in 2008 of four EC sessions followed by a
December CSP (not forgetting a Second RevCon in April),it
will be necessary for the U.S. to raise this issue from the
floor under this agenda item.

Item 13: Any other business. Del knows of no items at this
time that will be raised under this agenda item.


17. (U) Javits sends.
SCHOFER