NETHERLANDS/MTCR: PLENARY PAPERS, UAV/CRUISE

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 002031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MTR, EUR/UBI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM PREL NL
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/MTCR: PLENARY PAPERS, UAV/CRUISE
MISSILE COMMENTS

REF: A. STATE 149547


B. STATE 149559

C. STATE 149566

D. STATE 149612

E. STATE 152294

F. STATE 152615

G. STATE 134060

Classified By: POLCOUNS Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S) Summary: The GONL appreciates the opportunity to
review U.S. papers in preparation for the October 2-6, 2006
Plenary in Copenhagen, but has concerns regarding U.S.
unwillingness to deliver pre-launch notifications as part of
the Hague Code of Conduct. They also believe the U.S.
proposal on modernizing MTCR controls on unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles lacks sufficient
explanations to justify the changes proposed in the
non-paper. The Dutch suggest the USG has ulterior motives
for the proposed changes, to which Russia will most like
object. Polmiloff discussed these issues with MFA Senior
Advisor for Nuclear and Nonproliferation Issues Ceta Noland
on September 18. End summary.


2. (S) Polmiloff discussed the U.S. papers (refs A-F) with
Noland in preparation for the upcoming MTCR plenary in
Copenhagen. Noland appreciated the papers, and said she
would pass them on to relevant agencies for comment prior to
the plenary in October.


3. (C) In response to the "U.S. Report on Contacts with
Non-Partners" (ref E),Noland noted that as an EU member
state, the GONL greatly appreciates U.S. outreach efforts to
MTCR non-Partners, especially with regard to the Hague Code
of Conduct (HCOC). She added, however, that the USG failure
to deliver pre-launch notifications under the HCOC threatens
such efforts. She argued that "even Russia" lives up "for
the most part" to its HCOC commitments, and suggested Russia
might be more inclined to try and revise or even depart the
HCOC, given the USG's unwillingness to deliver pre-launch
notification. She acknowledged that these concerns had
already been delivered to Washington both bilaterally and
through the EU Presidency.


4. (C) Noland also passed on GONL comments to the U.S.
non-paper on modernizing MTCR controls on unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles (ref G). She said that
even with the additional explanatory note, the non-paper
lacked sufficient explanations to validate the paper's
proposed values and thresholds. She suggested the USG might
have ulterior motives, including the reclassification of a
Russian cruise missile as Category I under this latest
proposal. As such, she highly doubted Russia would support
the U.S. proposal.


5. (C) Noland described the new USG position on UAVs as quite
complex and "difficult to gauge." Following Sept. 11, she
said the USG characterized all UAVs as dangerous weapons
requiring strict controls. Given the new criteria proposed
by the U.S., she suggested the USG was looking to bolster its
defense industry with UAV sales. She also wondered if the
USG proposal had been "harmonized" with the Wasenaar
Arrangement, which also governs UAVs.


6. (C) Specifically, Noland questioned why certain UAV values
were chosen (launch or takeoff weight of 900 kg, 500 kg
payload, sea level airspeed greater than 800 km per hour) and
how these values would strengthen the regime. She pointed to
a UK proposal to 19.A.3 that suggests UAV payloads be
restricted to 20 liters, and said the GONL was more inclined
to agree with this more restrictive payload, especially given
how little a terrorist would need to make a UAV armed and
dangerous. She suggested 50 kg might be a more appropriate
UAV payload. She also said certain terms were not clearly
defined under the MTCR, such as "rocket propelled air
vehicles".


7. (C) Noland acknowledged that the GONL recognizes the
obvious difference between UAVs and cruise missiles. But the
USG needed to make a better case explaining why the values in
its paper would benefit the regime. She also said more
attention should be paid to UAV components, which are not
currently controlled. Noland suggested it was relatively
easy to acquire the components necessary to build a UAV. She
said the Dutch would present on this topic during the plenary
session's intelligence exchange based on its own UAV

catch-all case history.


ARNALL