CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

1. (SBU) Del reps met with senior Technical Secretariat
staff on August 31 to discuss the operational requirements
that would arise with Iraq's accession to the CWC. The Iraqi
Ambassador in The Hague had written to the Director General
to inform him that the Iraqi Council of Ministers had
approved on August 3 and sent to Parliament the
recommendation for Iraqi accession to the CWC. The Iraqi
Embassy informed del reps of the note to the DG and also
provided an informal view that accession as early as the end
of September was possible.



2. (SBU) Iraq would need to submit to the OPCW an initial
declaration 30 days after deposit of the notification of
accession in New York. They would need to submit a final
declaration 60 days after accession. Although the original
purpose of the August 31 meeting was to energize the TS on
planning a follow-up to the workshop held in February in
Amman, it quickly evolved into a brainstorming session on the
political and legal considerations of an Iraqi declaration,
and associated verification responsibilities.



3. (SBU) There was general agreement that any follow-up
meeting should take place in the Middle East to avoid
difficulties the Iraqi delegation might otherwise experience
with visas. Head of Verification Horst Reeps anticipates
needing at least ten days to complete a draft declaration,
with working groups in the areas of industry, chemical
weapons, and legislation. He noted, however, that it is
difficult to plan the next workshop when the TS has no idea
how much work has been done on drafting a declaration since
the February meeting. (TS efforts to contact Iraqi
counterparts have been unsuccessful, and it seemed clear that
the TS expects the U.S. and UK to facilitate future
communications.) Reeps also noted that initial efforts were
predicated on the assumption that Iraq would accede as a
non-possessor; if this is not the case, an initial
declaration will be much more complex.



4. (SBU) Meeting participants all agreed that Iraq's initial
declaration will have significant political implications, and
as such will be closely scrutinized by other States Parties,
particularly Iran. The difficulties of preparing a
declaration when the location and numbers of munitions still
in existence in Iraq are unknown were also cited. Chemical
Demilitarization Branch head Jerzy Mazur and others
questioned the viability of a non-possessor declaration when
previous UNSCOM inventories and general public knowledge all
point to a sizable number of CW munitions remaining in Iraq.
Although no recommendations as to a way forward were made,
Legal Advisor Santiago Onate pointed out that while there are
legal obligations under the CWC, this is a unique case, and
the policy making organs of the OPCW may be able to approve
measures justified by exceptional circumstances.



5. (SBU) The TS expressed clear concerns about the safety of
its inspectors in Iraq, but does not want to be faulted for a
failure to uphold their requirements under the Convention.
The TS staff pointed out that even without inspections of CW
storage facilities or former production facilities, Iraq's
Article VI declaration would need to be verified. The TS
participants noted that the DG would have the authority to
state that the conduct of inspections in Iraq could be
suspended due to a dangerous security situation. They also
referred to the provision in the CWC for "bilateral
verification agreements." The TS is also concerned about the
public image of the organization, citing their concern that
unrealistically high expectations may arise of the OPCW being
able to successfully handle its obligations under
exceptionally difficult circumstances.


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TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT INSPECTION


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6. (U) In response to the DG note inviting States Parties to
familiarize themselves with new equipment of the OPCW, a team
from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency conducted a
technical equipment inspection (TEI) at the OPCW Equipment
Store from August 28-31. The team reported that, overall,
they had no concerns regarding equipment on the original
list. The OPCW did, however, add several items for
certification after the team arrived. Most items could still
be evaluated; however, in anticipation of inspecting only the
original list, the team did not include an analytical expert,
and was unable to complete inspection of this particular
piece of equipment.



7. (U) Del rep attended one morning of equipment testing,
during which Senior Technical Support Officer Kangi Makiyama
and acting Head of Laboratory Miedczyslaw Sokolowski offered
a brief tour of the lab. The tour was informative, and
offered an opportunity for an exchange with TS staff on
concerns of particular relevance for the lab and analytical
capabilities of the OPCW. Sokolowski noted several times
that the GCMS currently used by the lab are not "top of the
line," but also pointed out that the OPCW does adhere to high
analytical standards. In fact, until recently the
organization had been using a separate purchasing company who
would purchase and test equipment to a higher standard than
typically found on the market. This company, however, has
recently decided for financial reasons to discontinue its
services.



8. (U) Sokolowski also voiced his (fairly standard) concern
regarding effects of the tenure policy. He pointed out that
this policy could be particularly detrimental to the lab,
where a highly specialized technical staff is critical. He
further noted that the lab must draw from a very limited pool
of qualified experts, and that it is unrealistic to expect
geographic distribution of employees when certain regions are
usually unable to field qualified candidates.


9. (U) Javits sends.
ARNALL