CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001624 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR JULY 21, 2006 This is CWC-65-06. ¶1. (U) Although generally a quiet week, delegations made up for it on Thursday 20 July, holding a WEOG meeting, two informal consultations (Budget and Article VII),and one small group discussion of the Schedule 3 Transfer draft decision language. -------------- Budget -------------- ¶2. (U) Co-facilitators Walter Lion (Belgium) and Hela Lahmar (Tunisia) chaired the opening session of the budget negotiations. First Rick Martin (Head/B&F) made a presentation on his methodology and presented an overview (faxed back to ISN/CB). Delegations were requested to make general observations. The response was nearly unanimous: the zero nominal growth budget and its presentations are both welcome, and a great improvement over years' past. India raised the first dissenting voice, supported by Mexico: it is inappropriate to put all the new industry inspections against OCPFs, resulting in a greater burden on States party with a smaller number of OCPFs. Rather, the increase should be spread across all industry categories to reflect their relative risk to the Convention. In addition to the unacceptable increase in OCPF inspections, these delegations noted the apparent decrease in ICA funding. The US, UK, Japan, France, and Austria all noted that in terms of percentages, the OCPF category had by far the fewest inspections and it is appropriate to increase the number of OCPF inspections. ¶3. (U) Iran made a long, difficult intervention, protesting the duplications in the draft, citing an agreement in 2006 in which the Secretariat promised that the next budget would be much shorter. In Iran,s view, the text is too descriptive, and brings into the budget debate topics that are still contentious in informal consultations (OCPF site selection, Article VII, etc). Japan and France countered that it was appropriate to include in a policy document discussion of such topics. Iran also reiterated its position: the core objectives and indicators of achievement are only for use in a budget context and cannot replace the mandate of the OPCW. Iran also noted that in last year,s budget, delegations agreed to include disclaimer language indicating that nothing in the budget text would supercede Convention mandates. DDG John Freeman noted that the OPCW's mandate comes from the Convention, and this also drives the core objectives. ¶4. (U) Finally, the co-facilitators distributed a program of work (faxed to ISN/CB) that sets out meeting dates and topics beginning the first week of September. Delegations protested the number of meetings - up to 20, but agreed to see how the discussions went before deciding to adjust the schedule. -------------- Article VII -------------- ¶5. (U) Facilitator Maarten Lak held an informal consultation on 20 July 2006 to review the events of EC-46 and consider how to move forward towards EC-47 and CSP-11. To del reps, dismay, Lak noted the apparent lack of linkage between Article VII and CW destruction issues and hoped that this would continue. Sudan stressed the importance of our finding consensus language during EC-47 and exhorted delegations to maintain this spirit through the Conference. ¶6. (U) Maarten then requested a discussion on our work schedule. Mexico noted the full plate of topics that delegations must cover, and stressed the difficulty for the part-time or small delegations to cover everything, especially given the proposed 20 sessions scheduled for budget consultations. Mexico recommended that the facilitator improve the efficiency or our work by chairing three or four informal consultations when the situation warranted, greatly increase the level and frequency of the facilitator's bilateral work, and create an open-ended drafting group to work on language. The US supported the first two suggestions, but noted that it would have difficulty putting an artificial cap on the number of consultations, because the TS might want to provide regular status reports, and SPs might also want to provide information regarding their implementation support efforts. Finally the US raised concerns about the potential for limiting general participation if a drafting group was created, which were supported by Germany, Australia, New Zealand, France, the UK, and Korea. Mexico explained that the intent was not to limit participation; everyone could participate in the drafting exercise. ¶7. (U) Iran, supported by India, noted that our work must be based on the Tenth conference decision (Dec.16),that no new elements should be introduced as had been attempted in the past few Council sessions. Delegations need to take a holistic approach, for instance, paragraph 12 (remedial measures) should not be taken out-of-context. Assistance and encouragement are the most important elements. Legislating is a long process, and artificial limits cannot be imposed. Finally, Iran noted that CW destruction is a far more critical issue and should not be overshadowed by other discussion topics such as Article VII. ¶8. (U) France supported by a number of other delegations noted that our work should not turn into solely drafting exercises. Delegations also want to hear about the implementation support work of the Secretariat and States parties, as well as the impressions of states that have been the recipients of TAVs. ¶9. (U) The facilitator noted that he would take delegations' views into account, and that he would host the next consultation on 24 August. The next progress report should be available in early September, so the facilitator may need to hold one or two meetings in early September as well. In response to those delegations protesting that 24 August was too early and that many would still be on vacation, Lak responded that those in town were welcome to attend. -------------- CW Destruction -------------- ¶9. (U) During the 20 July 2006 WEOG meeting, Maarten Lak (Netherlands) noted that delegations avoided linking Article VII and CW destruction extension requests during EC-46, and that he hoped this would continue through EC-47 (not all delegations agreed with his assessment). Delegations expressed a general interest in the way ahead for CW destruction and the extension requests, and the topic of Russia's CW destruction program. Russia,s reluctance to accept site visits was noted, and a number of delegations supported focusing first on getting Russian acceptance of the principle of site visits before working out the details of the visits. The U.S. commented on Russia,s apparent inflexibility on site visits, and briefly introduced the U.S. proposal for site visit parameters (later provided to the document counter for wider distribution). Del rep also noted that consultations to discuss the draft decision texts and site visits had been raised as a possibility, and that, while Washington had concerns about this sort of discussion forum, one benefit might be to draw out national positions on the issue. As opposed to offering insight from his role as Vice Chair of the CW cluster, Ambassador Petri noted that the U.S. was unlikely to receive feedback if it appeared to be inflexible on its decision text. Germany further noted that the US and Russia are 8approaching the same situation (i.e. not meeting 2012) from two different sides,8 and pointed out that the issue of visits may be deadlocked, as Russia is willing to entertain visits in capital only, while the U.S. would prefer visits only to CW destruction facilities. -------------- Industry ) Schedule 3 Transfers -------------- ¶10. (U) Facilitator Arya Sandeep (India) held an informal discussion on 6 July 2006 version (EC-46/DEC/CRP.2) of his decision text on Schedule 3 transfers. With respect to Preambular Paragraph 5 (PP5),its focus on Universality and the benefits from adherence of all States not Party suggests to German, India and Iran that the phrase &in particular8 from the Plan of Action on Universality is not necessary. The US noted that it wanted the quote verbatim. Germany noted its willingness to accept the language here as long as it was reworked in Operational Paragraph 1 (OP1). US asked for a redraft of second half per guidance. Iran, Germany, and India all advised that because this paragraph always was focused on Universality and its benefits for States not Party, the linkage to nonproliferation would be inappropriate; also because of the focus on the benefits of adherence, the US proposal was seen as too negative. ¶11. (U) Debate moved on to OP1: The US noted that because it is unnecessary to exhort SPs that have already done so to do so, the text should call only upon those that have yet to implement. Iran pushed back (supported by India),noting that it is important to exhort and/or remind all states to meet their obligations. Germany agreed with US, but noted that it could live with the first sentence as long as the next phrase was redrafted so that the phrase &whose adherence is a cause for serious concern8 is replaced by "the non-adherence of whom is a cause for serious concern." Delegations agreed to go back to capitals and discuss the responses sometime the week of 24 July. SANDERS SENDS. BLAKEMAN