CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 001386 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) NSC FOR DICASAGRANDE WINPAC FOR WALTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL CWC SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): SCENESETTER FOR 46TH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION, JULY 4-7 Classified By: Ambassador Eric M. Javits, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OPCW. Reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). This is CWC-52-06. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) There are two key objectives for the U.S. at EC-46. First, distribute the draft decision document on the U.S. 100% extension request and initiate discussion on that document. With careful management of expectations and timely circulation of documents, this can likely be steered in a positive direction. Support from the allies, however, may be critical, and does not seem at this point to be guaranteed. Second, continue the process of re-building a collegial, consensus-based approach on Article VII. U.S. presentation of positions that could be interpreted as going beyond the CSP-10 decision on Article VII could damage efforts on the entire range of issues under discussion, including the extension request. ¶2. (U) The expectation is that the Director General will distribute his proposed 2007 budget by EC-46, and this will be a zero nominal growth budget. While some minor issues may be ready for a decision, there are few agenda items ready for action. What will be more important than specific adoption of decisions will be continued work on re-generating an atmosphere in which U.S. positions on all issues (Article VII in particular) have the best possible chance of success. End Summary. -------------- ARTICLE VII -------------- ¶3. (C) The sharp, universal criticism of the U.S. at the end of EC-45 due to the dispute over Article VII report language currently is dormant. However, the U.S. faces a distinctly unhealthy atmosphere at the OPCW, particularly on Article VII. Simply put, there will be an instinctive negative reaction to any U.S. proposal which carries any "negative" or "punitive" connotation or which goes beyond the CSP-10 decision. Amb. Javits has met individually with the Ambassadors of a number of key delegations (India, Mexico, etc.) to work to re-build a positive environment, and there has been progress. Indeed, on some issues, such as financial �A;rules, the discussions have led to agreement from India and Iran on acceptable compromise language. ¶4. (C) Article VII, however, is in a league of its own. General opposition to the U.S. approach was energized at EC-45 and remains strong. In their view, the approach should be primarily "carrots," although Iran and India have begun alluding to the "stick" in paragraph 14 of the decision. The acceptable basis for negotiation is reiteration of the points in the CSP-10 decision, despite the fact that (as the delegation has repeatedly pointed out) many details remain to be filled in on this bare bones document. The WEOG delegations have different views, but they all converge on criticism of the U.S. approach. Most WEOG delegations are loath to accept anything that could be viewed as a "remedial" measure. ¶5. (SBU) Most constructively, the Canadians have argued that it is time to shift tactics to the next Article VII challenge. There has been great success on national authorities. The next task is getting draft legislation prepared, submitted to legislatures, and enacted. If a State Party has yet to draft implementing legislation, Technical Assistance Visits remain the most effective approach. If a State Party has drafted legislation, a different approach is needed. Here, it would be far more effective if States Party with strong political ties to the implementing state demarche in capital, focusing on a more "political" approach. ¶6. (C) Fortunately, the major battle over Article VII will take place at EC-47 in November. That allows for repair work under a less stressful environment at EC-46. Under pressure from the U.S. and others, facilitator Maarten Lak (Netherlands) has already started the process of considering EC-46 report language. From the delegation's perspective, it would be important to ensure that the report language emphasizes the following points: -- Restatement of the need to establish national authorities. -- Restatement of the requirement of preparing, submitting, and enacting national implementing legislation. If the implementing state has yet to complete the process, it will need to explain its status to EC-47 and provide its plans for finalizing its efforts. Del notes that one way of effectively monitoring the status of this issue (while avoiding a contentious discussion with other delegations in a consultation) is simply to ensure that the Legal Advisor's office provides updated information on this requirement on its external server. This would let the facilitator, the Technical Secretariat, or individual States Parties know on which states to focus attention, and to consider who would be best placed to press them on the importance of enacting legislation. ¶7. (C) Delegation is well aware of the fact that there is an intense interagency discussion under way on Article VII. We share Washington's view that we must press for more progress on Article VII. We strongly recommend a policy of "first, do no harm" in order to set the stage for the difficult negotiations to come in November. ¶8. (C) Should the U.S. be viewed as preventing consensus on Article VII at yet another EC, there could be repercussions on the other issue of primary significance to the U.S.: the request for an extension of the 100% destruction deadline. Many delegations believe that the heading of "non-compliance" covers missing destruction deadlines as well as not meeting Article VII requirements. The extent to which they are willing to accept that these are two distinct categories depends largely on whether they are inclined to support the U.S. Which brings the discussion back to the key point: the U.S. lost a substantial amount of goodwill at EC-45 on Article VII. That loss has an impact on the willingness of delegations to accept our argumentation on all other issues, including the extension request. -------------- EXTENSION REQUEST -------------- ¶9. (U) The U.S. could not have asked for a better outcome to the introduction of its extension request than it received at EC-45. Much of that is attributed to the extensive outreach that was conducted by Amb. Javits, the delegation and Washington. The result was a feeling of disappointment among other delegations, and a number of serious questions, but no major criticism. The next step is the tabling of the text of a proposed decision document, which is continuously raised with the delegation. ¶10. (C) Delegation appreciates the thorough coordination that has been initiated by Washington on decision document language, and will continue to report substantive comments from other delegations. Particularly with regard to the UK proposal for site visits to possessor states that have requested an extension to 2012, there will continue to be extensive discussion with the UK, Russia and others. ¶11. (C) To be clear: other delegations expect to see the U.S. draft text prior to, or at the latest at, the start of EC-46. However, with less than two weeks to go before the EC, there is no expectation that delegations will be asked to approve the document. Indeed, pressing for a quick decision would generate resentment. Instead, it would be best if Amb. Javits could simply emphasize that the U.S. is tabling the text for consideration. -------------- AGENDA ITEMS -------------- ¶12. (U) Following remarks are keyed to the annotated provisional agenda for EC-46 that was circulated on June 20. (U) Item 3: Statement by the DG. Delegation will provide the text of the DG's statement when it becomes available. (U) Item 4: General debate. Delegation has provided ISN/CB a draft statement by Amb. Javits. (U) Item 5: Status of implementation of the Convention: (C) 5.1: Having been continually deferred from previous sessions, the Indian Verification Plan is on the EC-46 agenda, still unaccompanied by a Facility Agreement. Del understands from the Indian delegation that significant progress has been made since the last EC, and that the TS recently provided a new draft for Indian review. Del will follow up with TS to confirm, and if progress does not seem satisfactory, will take further action. (U) 5.2: The Albanian Verification Plan and Facility Agreement are also back on the EC agenda. Although documents were blocked last session by Russia for purely procedural reasons, it is not unlikely that delegations consideration of the documents at this session may be colored by recent news of problems with the destruction system that will result in a significant delay in operations, and require further extension of Albania's first two intermediate deadlines. Del has already scheduled meetings for U.S. technical experts with the TS on the margins of the EC, but requests more specific guidance from Washington concerning questions that will almost certainly arise about Albanian plans to submit an extension request. (U) 5.8: Del will work with Washington to provide specific talking points for use by the Albanian del on this agenda item, given the concerns recent problems in system testing will likely generate. (C) 5.10: Discussed above, but del will work closely with the allies in the coming week to build support and foster more reasonable expectations for the U.S. draft decision and proposal for site visit parameters. Del recommends making a final determination on the tactics/timing of the specific site visit proposal once allied reaction to initial U.S. feedback is clear. Del will also work with the Russian del to set a positive precedent on decision language and site visits, but believes this will be more effectively accomplished with agreement from the allies, which has yet to be achieved. Del also recommends considering sharing an "advance" (read: just before official submission) with a few other key delegations. (C) 5.11: See discussion on 5.10. Del recommends our strategy be clear for EC-46 in terms of what we will and will not accept in a Russian decision document, and how we intend to approach the idea of site visits. Del also recommends that we communicate as clearly as possible with the allies regarding our intended interactions with the Russian del, given lingering sensitivities from the 45% destruction deadline decision process in 2003 that left the impression of U.S./Russia collusion. (U) 5.12: Having received verbal confirmation from the Russian del, who blocked the document during EC-45 for procedural reasons, that they should be in a position to approve it now, del does not anticipate problems with approval of the Libyan draft decisions (revised to incorporate language suggested during EC-45 by the German delegation). (C) 5.13: This is the request by China/Japan for an extension of the deadline for completing destruction of abandoned CW. The request is fairly light on detail, not surprising given the numerous modalities that remain to be worked out bilaterally. In general, it contains the basic elements set out in paragraph 17, Part IVB of the Verification Annex. A draft decision has finally been circulated. The Japanese delegation has, on several occasions, impressed upon the del how highly Japan values U.S. approval of the document. While the U.S. has no critical equities at stake in this matter, past experience indicates it will be a "lively" discussion. (U) 5.16: This is the sub-item under which Article VII will be discussed. (U) Item 6: Draft report of the OPCW for 2005. The EC Chair (South Africa) has called for consultations on this document on June 22. At present, delegation anticipates little substantive debate. (U) Item 7: Lists of new validated data. The three items under consideration are 1) noting a TS note assessing the implications of data in the lists of validated data set out in EC-42/DEC/CRP.5, dated 9 Sep. 2005, 2) approving the list of new validated data contained in the previously referenced document, and 3) approving a newer list of new validated data, EC-46/DEC/CRP.1, dated 16 June 2006. (SBU) Item 8: Office in Africa. The new facilitator (Andres Jose Rugeles Pineda, Colombia) has informed delegation that he has had his initial discussions with the TS and the African Group. He has yet to schedule a consultation on this topic, and may decide that the time is not yet ripe for him to do so. (Note: South African delegate Peter Makwarela, who was the driving force behind this issue, will depart The Hague on June 30.) (SBU) Rugeles Pineda has informed del that he does not view his role as that of a proponent of an Africa office, and, indeed, has privately expressed his skepticism about an office. However, he recognizes that as facilitator, he must ensure that all aspects of the issue are thoroughly evaluated. In a very positive sign, he informed us that he made clear to the African Group that they must take more responsibility for providing information regarding a possible office, and cannot simply rely on the TS to do all of the work. (U) Item 9: Administrative and financial matters. (U) 9.1: This will be the opportunity for the DG to formally present the 2007 proposed budget as well as the medium-term plan for 2007-2009. The expectation is a zero nominal growth budget for 2007, which will include some important U.S. objectives (such as a 10% increase in OCPF inspections). (U) 9.2: There is no agreement with regard to a mechanism for SPs to regularize payment of dues to the OPCW. (U) 9.4: On financial rules, the facilitator (Rick Snelsire, U.S.) continues to work to achieve consensus. (U) 9.5: WEOG was informed that the TS has requested a deferral to the next EC of the item on an agreement regarding transfers between the OPCW Provident Fund and the UN Joint Staff Pension Fund. (U) Item 10: Report of the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial Matters. Delegation is not aware of any contentious issues regarding the ABAF report at this time. The DG's note on the ABAF report has not yet been issued. Del will keep Washington apprised of issues which begin to generate attention. (U) Item 11: DG's note on instruments signed by the TS with governments or other international organizations. Amb. Javits has worked with the DG to provide sufficient transparency to assuage the concerns of several delegations that believe the DG has exceeded his authority. Delegation is aware that the goal is to ensure a proper balance: there are certain political agreements that require EC approval, but the DG has to have the authority to conclude "administrative" agreements. Delegation also recognizes that the U.S. has a particular interest due to the tax reimbursement agreement. (U) Item 12: Credentials of representatives to the EC. This will be purely procedural. (U) Item 13: Provisional agenda for the 11th CSP. Should Washington have objections or concerns regarding the provisional agenda, del would appreciate an opportunity to informally vet them with the TS and other key delegations. (U) Item 14: Dates for EC sessions in 2007. The proposed dates in 2007 are EC-48: March 13-16 EC-49: June 26-29 EC-50: September 25-28 EC-51: November 27-30 (U) 2006 is first year in which Washington's goal of a CSP that caps four EC sessions has been achieved. The TS has informed us that it is not/not possible to have this schedule again in 2007. The TS has reserved the Congress Center for Nov. 5-9 and the ICC and others already have exercised their options up to mid-December 2007. This may not be viewed as tragic by other delegations, which have yet to warmly adopt the 2006 schedule of meetings. However, del recommends pushing for a December 2008 CSP so that the TS can lock in the Congress center. (U) Item 15: Any other business. At this time, delegation knows of no other items to be raised under this agenda item. ¶13. (U) Javits sends. ARNALL