BEILIN PONDERS PA REFERENDUM ON A GOI-ABBAS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000899 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREF KWBG KPAL IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI INTERNAL SUBJECT: BEILIN PONDERS PA REFERENDUM ON A GOI-ABBAS NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Meretz Chairman Yossi Beilin repeatedly expressed incredulity to the Ambassador during their February 28 meeting that FM Tzipi Livni publicly referred to Palestinian Authority (PA) President Abbas as "irrelevant." Beilin said that former PA negotiator Saeb Erekat recently proposed to him that the GOI negotiate on final status issues with a PA team headed by Abbas and that the PA then hold a referendum on the results. Beilin advised that the international community not expect Hamas to change its position overnight and advocated using a third party to talk to Hamas about its positions. Beilin said his party is interested in joining a Kadima coalition, but noted the Meretz condition that Kadima open negotiations with the PA. The Ambassador made clear the USG's opposition to negotiations with Hamas unless it accepted the Quartet's conditions. He offered his observations about Livni's press statement, noting that she and the GOI are worried that contacts with Abbas may eventually serve to legitimize a Hamas government. The Ambassador noted that the Quartet conditions relate to the PA, not to Hamas per se, and cited the USG interest that Hamas form a straight Hamas government so that full governing responsibility is placed on it and there is no confusion between it and the PA. End summary. -------------- Tzipi's Faux Pas -------------- ¶2. (C) Beilin began the Ambassador's February 28 courtesy visit by inquiring about what he termed the "unusual tension" between the USG and the GOI over how to deal with PA President Abbas after the Hamas elections victory. The Ambassador made it clear that no tensions exist, and that the relationship is strong, but acknowledged that some disagreement exists on this issue. Beilin then expressed strong incredulity -- which he repeated throughout the meeting -- that FM Livni referred to Abbas as "irrelevant" in press interviews on February 26. "I can't understand the logic (of Livni saying this)," Beilin exclaimed, adding "and we are to be in the same coalition?" He commented that it is "tricky" in the elections run-up to know what are real GOI policy statements and what are political statements. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador offered that Livni is concerned that the GOI will be pressured to negotiate with Abbas, whom she fears does not have the power to deliver. He said that Abbas may not be relevant, in the eyes of a GOI unwilling to deal with him, but Abbas is certainly relevant to the international community, especially if he is saying the right things about violence, Israel's right to exist and the need to honor existing agreements. The Ambassador also observed that the GOI is worried that international unity on the Quartet conditions is wobbly. He added that the GOI worries that funding to the PA now channeled through Abbas in the future might lighten the financial burden on the Hamas-led PA. He noted that the U.S. prefers a straight Hamas government that bears full responsibility before the people for its actions. Beilin responded that he believes Hamas will not be any worse at governing than Fatah -- and that it may be better. -------------- Don't Discount Fatah -------------- ¶4. (C) Beilin said he is still trying to understand the ramifications of the Hamas win, which he described as "a sad development," and to determine how to proceed. He said he has been meeting with "old partners," including Saeb Erekat, whom he met on February 24, and former PA minister Yasser Abed Rabbo, his partner on the Geneva Initiative. He said that many of his Fatah contacts "have almost given up." Beilin stressed that these old Fatah veterans should not be dismissed since Hamas won the elections with only 44 percent of the vote. He added that their world is collapsing. "Their worst nightmare was a Hamas takeover," including the institution of Islamic law, Beilin said. He noted that the wives of these Fatah contacts are strong women used to their freedom. He also commented that the international community should understand that not all "Hamasniks" (Hamas members), are hard-core "Hamasniks." ¶5. (C) Beilin said that during their February 24 meeting, Erekat discussed a proposal by which Abbas could use his constitutional powers as head of the PLO to reconstitute a negotiating team -- which would include Erekat -- and then engage in negotiations with Israel during a six-month period. Beilin noted that Erekat proposes to negotiate on final status issues. "They believe they can solve the problems (during this time frame)...and achieve (President) Bush's vision," Beilin said. There would then be a referendum of the Palestinian people on any agreement reached, Beilin said. According to Beilin, Abbas as head of the PA, can call a referendum on his own. "He doesn't need the (Palestinian Legislative Council,)" Beilin added, and "Hamas will have to abide by the results or give up power." Beilin mused that perhaps Hamas would accept this scenario, since they may realize that "their old slogans can't prevail" and they need a "buffer." Beilin noted that Abbas's deputy chief of staff, Ghaith al Omari, who, Beilin said, is being paid by the Adam Smith Institute, is also involved in elaborating this proposal. ¶6. (C) "Is this a scenario or just wishful thinking," Beilin asked out loud, adding that he does not want to fool himself. "I know (Fatah) is not in power, (but) should we use this opportunity?" Beilin added that if such a scenario does not happen, "Abbas may resign -- he doesn't want to be Hamas's fig leaf." Abbas, Beilin joked, seems to always be on the verge of resigning, and, Beilin added, Abbas could financially afford to do so. Digressing, Beilin recounted a meeting he had with then-retired-PM Abbas in Amman in June 2004, when Abbas asserted that only he could deal with Hamas. Beilin added, "(Abbas's) belief in 'one weapon' is real -- he believes he can negotiate this." -------------- Hamas Can't Change Overnight -------------- ¶7. (C) Beilin said that it is unrealistic for the international community to expect that Hamas will change its positions overnight. In response to the Ambassador's comment that Hamas may not want to change, Beilin acknowledged that he has had no contact with Hamas. He speculated, however, that Hamas is not prepared for the power they have won and that the international community may be able to influence them. Beilin underlined that while he will "stick to his guns" on the three Quartet conditions, he does not want to dismiss "talking" to Hamas. "They are naive," Beilin said, "and don't know about Israeli society." ¶8. (C) The Ambassador noted that the Quartet placed its conditions on the PA -- not on Hamas -- whereas the GOI placed the conditions on Hamas. If the PA contains only Hamas representatives, this does not present a contradiction, the Ambassador said. However, if Hamas took non-Hamas officials into its government and this mixed PA then accepted the Quartet conditions, it would potentially complicate the issue. He noted that Ha;aretz journalist Aluf Ben had pointed this out in a recent conversation, asking if the distinction was intentional. Beilin acknowledged that he had not been aware of this distinction and said it could be a very important point. He said that he believes some kind of "third party" is needed to talk to Hamas to see what they are ready to do. "We can't set up impossible conditions," Beilin said, adding that "my electorate is to my left. It's stupid to say we can't negotiate with someone who doesn't recognize me. The very willingness to negotiate is a form of recognition." ¶9. (C) Beilin noted that his party will not agree to enter a coalition with Kadima unless Kadima agrees to pursue negotiations for at least a six-month period. Beilin remarked, "Why shouldn't we try it? If they want to, why not?" The Ambassador commented that Beilin should be careful to distinguish between negotiating with Abbas and negotiating with Hamas. The Ambassador noted USG opposition to negotiating with a U.S.-designated terrorist organization such as Hamas. Beilin commented that he has "debates with my own people about (this issue)," adding that he has no "temptation" to negotiate with Hamas. "What's most important to (Meretz)," Beilin underlined, "is to divide the land before we become a minority in our own land." In response to the Ambassador's query about right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party leader Avigdor Lieberman's "land swap" plan, wherein some Israeli-Arab population centers would be placed within the Palestinian territories and major Jewish settlements around Jerusalem would be placed within Israel, Beilin said that "this will never, never fly -- I hope." Beilin also expressed his opposition to any further unilateral moves. -------------- Kadima will Win -------------- ¶10. (C) On the upcoming elections, Beilin asserted that, "Kadima won the elections already." The question, he said, is with which parties Kadima will form a coalition. He expressed amazement about the people on Kadima's list, joking that the Kadima leaders do not even know many of the people on their list. Beilin claimed that number 16 or 17 on Kadima's list is a Russian immigrant who lives in a settlement and who opposed disengagement. "He got a call from Olmert one day out of the blue," Beilin said, because Kadima needed a Russian on the list. Beilin speculated that because of the way it put its list together Kadima may one day have its own "rebels" like Prime Minister Sharon had faced when he was head of Likud. "What's the glue (of Kadima)?" Beilin asked, and answered, "He's in Hadassah (Hospital). Olmert isn't (the glue.)" Beilin said in confidence that Senior PM Advisor Dov Weissglas acknowledged to him that Kadima is a one-term party, but, Beilin added, Weissglas said that this is irrelevant since within four years they could change the world. Beilin asserted that Kadima will first seek out the smaller parties, like Meretz, Shas, and United Torah Judaism, to invite into a coalition since smaller parties will not be able to credibly demand important ministerial portfolios. If Kadima succeeds in reaching a majority this way then it can approach a chastened Labor party from a position of strength without having to concede key portfolios. Beilin claimed that Kadima leaders have told him that this is their plan. Beilin said he prefers to join with Kadima than to try to form a left-wing bloc against Kadima. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES