EILAND PESSIMISTIC WITH CODEL OBAMA ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000566 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR H E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM KWBG OREP IS ISRAELI PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS GOI EXTERNAL SUBJECT: EILAND PESSIMISTIC WITH CODEL OBAMA ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS REF: TEL AVIV 366 - NOTAL Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz. Reason 1.4 (b/d) . ¶1. (C) Summary: National Security Advisor (NSA) Giora Eiland briefed Senator Barack Obama January 10 on "three and a half" different approaches to dealing with the stalemate that exists in Israeli-Palestinian relations. He anticipated the predicament that the U.S. and Israel would face should Hamas assume power as a result of the January 25 Palestinian elections, and, in the wake of those elections, has elaborated further on how the international community should react (reftel). Eiland's general assessment of prospects for achieving a two-state solution remains pessimistic even though he believes Israelis and Palestinians are not far apart on the substance of a final settlement. Eiland raised red flags about the dangers Hamas represents. End Summary. ¶2. (C) NSA Director Eiland outlined for Senator Obama and his Foreign Policy Advisor, Mark Lippert, several possible scenarios that may unfold in the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic over the coming months. His general point was that Hamas sees itself as a coequal of the Palestinian Authority no matter what the outcome of the Palestinian Legislative Council elections. In Eiland's view, Hamas claims equal rights in determining Palestinian national interests. Whether involved in the institutions of the PA or not, it will always be strong enough to undermine constructive measures, if it so chooses. ¶3. (C) Eiland retraced the actions President Abbas took upon coming to power. In February, Abbas promised Hamas that if Hamas reduced the level of violence, then the PA would fully integrate Hamas into the political system. Neither the U.S. nor Israel reacted at the time, as both were eager to reduce the level of violence, Eiland claimed, noting that PM Sharon met with Abbas just a week after his deal with Hamas and never raised the issue as a key concern. Eiland criticized his own administration for focusing on issues such as East Jerusalem voting rather than the strategic issue of what the Israeli policy line should be toward Hamas. -------------- -------------- Problem about Process, not Substance of a Solution -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Eiland claimed that the Israeli-Palestinian differences do not generally pertain to the nature of the final settlement: "We're disputing the process, not the substance," Eiland insisted, adding that in this the two parties are completely at odds. He retraced the two positions as he saw them, explaining why Israel accepted the roadmap. "We accept it not because it is better than Oslo or other agreements, but because the roadmap recognizes, in the Israeli interpretation, that security problems must be solved before political issues are broached." The Palestinian position is exactly the opposite, according to Eiland. "The only way to solve the security problems is if there is a full political solution. This requires a detailed final settlement, with clear timetables, benchmarks, international guarantees, and, only then -- maybe -- can (President Abbas) persuade Hamas to give up its weapons." Eiland said he could not see how these two positions could be bridged. -------------- Israeli policy toward the PA on January 26: -------------- ¶5. (C) Eiland outlined two alternatives: -- Stick to principles: Declare that the PA will not be considered a reliable partner and that the GOI will not discuss important issues with a hostile party. This, in effect, would mark an end of the roadmap. -- Draw a redline between participation in the (PLC) elections and other activities. When President Abbas nominates his government, Hamas could be kept out. If Hamas participates in the political system, Abbas must show us he will disarm Hamas. If he presents a reasonable plan of action, then we could give them a chance. Under this scenario, Eiland said he would not imagine that the PA could expect much cooperation from the GOI until Abbas proves that his way is working. Eiland described this alternative as "the spirit of the roadmap" that would require some flexibility and would be harder to explain politically than the first alternative described. -------------- -------------- Three Political Approaches (Labor, Likud, Kadima) -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Israeli policy post-PLC elections could move in several directions, none of which are new options, in Eiland's view. -- The Peretz (Labor) Approach: Dialogue without preconditions, i.e. accept the PA perspective on the peace process by pursuing political and security tracks. Although this approach has been tried, the proponents of this approach will respond that it must be tried again with pragmatic leadership. -- The Likud Approach: No real progress possible until the Palestinians stop terrorism. This represents a very strict interpretation of the roadmap, with no compromises or further withdrawals. -- The Unilateral Approach: Cooperate with the U.S. and withdraw from parts of the West Bank. Israel persuades the international community that it is in its interest to reduce the state of Israeli occupation. In return, Israel gets something in return -- perhaps new relations with the EU, trade incentives. Anything could be on the table. Although Olmert has espoused this perspective at times, Eiland clarified that this approach was not the policy of the current government. Moreover, there are many differences on the size of and level of further unilateral withdrawals contemplated. -------------- Option 3.5: An International Role -------------- ¶7. (C) Unilateral actions are not the best solution, Eiland said, adding that perhaps it is time to consider giving an official mandate/role to the international community in certain activities or areas. Even with these alternatives, Eiland concluded that while the bilateral differences are mostly process-related, there is currently no way to reach agreement with the Palestinians. -------------- HAMAS: Don't be fooled -------------- ¶8. (C) Senator Obama asked whether Hamas participation in the government of the PA would prove to be a moderating influence, or whether the organization's core is so focused on the destruction of Israel that it would be amenable to the "softening" that President Abbas's approach is predicated upon. Is there anything Israel, the U.S. or international community can do to strengthen President Abbas and his ability to deliver a functioning government, including law and order and economic development? ¶9. (C) Eiland addressed several assumptions observers made about Hamas and proceeded to debunk them. -- Some say Hamas can be made a more pragmatic Palestinian party. Eiland doubts that a party rooted in the tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood and its legacy can move in this direction. "In religious terms, Israel can't exist," according to their ideology, so, Eiland said, it is hard to imagine Hamas being pragmatic about a non Arab state on "Arab land." Hamas does not operate in isolation, Eiland underscored. -- Hamas behavior may moderate, but Hamas policy positions will not change. That point will make things difficult for the GOI, in Eiland's view. "The last change Hamas would make -- even if they do become more pragmatic -- would be in its statements and declarations (about Israel)." -- Even if Hamas behavior changes, it won't be soon. -------------- Back to the Future: No reason to be hopeful -------------- ¶10. (C) Senator Obama queried Eiland about AMA implementation. Eiland replied that Israel had tried to ease the life of ordinary Palestinians at checkpoints and the like. But the problem remains one of distinguishing between civilians and terrorists. "If we relax (closures/checkpoints),this leads to an upsurge in terrorism. The DCM asked whether the launching of convoys and easing of closures would have improved President Abbas' stature. Eiland claimed that seventy percent of Palestinian problems were "domestic" -- unrelated to such measures. He did acknowledge that the release Palestinian prisoners, including leaders like Marwan Barghouti, might have given President Abbas a deliverable, which could have been achieved solely through political means. ¶11. (C) Senator Obama asked what the U.S. could do to help the PA build structures that function? Eiland said the U.S. must help improve the capacity of the young Fatah leadership, but acknowledged that this challenge could not be met overnight. He also addressed the argument that Fatah was in difficulty because Israel had destroyed the PA by arguing that Arafat's influence over the years had so complicated (and compromised) the functioning of the PA that it now required even stronger leadership to correct its problems. Eiland cited the Tanzim as an example: ARAFAT gave the "movement" weapons that transformed it into a militia that even his own security forces could not control. ¶12. (U) CODEL Obama cleared this message February 6. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES