WITH CEASEFIRE HOLDING, OLMERT SPEECH OFFERS PEACE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004641

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER KWBG IS
SUBJECT: WITH CEASEFIRE HOLDING, OLMERT SPEECH OFFERS PEACE
TO PALESTINIANS

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. Deputy Defense Minister Sneh and Olmert's
foreign policy adviser Tourgeman separately told the
Ambassador November 27 that the ceasefire announced November
26 following a phone conversation between Olmert and Abu
Mazen represented a real opportunity to change the atmosphere
with the Palestinians. In a major policy speech by Olmert at
noon the same day, the Prime Minister declared that he was
"reaching out his hand in peace to our Palestinian
neighbors," and then went on to suggest a number of steps the
GOI was prepared to take if a Palestinian government that
meets the international conditions and returns Corporal
Shalit were formed and/or if the Palestinians ceased terror
attacks against Israel. The steps mentioned by Olmert
included initiating negotiations on a Palestinian state,
releasing prisoners, handing over tax revenues, withdrawing
from parts of the West Bank and removing some settlements.
Sneh told the Ambassador he was looking at concrete steps
that would help tilt the internal Palestinian situation in
favor of Abu Mazen, including removing obstacles to movement.
Tourgeman suggested that Olmert was open to U.S. suggestions
on steps the GOI could take to show the Palestinian public
that Abu Mazen's approach delivers results. The Ambassador
stressed to both Sneh and Tourgeman the importance of
extending the Gaza ceasefire to the West Bank, especially
since as Sneh noted, Palestinian extremist factions are
likely to use continued IDF operations in the West Bank as a
pretext to violate the ceasefire in Gaza. We further suggest
the Department and NSC consider visible ways we can show
support for the ceasefire and for the encouraging new signs
of life in the Israeli-Palestinian track. End Summary.

Sneh and Tourgeman Upbeat on Ceasefire
--------------


2. (U) Following a telephone conversation between Prime
Minister Olmert and Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen
the evening of November 25, a ceasefire was announced
November 26 and appeared to be holding despite several hours
of continued Qassam rocket fire from Gaza that morning. The
Israeli media on November 27 provided heavy coverage to PM
Olmert's statement that Israel was strong enough to exercise
restraint in order to try to give the ceasefire a chance to
work. The media similarly emphasized Abu Mazen's decision to
order his security forces to enter northern Gaza, in
coordination with Israel, in order to ensure that the
ceasefire would be respected.


3. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador the morning of
November 27, Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh said that he
and Defense Minister Peretz viewed the ceasefire as a real
opportunity to tilt the Palestinian political situation in
favor of Abu Mazen. Sneh said he was working on plans to
remove roadblocks and reduce impediments to Palestinian
movement in the West Bank, as well as a number of other steps
to improve the Palestinians' living conditions and economic
situation (septel).


4. (C) In a subsequent conversation with the Ambassador,
Olmert's foreign policy adviser Shalom Tourgeman was more
cautious than Sneh, but he also expressed a desire to use the
ceasefire as an opening to press forward. Tourgeman flagged
for us a speech that Olmert was about to give later in the
day, which Tourgeman urged that we study carefully.
Tourgeman also solicited our advice on steps that the GOI
might take to demonstrate to the Palestinians that Abu
Mazen's diplomatic approach would pay off. Tourgeman said
the Prime Minister's Office was "looking for a nice package."
With both Sneh and Tourgeman, the Ambassador stressed the
importance of moving quickly to show that Abu Mazen's
approach can deliver results, and pointed out that the
ceasefire provides the Palestinians with something to lose if
the extremist factions violate it. Both recognized the need
for urgency since the ceasefire remains fragile.

Ambassador Urges Ceasefire be Extended to West Bank
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The Ambassador urged both Israelis to consider
extending the ceasefire to the West Bank in order to maximize
the political value to Abu Mazen and to reduce the likelihood
that IDF action in the West Bank could be used by
Palestinians factions as a pretext to violate the ceasefire
in Gaza. Sneh agreed that IDF operations in the West Bank
could be used as a pretext by Palestinian factions to break
the Gaza ceasefire and said he would consider the idea, but
he noted that there was significant resistance from the IDF
and security establishment to extending it to the West Bank
since they were concerned that Palestinian terrorist would
exploit a West Bank ceasefire to accelerate bomb-making and
operational planning for suicide attacks. Tourgeman made
similar points, also noting that it was not clear that Abu
Mazen's security forces had the capability to prevent
terrorist activity in a territory as large as the West Bank.
He assured the Ambassador, however, that the IDF would reduce
its West Bank operations to the greatest extent possible as a
gesture to the Palestinians. Tourgeman also urged that the
Secretary press PA President Abbas to meet with Olmert soon.

SIPDIS

Olmert Speech Addressed to Palestinians
--------------


6. (U) In a long-scheduled speech commemorating Israel's
first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion November 27, Prime
Minister Olmert declared that he was extending his hand in
peace to the Palestinians in the hope that it would not be
rejected. Noting that the Palestinians stood "on the brink
of an historic crossroad," Olmert made the following points:

-- Terrorism has not brought the Palestinians any closer to
the goal of establishing a state.

-- If a new Palestinian government is established which meets
the Quartet conditions and brings about the release of
Corporal Shalit, Olmert will invite Abu Mazen to meet to
establish a dialogue on creating an independent and viable
Palestinian state, with territorial contiguity in the West
Bank.

-- Once Shalit is released, Israel will be willing to release
many Palestinian prisoners, including some sentenced to
lengthy prison terms.

-- An end to Palestinian terror attacks will lead to steps to
improve Palestinian living conditions, including removing
roadblocks, facilitating the movement of people and goods,
improving the operation of the border crossings in Gaza, and
releasing frozen Palestinian tax revenues.

-- Israel will seek the assistance of moderate Arab states.
Calls by moderate Arabs for the need to recognize and
establish normal relations with Israel -- including "some
parts of the Saudi peace initiative" -- are positive and
Olmert intends to "invest efforts" in developing relations
with these states.

-- Both Israel and the Palestinians must make painful
compromises. Israel will agree to evacuate territories and
communities (i.e. outposts and settlements) in return for
true peace. The Palestinians must stop terrorism, recognize
Israel's right to live in peace and security, and give up the
demand for the right of return of refugees.

-- If the Palestinians demonstrate determination and
discipline, they will find Israel a ready partner. Olmert
cautioned, however, that the Palestinians should not be
fooled by Israel's internal differences and political
rivalries. If pressed, Israel will do whatever it takes to
prevail and the cost will be very high.

-- There is no point in trying to settle historical scores.
Israelis and Palestinians should instead focus on preventing
further tragedies and bequething hope for a better life to
future generations.


7. (C) Comment: The Gaza ceasefire remains fragile, but it
nevertheless represents an opportunity to change the
Palestinian-Israeli environment and break out of the downward
spiral of violence and political impasse. Olmert's speech is
welcome and we hope that his reference to the Palestinian
need to give up the "right of return" does not sour the
Palestinian reaction to the totality of what he is offering.
We recommend that the Department and NSC consider a visible
show of support for the ceasefire and for further steps,
including AMA implementation and beyond.

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JONES