Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV4603
2006-11-24 12:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:
FRANCES TOWNSEND'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH ISA CHIEF DISKIN FOCUSES ON THE PALESTINIANS
how-tonull Carol X Weakley 11/27/2006 02:29:52 PM From DB/Inbox: Carol X Weakley Cable Text: S E C R E T TEL AVIV 04603 SIPDIS CXTelA: ACTION: POL INFO: IPSC PD RES ECON DCM DAO AMB AID ADM RSO CONS IMO DISSEMINATION: POL CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: CDA:GCRETZ DRAFTED: CONS:RBOREK CLEARED: POL/C:MJSIEVERS, POL:MCKEAYS, LEGATT:MS, POL/RES:JF VZCZCTVI108 PP RUEHC RUEHXK RHEHAAA RHMFISS RUEKJCS RUCNFB RUEAIIA RHEHNSC DE RUEHTV #4603/01 3281240 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 241240Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7785 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004603
SIPDIS
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND
NSC FOR MALVESTI
STATE FOR S/CT (AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON),NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER)
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5
HQ USEUCOM FOR ECJ-5 (KLOTHE)
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 11/24/2026
TAGS: PTER, ECON, OTRA, OVIP, KPAL, KWBG, KHLS, AMGT, ASEC,
EG, IS
SUBJECT: FRANCES TOWNSEND'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH ISA
CHIEF DISKIN FOCUSES ON THE PALESTINIANS
Classified By: Classified By: Charge Gene Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
-------
SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004603
SIPDIS
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND
NSC FOR MALVESTI
STATE FOR S/CT (AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON),NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER)
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5
HQ USEUCOM FOR ECJ-5 (KLOTHE)
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 11/24/2026
TAGS: PTER, ECON, OTRA, OVIP, KPAL, KWBG, KHLS, AMGT, ASEC,
EG, IS
SUBJECT: FRANCES TOWNSEND'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH ISA
CHIEF DISKIN FOCUSES ON THE PALESTINIANS
Classified By: Classified By: Charge Gene Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) In a November 12 discussion on the Palestinian and
other terrorist threats facing Israel, Israeli Security
Agency (ISA) Chief Yuval Diskin told Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
(APHSCT) Frances Fragos Townsend that he believes it is
more important to strengthen Fatah than Palestinian
Authority President Abu Mazen. Diskin said that the
external Hamas leadership in Damascus is controlling
Hamas's strategy in the Palestinian Territories, and warned
that Hizballah is developing infrastructure within the Gaza
Strip, forcing the ISA to devote more resources to
monitoring the situation there. Disking characterized
Global Jihadist ideology as a growing threat to Israel.
Townsend and Diskin agreed that Egypt is not doing enough
to stop the smuggling of arms and terrorist experts into
the Gaza Strip. Townsend requested increased cooperation
between the USG and GOI on border security and the exchange
of forensic data. END SUMMARY.
--------------
DISKIN: STRENGTHEN FATAH, NOT ABU MAZIN
--------------
2. (C) In discussing the Palestinian terrorist threat to
Israel, Diskin stated that Fatah's weakness presents
Israel, the U.S. and the EU with a "strategic problem."
Because, in Diskin's view, Palestinian Authority (PA)
President Abu Mazen does not know how to "rehabilitate"
Fatah as a social movement or a political party, it is more
important in the current situation to strengthen Fatah than
Abu Mazen. Diskin said that Abu Mazen is making a mistake
by trying to be a national leader, especially as he does
not "speak the language of young Fatah." As for Fatah,
Diskin said that it lacks motivation, which needs to come <br />
from a strong political party and popular will. Diskin
added that giving Abu Mazen weapons to strengthen him is
not enough: "Without popular support for Fatah as a social
movement and a political party, there is no momentum to
form a cohesive effort against Hamas." Diskin observed
that while Fatah holds a majority in the Palestinians'
security apparatus, it is not confronting Hamas. He
explained this as recognition by Fatah members that they
lack popular support, and political support from Fatah as a
whole.
3. (C) Diskin said that Abu Mazen has "lost direction" and
is not qualified to run Fatah. He warned that the threat
of assassination of Abu Mazen or (more likely) senior Fatah
members is a "real possibility" in the future if "things go
in the wrong direction" with Hamas. Diskin lamented that
since the Second Intifada, Fatah has failed to raise
leaders that can unite the old guard and the new
generation. He stated his belief that only two Fatah
leaders currently have enough support and experience to
control the party: Muhammad Dahlan and Marwan Barghuti.
4. (C) According to Diskin, Dahlan is a well-qualified
politician who understands Gaza, but who also prefers to
work behind the scenes. Diskin claimed that Hamas has
identified him as its "worst enemy" and has already
assassinated members of his inner circle. While Dahlan may
claim to have the support of the "Arab Quartet," Diskin
expressed concern that Dahlan's ego could interfere with
his leadership: "Dahlan's big ego is more important than
Palestinian interests." He added that Dahlan has
"alternatives" to staying in Gaza, and could "get out" of
the Palestinian political scene if he felt that he had to.
Diskin claimed that Dahlan believes that Hamas will stay in
power until 2009. According to Dahlan, Fatah will use this
time to prepare to run against Hamas and win. Townsend
wondered if Dahlan is capable of implementing his vision to
lead the Palestinians. Diskin responded that he is smart,
experienced, and well-connected, but is "not motivated
enough."
5. (C) Marwan Barghuti is strong and has support in the
West Bank, Diskin said, but this is largely because his
incarceration has made him a popular symbol. Diskin said
that he is opposed to releasing Barghuti, and believes that
whatever Barghuti says from jail is irrelevant. He
characterized Barghuti as a dangerous extremist, but the
most prominent leader in the West Bank Fatah.
--------------
HAMAS SPLIT BETWEEN GAZA AND DAMASCUS
--------------
6. (C) Diskin said that in his view, Hamas is laboring
under the challenge of being in power. While Hamas is
attempting to build consensus among its leadership, there
is significant tension between the power centers in Gaza,
the West Bank and Damascus. According to Diskin, PA Prime
Minister Ismail Haniyeh and others in Gaza "face reality"
and are more pragmatic, but Khalid Meshal in Damascus is
under pressure from Iran, Hizballah, and Syria to maintain
a hard line. Diskin claimed that Meshal's current strategy
is to control Hamas. He observed, however, that for Hamas,
"the movement" is still more important than participation
in the government. Diskin predicted that if Hamas and Fatah
are able to form a National Unity Government (NUG) or
technocrat government, Haniyeh will not be its prime
minister, but will probably lead in an indirect way.
Diskin observed that Hamas and Abu Mazen were closer to
forming a NUG than ever before, but cautioned that anything
could happen to torpedo such an effort. He cited as an
example the near success last June in reaching agreement on
the Prisoners' Document, undermined in the last moment by
the kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit.
-------------- --------------
PREDICTION: HIGH TENSIONS BETWEEN FATAH AND HAMAS
-------------- --------------
7. (C) Asked about what the future holds, Diskin predicted
continuing high tensions between Fatah and Hamas. He said
that neither group wants a full-scale war to break out
between them, but added that both groups are preparing in
case the situation deteriorates. Diskin said that he is
concerned that a high-level assassination (e.g., of Abu
Mazen or Dahlan) would accelerate the deterioration. He
claimed that there are efforts afoot to "calm the
situation" between Fatah and Hamas.
--------------
EGYPT A SOURCE OF "GROWING FRUSTRATION"
--------------
8. (C) Diskin expressed "growing frustration" with Egypt's
role in securing the border between the Sinai and the Gaza
Strip, and said that the he holds the GOE responsible for
the current situation in Gaza. He claimed that smugglers
moved twelve tons of TNT from Sinai into the Gaza Strip in
October, and that more than fourteen tons of explosives are
currently in the Sinai, waiting to be smuggled in. Diskin
said that the GOI passed the names of "smuggling barons" to
the GOE and offered to conduct a joint operation to stem
the flow of weapons from the Sinai into Gaza, but that the
GOE has not agreed. Diskin said that the GOE is
well-connected in Gaza due to historical and cultural ties
and can serve as a negotiator, but has no control over the
area. He reiterated his belief that Egypt could make a
significant contribution to stabilizing the situation in
Gaza by cooperating with the GOI against smuggling.
--------------
NEXT THREAT: GLOBAL JIHAD
--------------
9. (C) Diskin said the second terrorist threat facing
Israel comes from Global Jihadist ideology. He stressed
that there is currently no Global Jihad infrastructure in
Israel or the Occupied Territories. Diskin allowed that
that "cells" might exist, and said that the ISA is seeing
the beginnings of Salafist ideology in Nablus and East
Jerusalem, and has arrested people as a precaution. Diskin
claimed that in the Gaza Strip, multiple factions of the
Popular Resistance Committees have adopted Global Jihadist
ideology since the last years of the Second Intifada. He
noted that Hamas is also concerned about Global Jihad,
adding, "If Hamas is troubled, we should be worried too."
10. (S) Diskin claimed that the GOI has intelligence
regarding alleged efforts by Mumtaz Dughmush to make
contact with Global Jihad sources, possibly to include
those responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole. Diskin
added that Jamallah Abu Samadama -- killed by the Israelis
-- made contacts with Global Jihad sources in North Africa
and the Sinai before his death. Diskin reiterated that the
Global Jihad threat to Israel currently comes from its
ideology and not infrastructure.
-------------- --------------
HIZBALLAH MORE ACTIVE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Diskin claimed that Hizballah is developing
infrastructure and capabilities within the Palestinian
Territories, but admitted that the GOI needs more time to
identify the trend in Hizballah's actions. He said that
the Shin Bet intends to focus more attention to this issue,
and needs international help.
--------------
REQUEST TO INCREASE COOPERATION IN FORENSICS
--------------
12. (C) Townsend concluded the meeting by thanking Diskin
and the ISA for the language immersion program they
established for the FBI. She asked Diskin to look into
ways that the USG and GOI could increase cooperation on
border security and forensic data -- specifically
fingerprint exchange. Diskin observed that there are some
technical and other hurdles that need to be overcome, but
agreed to consider data sharing and similar programs. He
noted that the Shin Bet has established its own,
independent liaison with other international counterparts
for the first time in its history. He claimed that Mossad
disapproves of it, but stressed that it will continue
nonetheless, especially as the Shin Bet has "something to
sell" -- an integrated counterterrorism concept that other
agencies around the world may find useful.
13. (U) This cable has been cleared by APHSCT Frances
Fragos Townsend.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
CRETZ
SIPDIS
THE WHITE HOUSE FOR APHSCT FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND
NSC FOR MALVESTI
STATE FOR S/CT (AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON),NEA, NEA/IPA (MAHER)
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5
HQ USEUCOM FOR ECJ-5 (KLOTHE)
E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 11/24/2026
TAGS: PTER, ECON, OTRA, OVIP, KPAL, KWBG, KHLS, AMGT, ASEC,
EG, IS
SUBJECT: FRANCES TOWNSEND'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH ISA
CHIEF DISKIN FOCUSES ON THE PALESTINIANS
Classified By: Classified By: Charge Gene Cretz. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d).
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (C) In a November 12 discussion on the Palestinian and
other terrorist threats facing Israel, Israeli Security
Agency (ISA) Chief Yuval Diskin told Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
(APHSCT) Frances Fragos Townsend that he believes it is
more important to strengthen Fatah than Palestinian
Authority President Abu Mazen. Diskin said that the
external Hamas leadership in Damascus is controlling
Hamas's strategy in the Palestinian Territories, and warned
that Hizballah is developing infrastructure within the Gaza
Strip, forcing the ISA to devote more resources to
monitoring the situation there. Disking characterized
Global Jihadist ideology as a growing threat to Israel.
Townsend and Diskin agreed that Egypt is not doing enough
to stop the smuggling of arms and terrorist experts into
the Gaza Strip. Townsend requested increased cooperation
between the USG and GOI on border security and the exchange
of forensic data. END SUMMARY.
--------------
DISKIN: STRENGTHEN FATAH, NOT ABU MAZIN
--------------
2. (C) In discussing the Palestinian terrorist threat to
Israel, Diskin stated that Fatah's weakness presents
Israel, the U.S. and the EU with a "strategic problem."
Because, in Diskin's view, Palestinian Authority (PA)
President Abu Mazen does not know how to "rehabilitate"
Fatah as a social movement or a political party, it is more
important in the current situation to strengthen Fatah than
Abu Mazen. Diskin said that Abu Mazen is making a mistake
by trying to be a national leader, especially as he does
not "speak the language of young Fatah." As for Fatah,
Diskin said that it lacks motivation, which needs to come <br />
from a strong political party and popular will. Diskin
added that giving Abu Mazen weapons to strengthen him is
not enough: "Without popular support for Fatah as a social
movement and a political party, there is no momentum to
form a cohesive effort against Hamas." Diskin observed
that while Fatah holds a majority in the Palestinians'
security apparatus, it is not confronting Hamas. He
explained this as recognition by Fatah members that they
lack popular support, and political support from Fatah as a
whole.
3. (C) Diskin said that Abu Mazen has "lost direction" and
is not qualified to run Fatah. He warned that the threat
of assassination of Abu Mazen or (more likely) senior Fatah
members is a "real possibility" in the future if "things go
in the wrong direction" with Hamas. Diskin lamented that
since the Second Intifada, Fatah has failed to raise
leaders that can unite the old guard and the new
generation. He stated his belief that only two Fatah
leaders currently have enough support and experience to
control the party: Muhammad Dahlan and Marwan Barghuti.
4. (C) According to Diskin, Dahlan is a well-qualified
politician who understands Gaza, but who also prefers to
work behind the scenes. Diskin claimed that Hamas has
identified him as its "worst enemy" and has already
assassinated members of his inner circle. While Dahlan may
claim to have the support of the "Arab Quartet," Diskin
expressed concern that Dahlan's ego could interfere with
his leadership: "Dahlan's big ego is more important than
Palestinian interests." He added that Dahlan has
"alternatives" to staying in Gaza, and could "get out" of
the Palestinian political scene if he felt that he had to.
Diskin claimed that Dahlan believes that Hamas will stay in
power until 2009. According to Dahlan, Fatah will use this
time to prepare to run against Hamas and win. Townsend
wondered if Dahlan is capable of implementing his vision to
lead the Palestinians. Diskin responded that he is smart,
experienced, and well-connected, but is "not motivated
enough."
5. (C) Marwan Barghuti is strong and has support in the
West Bank, Diskin said, but this is largely because his
incarceration has made him a popular symbol. Diskin said
that he is opposed to releasing Barghuti, and believes that
whatever Barghuti says from jail is irrelevant. He
characterized Barghuti as a dangerous extremist, but the
most prominent leader in the West Bank Fatah.
--------------
HAMAS SPLIT BETWEEN GAZA AND DAMASCUS
--------------
6. (C) Diskin said that in his view, Hamas is laboring
under the challenge of being in power. While Hamas is
attempting to build consensus among its leadership, there
is significant tension between the power centers in Gaza,
the West Bank and Damascus. According to Diskin, PA Prime
Minister Ismail Haniyeh and others in Gaza "face reality"
and are more pragmatic, but Khalid Meshal in Damascus is
under pressure from Iran, Hizballah, and Syria to maintain
a hard line. Diskin claimed that Meshal's current strategy
is to control Hamas. He observed, however, that for Hamas,
"the movement" is still more important than participation
in the government. Diskin predicted that if Hamas and Fatah
are able to form a National Unity Government (NUG) or
technocrat government, Haniyeh will not be its prime
minister, but will probably lead in an indirect way.
Diskin observed that Hamas and Abu Mazen were closer to
forming a NUG than ever before, but cautioned that anything
could happen to torpedo such an effort. He cited as an
example the near success last June in reaching agreement on
the Prisoners' Document, undermined in the last moment by
the kidnapping of Corporal Gilad Shalit.
-------------- --------------
PREDICTION: HIGH TENSIONS BETWEEN FATAH AND HAMAS
-------------- --------------
7. (C) Asked about what the future holds, Diskin predicted
continuing high tensions between Fatah and Hamas. He said
that neither group wants a full-scale war to break out
between them, but added that both groups are preparing in
case the situation deteriorates. Diskin said that he is
concerned that a high-level assassination (e.g., of Abu
Mazen or Dahlan) would accelerate the deterioration. He
claimed that there are efforts afoot to "calm the
situation" between Fatah and Hamas.
--------------
EGYPT A SOURCE OF "GROWING FRUSTRATION"
--------------
8. (C) Diskin expressed "growing frustration" with Egypt's
role in securing the border between the Sinai and the Gaza
Strip, and said that the he holds the GOE responsible for
the current situation in Gaza. He claimed that smugglers
moved twelve tons of TNT from Sinai into the Gaza Strip in
October, and that more than fourteen tons of explosives are
currently in the Sinai, waiting to be smuggled in. Diskin
said that the GOI passed the names of "smuggling barons" to
the GOE and offered to conduct a joint operation to stem
the flow of weapons from the Sinai into Gaza, but that the
GOE has not agreed. Diskin said that the GOE is
well-connected in Gaza due to historical and cultural ties
and can serve as a negotiator, but has no control over the
area. He reiterated his belief that Egypt could make a
significant contribution to stabilizing the situation in
Gaza by cooperating with the GOI against smuggling.
--------------
NEXT THREAT: GLOBAL JIHAD
--------------
9. (C) Diskin said the second terrorist threat facing
Israel comes from Global Jihadist ideology. He stressed
that there is currently no Global Jihad infrastructure in
Israel or the Occupied Territories. Diskin allowed that
that "cells" might exist, and said that the ISA is seeing
the beginnings of Salafist ideology in Nablus and East
Jerusalem, and has arrested people as a precaution. Diskin
claimed that in the Gaza Strip, multiple factions of the
Popular Resistance Committees have adopted Global Jihadist
ideology since the last years of the Second Intifada. He
noted that Hamas is also concerned about Global Jihad,
adding, "If Hamas is troubled, we should be worried too."
10. (S) Diskin claimed that the GOI has intelligence
regarding alleged efforts by Mumtaz Dughmush to make
contact with Global Jihad sources, possibly to include
those responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole. Diskin
added that Jamallah Abu Samadama -- killed by the Israelis
-- made contacts with Global Jihad sources in North Africa
and the Sinai before his death. Diskin reiterated that the
Global Jihad threat to Israel currently comes from its
ideology and not infrastructure.
-------------- --------------
HIZBALLAH MORE ACTIVE IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
-------------- --------------
11. (C) Diskin claimed that Hizballah is developing
infrastructure and capabilities within the Palestinian
Territories, but admitted that the GOI needs more time to
identify the trend in Hizballah's actions. He said that
the Shin Bet intends to focus more attention to this issue,
and needs international help.
--------------
REQUEST TO INCREASE COOPERATION IN FORENSICS
--------------
12. (C) Townsend concluded the meeting by thanking Diskin
and the ISA for the language immersion program they
established for the FBI. She asked Diskin to look into
ways that the USG and GOI could increase cooperation on
border security and forensic data -- specifically
fingerprint exchange. Diskin observed that there are some
technical and other hurdles that need to be overcome, but
agreed to consider data sharing and similar programs. He
noted that the Shin Bet has established its own,
independent liaison with other international counterparts
for the first time in its history. He claimed that Mossad
disapproves of it, but stressed that it will continue
nonetheless, especially as the Shin Bet has "something to
sell" -- an integrated counterterrorism concept that other
agencies around the world may find useful.
13. (U) This cable has been cleared by APHSCT Frances
Fragos Townsend.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
CRETZ