MK SCNELLER'S PLAN TO EVACUATE WEST BANK SETTLER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004474

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG IS
SUBJECT: MK SCNELLER'S PLAN TO EVACUATE WEST BANK SETTLER
SITES

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Econoff and Deputy PolCouns met with member
of Knesset (MK) Otneil Schneller to discuss efforts by Prime
Minister Olmert's office to negotiate the evacuation of West
Bank settlements and outposts with settler leaders. In press
reports, Schneller -- settler of the Mikhmas settlement --
asserts that he is a central consultant of Prime Minister
Olmert on the question of settlements. According to
Schneller's current plan, settlers would voluntarily evacuate
many settlements and outposts east of the seamline barrier in
exchange for U.S. assurances of support to Israel for
annexing between 11-15 percent of the West Bank, including
settlement blocs. Schneller asserts that former Prime
Minister Sharon supported his plan and Prime Minister Olmert
continues that support. Schneller claimed that settler
leaders also supported the plan, and, if Israel was able to
obtain U.S backing, voluntary evacuation of outposts would
begin within weeks. Schneller said any plans to forcibly
remove settlers, including those in illegal outposts, would
be a mistake. End summary.


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Man With a Plan...Just Not the 1967 Borders
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2. (C) In a November 2 meeting with emboffs, Schneller said
"it is impossible for Israel to return to the 1967 borders."
Given that premise, Schneller stated the principles of his
vision were based on a "win-win-win" scenario:

-- The Political Left's "Win:" According to Schneller, the
Israeli left would "win" if West Bank settlements and
outposts were evacuated and an independent Palestinian state
was created.

-- The Political Right's "Win:" Schneller asserted that the
Israeli right would still "win" despite the evacuation of
settlements and outposts in the West Bank. If part of the
West Bank -- including settlement blocs -- were retained, the
rationale for establishing settlements and outposts would
remain valid.

-- Palestinian "Win:" Palestinians would be the biggest
winners, according to Schneller, because they would have an
"independent and viable state -- "not cantons" -- consisting
of approximately 85 percent of the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. (Note: Although Schneller said that the Palestinians
may eventually achieve an independent state, Schneller's plan
does not call for final status negotiations. His vision
foresees a "Hong Kong-like" scenario where the Israeli and
Palestinian populations would be demographically separated
until the political climate warrants negotiations.
Demographic separation would engender a Palestinian entity or
a de facto state, in which Palestinians would administer West
Bank and Gaza. End note.)


3. (C) The goal of Schneller's plan is to create
demographic separation between Israelis and Palestinians --
"we are here, they are there." Schneller posited that one
does not have to choose between being at war and finalizing a
peaceful resolution -- "one can be in the middle."
Separation between the two populations would create an
opportunity to "build good neighbors and good relations."
The Palestinian entity would have "special status" for a
"long time, possible 30 years" within the same customs
envelope as Israel.


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Annexation of Blocs
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4. (C) Schneller's plan entails the annexation of between
11-15 percent of the West Bank, encompassing most Israeli
settlement blocs, such as Ariel, Modi'in Illit, Gush Etzion,
and Ma'ale Adummim. He noted that the area to be annexed
will not necessarily be limited to land located west of the
seamline barrier. Schneller stressed the importance of
obtaining settler "buy-in" for the plan, adding that a
"wiggly border" should not pose a problem -- even from a
security perspective. The current seamline barrier "could be
moved," if necessary. When asked if his plan included
retaining control of the Jordan Valley, Schneller answered
that only part of the northern Jordan Valley would be
appropriated.


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Land Swaps
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5. (C) Schneller told emboffs that Israel would swap land in
exchange for West Bank lands annexed. He also, however,
advocated that Egypt -- in addition to Israel -- contribute
land to the Palestinians. Schneller envisions the
Palestinian state to be composed of 85 percent of the West
Bank, the entire Gaza Strip, and an Egyptian land grant of
Sinai territory between Rafah and El-Arish. Schneller
confided to emboffs that he has discussed this possibility
with "high-level Egyptians and Palestinians" and claimed that
both sides seemed open to this idea. In turn, Israel would
offer Egypt the option of a land link across the southern
Negev, north of Eilat, to facilitate Egyptian transportation
to Jordan and Saudi Arabia.


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Two Stage Withdrawal of Outposts and Some Settlements
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6. (C) Schneller claimed that if key rabbis (eg: Shlomo
Amar, Ovadia Yousef, Avraham Shapira, Yosef Shalom, Avraham
Elyashiv) supported his plan, the Israeli public would also
support it. Schneller said that he already has support from
some key rabbis, but implementation of his plan is predicated
on settler support. Settlement supporters and leaders such
as Avigdor Lieberman, Ze'ev Hever (known as Zambish),and
Benjamin Netanyahu all agree in principle with his plan, but
doubt that the GOI could obtain U.S. agreement to annex parts
of the West Bank. He also claimed to have Labor Party's Ami
Ayalon's support as well. (Note: Schneller noted to emboffs
that the 11-15 percent was the consensus between those he was
trying to obtain support for the plan from. Schneller said
that Ami Ayalon thought Israeli annexation of 11 percent was
satisfactory, whereas, Lieberman wanted 18 percent.
Moreover, although Schneller claims that Prime Minister
Olmert, as well as some government officials, support his
plan, it is unclear whether Schneller has overall GOI
backing. End note.)


7. (C) Schneller continued, however, by saying that if the
GOI gained assurances from the U.S. to annex settlement blocs
and other key areas, evacuation would be implemented in two
phases. The first phase --which he called a "mini-hitkansut"
-- would be the voluntary evacuation of the outposts Israel
committed to evacuate under the roadmap and in the April 2004
commitments to President Bush. The second phase would be to
evacuate settlements in West Bank areas Israel would not
retain. While phase one could be completed fairly quickly,
the second phase would occur only after the GOI built new
housing for settlers in areas where they would be relocated.
Under his plan, settlers would be able to resettle inside
Green-Line Israel, in settlement blocs, or in some cases,
whole communities could opt to relocate.


8. (C) When asked if Olmert supported his plan and how his
plan compared to Defense Minister Peretz's current efforts to
evacuate outposts in the West Bank, Schneller recounted to
emboffs a recent Knesset meeting where Olmert stated that
there is only one prime minister in Israel and only one
policy. "He supports my plan," claimed Schneller.
Schneller, a former leader of the YESHA Council (the
settlement umbrella organization),believes his plan can work
and asserts that his job is to bridge the gap between
Olmert's vision and YESHA. "Most leaders who tried to
accomplish peace were not religious and were from the
political left," Schneller explained. He asserted that the
problem with them is that they only represent 20 percent of
the population" so they cannot broker peace. "Israel is not
a democracy. It's somewhere between a Jewish state and a
democracy."


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Understanding Schneller's Plan
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9. (C) Although Schneller was hesitant to admit whether his
plan is actually Olmert's frozen "hitkansut" or
convergence/realignment) plan, both plans share key
similarities. Both plans call for:

-- Unilaterally setting Israel's borders by resettling
settlers from isolated West Bank areas to settlement blocs
west of the seamline barrier.

-- Demographically separating Israel from the Palestinian
population, with the barrier route serving as the basis for a
de facto border between Israel and a Palestinian state.

-- Maintaining some level of control in the Jordan Valley.
Although Olmert did not detail the extent of Jordan Valley
land encompassed under his convergence plan, Schneller's
statements suggest Israel plans to keep at least part of the
Jordan Valley. A June 2006 Associated Press article states
that Schneller advocated ongoing construction in the Jordan
Valley settlement of Maskiyot, saying that Israel needs to
keep this are as a buffer against Islamic militants based in
Iraq and Iran.


10. (C) Although Olmert did not made public references to the
future of Hebron under the convergence/realignment plan,
Schneller was quoted in May 2006, when realignment was under
discussion, saying that settler sites in Hebron and Qiryat
Arba "are supposed to be part of the Israeli state."


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Schneller on Peace Initiatives
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11.(C) Schneller was dismissive of grand plans -- Reagan
Plan, Kissinger Plan, the Roadmap -- and argued that settler
buy-in on a plan like his (which he claimed offered to
satisfy everyone's interest) rather than prescriptive policy
(eg: settlement freeze) would be ultimately more effective at
securing any outcome that advances international, Israeli
(including settlers),and even Palestinian interests. Of
grand plans, Schneller stated, "All plans are only plans.
You can talk about it for four years, then everything will
change."


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