PERETZ AND AMBASSADOR KICK OFF AMA NEGOTIATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004465

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG IS
SUBJECT: PERETZ AND AMBASSADOR KICK OFF AMA NEGOTIATIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Defense Minister Amir Peretz told the
Ambassador on November 6 that despite the threats Israel is
facing, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will do everything
possible to improve the humanitarian situation in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip. He said that he, as defense minister,
has made decisions to improve the humanitarian situation that
were implemented regardless of the opposition of his senior
military staff. He cited his decisions to keep Rafah open
two days per week despite threats, and to issue orders for
the IDF to reduce friction between Palestinians and settlers
during the olive harvest. According to Peretz, it is
important to find the balance between humanitarian needs and
threats, and "the needs sometimes outweigh the threats." The
Ambassador said that part of the political strategy to
improve Palestinians' lives is to implement the Agreement on
Movement and Access (AMA). He presented Peretz documents
detailing the Embassy's goals, staffing, and agendas for
various AMA working groups, and a paper on negotiation
procedures and timetables. Peretz endorsed the negotiations,
but said that the MOD needed more time to staff up and
organize for the talks. End summary.

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Difficult Times in Israel...
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2. (C) Defense Minister Amir Peretz told the Ambassador on
November 6 that their meeting was occurring as "the usual
dilemma for Israel" is taking place vis-a-vis fighting in
Beit Hanoun in the Gaza Strip. He said that on one hand, the
IDF has to fight terrorist elements without harming the
Palestinian population, which is sometimes a difficult
distinction to make. On the other hand, the GOI cannot allow
rockets to be fired into its sovereign territory on a daily
basis and stay indifferent to the damage done to its own
population. He commented that the GOI would have to examine
how to strengthen Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud
Abbas when dealing with the fighting in Gaza. He noted that
the debate on whether to increase or decrease the tempo and
intensity of operations in Gaza is important and very real,
and he said that he personally felt that fighting against
Hamas helps Abbas, because Hamas is strengthened if it
commits terror attacks without being punished for its
actions. He opined that the people of Beit Hanoun "in their
hearts" really do not want to see Hamas take refuge among
them, even if they cannot say so publicly.

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...But Committed to Improving
Humanitarian Situation
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3. (C) Peretz continued that despite any threats of attacks
to Israel, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) will do all that is
possible to improve the humanitarian situation on the ground
in both the West Bank and Gaza. He cited as an example
orders that he gave for the IDF to reduce the friction
between settlers and Palestinians in the West Bank during the
olive harvest, and claimed that as a result, even though the
crop is much bigger than in recent years, there have hardly
been any incidents during the harvest. He commented that it
is imperative to make a distinction between terrorists and
civilians, and that for this reason it is important to
implement LTG Dayton's security project for Karni as soon as
possible.


4. (C) Peretz also underlined that Israel's security
policies are decided by the political echelon of the MOD, and
anything he decides as defense minister will be fully
implemented, despite any contrary positions provided by "my
intelligence." He said that there are many warnings of
threats against Rafah, and that the GOI has proof that the
passage is being used by senior terrorist elements to
transfer funds and know-how into Gaza. Regardless of the
intelligence, however, he has issued orders that the crossing
should be open at least two days per week, and his orders are
being followed, he claimed. He explained that the opening
days for the crossing may vary throughout the week, so that
terrorists cannot anticipate operating hours, but that the
crossing is open nevertheless. Peretz reiterated that his
decisions as defense minister are implemented, and cited as
an example that Israel last week approved the entry of
Palestinian businessmen from the West Bank into Israel, as
well as 1,000 additional workers from the northern West Bank
"under the regular age." According to Peretz, it is
important to find the balance between humanitarian needs and
threats, and "the needs sometimes outweigh the threats."

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AMA Talks to Begin Soon
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5. (C) The Ambassador said that there can be no purely
military solution to the situation in Gaza. To combat
terrorism successfully, we also need a political strategy.
Part of our political strategy is to improve Palestinians'
lives and strengthen Abbas against Hamas by implementing the
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA). He commented that
the Secretary was here one month ago, that Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert is going to the U.S. in less than a week, and
that it is high time to make some progress on implementing
the AMA. He reiterated that Hamas cannot be defeated by
military action alone. He noted that violence fills
political vacuums, and emphasized that the AMA is an
important component of the overall strategy to move the
political process forward. The Ambassador reported that
staff members from the MOD and Embassy have been working to
prepare a number of papers to begin talks on implementing the
AMA, and offered Peretz copies of the documents. (Note:
These documents have been forwarded to NEA/IPA. End note.)
He told Peretz that the documents include a goal paper,
agendas for working teams on crossings, convoys, West
Bank-Gaza Strip link, obstacles to movement, Palestinian
economic development, and Palestinian social development. He
also presented the Embassy's organizational chart detailing
the staff involved in each of the working groups, a document
on the procedures that should take place during the
negotiations, such as reporting of meeting outcomes and
agreed minutes, and the Embassy's expectations on the
frequency of meetings. He suggested that the core groups,
led by the DCM on the U.S. side and MOD Pol-Mil Director Amos
Gilad on the Israeli side, have a meeting that same
afternoon, so that the working groups could begin their work
the following day. The Ambassador emphasized that the goal
of the discussions is to quickly move to trilateral meetings
with the Palestinians. He noted that the Embassy also wants
to re-new the discussions on realizing Israel's commitments
to the USG regarding settlements and outposts.


6. (C) Despite MOD staff assurances, Peretz made clear that
he had not been fully briefed in advance. He offered to
study the papers with his senior staff, and to send to the
Embassy in the afternoon or the following morning the names
of the heads of each of the working groups. The Ambassador
pushed for a meeting of the core groups in the afternoon, but
Peretz replied that the MOD was not prepared, and that the
earliest it could happen would be the following day. The
Ambassador said that he understood that the Embassy had
proposed an ambitious timeline, but the U.S. is concerned
about continued delay and wants to begin a political process
to give Palestinians hope. Peretz responded that the MOD
would organize itself that day, and inform the Embassy of
when it was ready to start the talks. MOD Chief of Staff
Mike Herzog communicated the MOD's names for working groups
to the DCM on November 7. The Ambassador subsequently met
with Pol-Mil Director Amos Gilad (septel) and will meet with
Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh on November 9 to further
organize the negotiations.


7. (C) The MOD's list of working groups is as follows:

-- Sneh: Palestinian economic development, obstacles to
movement, West Bank-Gaza Strip link.

-- Ashkenazi: Crossings, Karni.

-- Mishlev: Palestinian social development. (Note: This
has since changed, but we are unaware of who will chair this
group on the GOI side. End note.)

-- Gilad: Rafah.

The MOD also made clear that they would not agree to a
separate working group on convoys at this time.

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