Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV4376
2006-11-03 07:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

ISRAELI MFA ON IMPROVING UNSCR 1701 IMPLEMENTATION

Tags:  PREL PARM ETTC PTER SY LE IS UN 
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Leza L Olson 11/03/2006 02:16:29 PM From DB/Inbox: Leza L Olson

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 04376

SIPDIS
CXTelA:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: IPSC PD IMO RES ECON DCM DAO AMB AID ADM RSO
 CONS

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:RHJONES
DRAFTED: POL:SCROWLEY,POL:PVR
CLEARED: ADCM:HFINN, POL:MSIEVERS/MK, ECON:BWEINSTEIN, DAO:DOMEARA

VZCZCTVI112
OO RUEHC RUEHXK RUEHUNV
DE RUEHTV #4376/01 3070755
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 030755Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7379
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0115
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004376 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC PTER SY LE IS UN
SUBJECT: ISRAELI MFA ON IMPROVING UNSCR 1701 IMPLEMENTATION


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B and D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 004376 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016 TAGS: PREL PARM ETTC PTER SY LE IS UN SUBJECT: ISRAELI MFA ON IMPROVING UNSCR 1701 IMPLEMENTATION Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones; Reasons 1.4 (B and D). ¶1. (C) Summary: MFA officials have outlined for poloffs their "initial thinking" on possible ways to improve implementation of the UN arms embargo contained in UNSCR ¶1701. The MFA would prefer to establish a UN sanctions committee to deal with Lebanon, but realizes that such a move is unlikely to succeed without first increasing awareness of violations. In papers prepared for FM Livni, MFA officials have proposed a number of options: -- asking UNSYG Annan to send letters to UN member states highlighting their responsibilities under UNSCR 1701; -- working to include more embargo language in reports to the UNSC under UNSCRs 1559 and 1701; -- establishing an "Embargo Strengthening Initiative" to exchange real-time intelligence, report on violations, and "name and shame" violators; -- adding a Lebanon component to existing arms-control bodies such as the Wassenaar Arrangement; and -- freezing TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers customs arrangements) privileges for countries whose trucks transport illegal cargo. The Israelis directly link the embargo issue to their continued overflights of Lebanon, claiming that such missions play an important role in monitoring the Syrian-Lebanese border for arms shipments. End summary. -------------- -- GOI Dissatisfaction with UNSCR 1701 Enforcement -------------- -- ¶2. (C) On October 24, FM Livni's policy adviser for UN issues, Tal Becker (please protect),told poloffs that enforcement of the arms embargo established by UNSCR 1701 is "not going well." He questioned how the international community could convince Lebanon to request international assistance, as foreseen in OP 14. Citing a recent example of the failure of Spanish troops in UNIFIL to interdict arms found within their area of responsibility, Becker also argued that "the way that UNIFIL sees its mission undermines the narrative that 1701 was intended to create." On October 31, Oded Joseph (please protect),an adviser to Director General Aharon Abramovitch, said that the MFA is looking at different options that balance the legitimacy provided by the UN system with the need for truly effective embargo enforcement. -------------- -- MFA Brainstorming on UNSCR 1701 Weapons Embargo -------------- -- �
00A; ¶3. (C) Becker said that the MFA remains in favor of clearer embargo language and the creation of a UN sanctions committee, but he also stressed the need to avoid a follow-on resolution if it would open up the entire "Lebanon package (of issues)." Joseph admitted that Israel is aware of the political constraints -- particularly Russian and Chinese opposition -- within the UN system, and he said the MFA is looking for ways to bring Russia into the discussion. The MFA sees little chance of success for another resolution unless Israel can first establish diplomatic momentum by increasing awareness of violations. Becker complained that the French and others perceived Israeli overflights as a threat on par with that posed by Hizballah, and acknowledged that overflights were likely to continue to be a bone of contention at the UN. ¶4. (C) Joseph said that the MFA's "initial thinking" on possible steps to improve implementation of OP 15 of UNSCR 1701 includes a number of "parallel tracks." First, the GOI would like to highlight the importance of the embargo within the UN system. Becker said that FM Livni had already spoken "indirectly" to UNSYG Annan about sending letters to UN member states highlighting their responsibilities under UNSCR ¶1701. Another option is to push for inclusion of more language on embargo enforcement and violations in reports to the UNSC on the implementation of UNSCR 1559 and 1701. ¶5. (C) Reading from an internal GOI discussion paper, Joseph discussed the MFA's thinking on a possible "Embargo Strengthening Initiative" (ESI) modeled loosely on the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). He described the ESI idea as a useful forum to gather key UNIFIL troop contributors and regional players interested in successful implementation of OP 15 of UNSCR 1701. The MFA believes an ESI group could exchange real-time intelligence on weapons shipments, report on embargo violations, "name and shame" violators, and discuss tactics (diplomacy, sanctions, etc.) to improve enforcement. ¶6. (C) The MFA is also considering the utility of adding a Lebanon component to existing arms-control bodies. Joseph suggested that the Wassenaar Arrangement might be a good starting point, asking if it would be possible to expand the successful MANPADS process to include medium and longer range missiles. He said that the MFA is looking at the possibility of obtaining some sort of "political reference to 1701" at the next Wassenaar plenary meeting in December. ¶7. (C) Another option under review by the MFA is the possibility of requesting a freeze in TIR (Transports Internationaux Routiers customs arrangements as defined in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) privileges for Iran, Turkey, or other countries whose trucks Israel claims transport illegal cargo to Lebanon. -------------- -------------- Comment: Embargo Linked to Overall GOI Policy on Lebanon -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Comment: The GOI's main concern with UNSCR 1701 is that its embargo enforcement mechanism may not be strong enough to prevent the rearmament of Hizballah. The official Israeli policy position has been to directly link the Hizballah threat to their continued overflights of Lebanon, maintaining that such missions play an important intelligence-gathering role in monitoring the Syrian-Lebanese border for arms shipments. MFA Spokesman Mark Regev, for instance, reportedly stated on November 1 that the overflights were "a response to the failure of the Lebanese side to implement its core commitments. When there are illicit arms transfers and no mechanism to impede them, we have cause to monitor such transfers." Becker suggested that a robust embargo could lead to a "package deal" ending most overflights, although he admitted that the MOD and security services (who have a much larger say than the MFA in the decision) insist that overflights are necessary. Privately, some Israeli officials admit that the Israeli Air Force is also maintaining control of Lebanese airspace in preparation for another possible conflict with Hizballah. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES

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