TWO FORMER IDF CHIEFS OF STAFF OFFER OPPOSING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 004069

SIPDIS

PENTAGON FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK (ANDERSON)
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5
HQ USEUCOM FOR ECJ5-E (KLOTHE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS SY LE IR IS
SUBJECT: TWO FORMER IDF CHIEFS OF STAFF OFFER OPPOSING
VIEWS ON SYRIA

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz.
Reason: 1.4 (b) (d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In separate meetings September 22 and October 10,
former IDF Chiefs of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak and Moshe
Yaalon provided POL and DAO sharply differing assessments of
how Israel should deal with Syria. These assessments mirror
a broader debate in Israel, with political commentators and
politicians staking out positions in response to Syrian
President Bashar Asad's recent comments suggesting he was
interested in resuming negotiations with Israel over the
return of the Golan Heights. Lipkin-Shahak, who was engaged
with the negotiations with Syria conducted by former Prime
Ministers Rabin and Barak, told emboffs September 22 that he
believes Israel should open up a dialogue with Syria, and
push for a peace treaty with security guarantees in exchange
for the Golan Heights. He urged the U.S. support an Israeli
initiative toward Syria that would lure Damascus away from
its alliance with Tehran. Retired IDF Chief of Staff Moshe
Yaalon, by contrast, told Pol Couns and DATT October 10 that
the timing was wrong for Israel to engage Syria. Yaalon
urged a more assertive Israeli and U.S. posture, saying Iran
and Syria needed to pay a price for their backing of
Hizballah and Hamas. Arguing that "the best defense is a
good offense," Yaalon called for a concerted U.S. effort to
undermine the Syrian regime. END SUMMARY.

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A TALE OF TWO GENERALS
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2. (C) In the self-critical atmosphere surrounding the
aftermath of the Lebanon war, a number of retired senior IDF
officers have offered statements and interviews to the press.
We arranged meetings recently with former Chiefs of Staff
Lipkin-Shahak and Yaalon to reestablish embassy contact with
two retired generals with potential political ambitions on
opposite ends of the Israeli political mainstream. Amnon
Lipkin-Shahak, a former head of Israeli military
intelligence, served as a military adviser to former Prime
Minister Rabin and was Chief of Staff when Prime Minister
Ehud Barak was negotiating with Syrian President Hafiz
Al-Asad. Former Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon, who is
mentioned in the press as a possible Minister of Defense if
Bibi Netanyahu stages a political comeback, was IDF Chief of
Staff during the later phases of Sharon's campaign against
Arafat's PA. Yaalon also planned and carried out air strikes
against a terrorist training camp inside Syria in October

2003.

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LIPKIN-SHAHAK: ENGAGE SYRIA NOW
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3. (C) Lipkin-Shahak told Pol Couns, Navy Attache, and
Pol-Mil Officer September 22 that he saw an opportunity to
lure Syria away from Iran. The only way to achieve this was
through direct dialogue with the Syrians. Noting that he had
been impressed by his former Syrian counterpart, General
Hikmet Shihabi, during Israel's negotiations with the Syrians
in 1999-2000. Lipkin-Shahak said that the U.S. and Israel
should now try to separate Syria from Iran and push Syria
"out of the international terrorism game" through positive
engagement. In his view, this is a worthwhile endeavor, even
if the chance of success is low, which is how he assessed the
current situation. He said he hoped the U.S. would not
oppose an Israeli decision to engage Syria.

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THERE ARE SYRIANS WHO CARE ABOUT SYRIA INTERESTS
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4. (C) Lipkin-Shahak expressed his view that Bashar Al-Asad
is a "weak personality and leader." Lipkin-Shahak stressed
that Syria has interests like any state, and that these
should be considered in approaching it. He cautioned,
however, that nothing should be given to the Syrians before
they surrender the unacceptable aspects of their political
agenda. Lipkin-Shahak said that he believes that there are
elements in Syria that can be convinced that they can gain
from changing Syria's current course. These persons, he
suggested, are worried about Syria's overall future, and not
only about their own bank accounts.


5. (C) The general lamented, however, what he described as a
stagnation in Israeli thinking on Syria: "I doubt seriously
that anyone in the Israeli government is thinking about how
to get Syria to change its course. This is unfortunate, as
Israel has nothing to lose, and can only gain."
Lipkin-Shahak observed that Syria is weak by every standard,
even though the regime manages to hold on. He noted that it
makes no sense from a religious perspective for Syria to fall
any deeper into Iran's embrace. Iran's brand of Shia
fanaticism is a serious threat to Syria's secular regime, the
people, and even the Muslim Brotherhood. It is strengthening
radical elements in Syria, and runs counter to the ideology
of the Ba'ath movement. Lipkin-Shahak observed that Syrian
military capabilities have deteriorated significantly since
the 1980's. He noted, however, that the Syrian military has
improved its nonconventional capabilities, especially
chemical weapons along with ground-to-ground missile
capability in particular. He questioned the wisdom on
Israel's part of withdrawing unilaterally from Lebanon in
2000 without a peace agreement with Syria.

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ISRAEL MUST BE PREPARED TO RETURN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS
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6. (C) Lipkin-Shahak said that Syria wants the Golan Heights
back from Israel, and Bashar has made it clear that there can
be no peace agreement with Israel without their return. He
said that in the Shepherdstown talks, it became apparent to
him that the gap between the Israeli and Syrian negotiating
positions was smaller than most people thought. He envisioned
that the negotiations would, in the end, only involve deals
on "a few meters of land here and there." The question is,
'What kind of peace you will have.'" Lipkin-Shahak
acknowledged that the heights -- and especially Mount Hermon
-- are of strategic importance to Israel as long as there is
no peace between Israel and Syria, and there is a threat
emanating from Syria. The Syrians would accept an early
warning station and demilitarization of major parts of the
Golan Heights. Israel, he said, should only go into the
details after there is certainty that it has a real
negotiating partner in Syria: "We would not want to give
something to Bashar Asad only for his own internal benefit."
He stressed that the Israel should look for an opening and
pursue it. "This would be a big failure for Iran, increase
stability in Lebanon, and raise security along the
Syrian-Iraq border."

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NOW NOT THE TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS
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7. (C) In an October 10 meeting with Pol Couns and DATT,
General Moshe Yaalon offered a diametrically opposed
assessment. Yaalon, who has publicly called for the
resignations of IDF Chief of Staff Halutz, Prime Minister
Olmert, and Defense Minister Peretz over what he described as
their "mismanagement" of the Lebanon war, stressed that he
opposed engaging Syria. Israel's past negotiations with
Syria may have been appropriate at the time, Yaalon said, but
now it was necessary to "make Syria pay a price" for its
support for Hamas and Hizballah. Yaalon said that in 2003,
Syria and Iran were afraid of Israel and the U.S. because of
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Israel's actions against Arafat.
Now, however, there was a danger that Syria and Iran believed
that the U.S. and Israel were on the defensive, both in Iraq
and against Hamas and Hizballah.


8. (C) Arguing that "the best defense is a good offense,"
Yaalon urged active U.S. and Israeli efforts to undermine the
Syrian regime. If Bashar felt threatened, he said, he would
be less inclined to take risks. Yaalon suggested that during
the Lebanon war, Israel should have bombed Syrian targets as
a warning. Yaalon was highly critical of public statements
by Olmert and Peretz in which they offered assurances that
Israel would not strike Syria, since that only served to make
the Syrians believe that there would not be any consequences
for their actions.


9. (C) Turning to Gaza, Yaalon said the IDF had the
capability to suppress Qassam rocket fire, but it would take
a sustained and determined ground campaign to make it work.
He predicted that a major clash was coming in Gaza, since
Hamas was learning from Hizballah and was upgrading its
ground to ground and anti-tank rocket capabilities.
Concerted U.S. and Israeli action, using a range of tools
including but not limited to military power, was needed
simultaneously against Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah in
order to reverse their impression that the regional tide had
turned in their favor.

10. (C) Offering his views on the future of the region,
however, Yaalon said he thought the U.S. and Israel should
support democratization and back democratic civil society
elements in the Arab world and Iran. Democratic
transformation, however, could take twenty years, as the
entire political culture of the region had to change. In the
meantime, it was necessary to prevail over Iran.

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