PRM PDAS GREENE MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI AND NGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEL AVIV 003952

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2026
TAGS: PREL KPAL PHUM IS LE KWBG PREF IZ
SUBJECT: PRM PDAS GREENE MEETINGS WITH ISRAELI AND NGO
OFFICIALS

REF: A: SEPTEMBER 30 PRM E-MAIL REPORT ON PDAS MEETINGS

Classified By: Classified by Political Counselor Marc Sievers. Reason
1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: On September 28-29, PRM PDAS Richard Greene
had wide-ranging discussions with GOI and International
Organization (IO) officials pertaining to: access barriers
facing IOs and NGOs implementing humanitarian programs in the
West Bank and Gaza; coordination efforts between the GOI and
ICRC during the Lebanon war; ICRC policies and procedures to
ensure that USG contributions do not benefit Hizballah and
Hamas; ICRC efforts to obtain "proof of life" for the three
Israeli soldiers held by Hizballah and Hamas; and progress on
implementation of the first Memorandum of Understanding
between Magen David Adom (MDA) and the Palestinian Red
Crescent Society (PRCS). In meetings with GOI officials,
PDAS Greene emphasized that implementing tangible
improvements on humanitarian access issues will help bolster
the international community's commitment to deliver
humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian population.
Israeli MFA Deputy Director General (DDG) for International
Organizations Roni Ya'ar stressed that the Israeli government
is working at the highest levels to develop an access
strategy in anticipation of the Secretary's October 4-5
visit.

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ICRC ON HUMANITARIAN OPS AND PRISONER ACCESS
IN LEBANON AND GAZA CONFLICTS
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2. (C) Dominik Stillhart, Head of Delegation for the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) office that
covers Israel, the West Bank and Gaza complimented ICRC-GOI
coordination during last summer's conflict in Lebanon "from a
purely technical point of view," but he indicated that there
is room for future improvement. Stillhart noted that the
ICRC and IDF had established a coordination mechanism five
days into the fighting, a distinct improvement over past
conflicts during which the IDF reportedly told ICRC to "wait
until the war is over." He characterized the functioning of
that center as "close to exemplary," but registered concern
that the IDF did not give sufficient weight to humanitarian
concerns, citing tensions caused by the IDF's request that
all humanitarian actors work via the ICRC early during the
war, and numerous IDF decisions to deny ICRC and UN vehicles
access to vulnerable populations in southern Lebanon during
the height of the conflict. For illustrative purposes,
Stillhart revealed two instances in which he had received
calls from the IDF, one claiming they had aerial photos of an
ICRC office in Tyre that showed Hizballah operatives on the
roof of an ICRC building, and another in which the IDF
claimed that Lebanese Red Crescent convoys were being used
for movement by Hizballah and thus justified the IDF's
directive that any ICRC vehicle moving without coordination
would be considered a military target. Stillhart interpreted
these calls as "deliberate signals from the IDF that it had
the power to effectively shut down ICRC operations at any
time if it pressed too hard for access." (Stillhart noted
that ICRC's Lebanon delegation controlled the entire building
it occupied in Tyre and thoroughly searched not only its own
roof but all neighboring buildings.) Stillhart did not
mention any occasions on which the IDF actually fired on ICRC
locations, vehicles, or personnel.


3. (C) Finally, Stillhart expressed concern about the
purported number of cluster bombs dropped by the IDF in
Lebanon during the last 48 hours of the fighting and what he
described as the GOI's subsequent failure to provide any
response to ICRC's request for information on the number of
POWs or captured civilians who remain in GOI custody.
Stillhart explained that multiple ICRC interventions have so
far failed to elicit clarification as to whether the GOI
considers the detainees POWs, or will grant the ICRC access
in the near future. Stillhart expressed frustration at this
approach, explaining that the Israelis have, in the past,
generally been responsive to similar inquiries. Stillhart
speculated that this is an internal political decision,
perhaps due to the fact that the GOI is under public pressure
to appear tough. To help address these concerns, Stillhart
intimated that he is personally pressing his HQ to break with
longstanding ICRC practice and share the post-war assessment
ICRC usually compiles on the conduct of combatants with "both
sides." He was doubtful, however, that such a controversial
request would be approved by Geneva.

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GAZA
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4. (C) Turning to Gaza, Stillhart echoed the same concerns
that UNRWA and UNSCO officials expressed (ref. a) that new
but unspecified Israeli security procedures are hindering
their ability to effectively implement U.S.-funded
humanitarian assistance programs in the West Bank and Gaza.
Closures of borders and checkpoints into and out of the West
Bank and Gaza have been frequent and sustained. Stillhart
also reiterated an oft-heard UN concern that international
humanitarian staff are subjected to vehicle checks out of the
line-of-sight of ICRC and UN officials, explaining that the
humanitarian community fears that a rogue individual (such as
one of the private contractors that now have responsibility
for managing the Erez and Allenby checkpoints) could plant
items such as weapons that could be discovered at a later
checkpoint. Such an incident could result in a total closure
of ICRC operations. Stillhart urged Greene to deliver the
message that the GOI should view the ICRC as a willing
security partner, not as the enemy, as both entities are
pursuing the same goals -- delivery of humanitarian
assistance to vulnerable Palestinians with zero tolerance for
direct or indirect benefit to terrorist organizations. In
response to PDAS Greene's questions about ICRC's policies and
procedures to ensure that USG assistance does not benefit
Hamas or Hizballah, Stillhart assured Greene that the ICRC
has adequate mechanisms in place to prevent this, including
controlling the disbursal of assets directly to beneficiaries
(as opposed to through intermediaries with potentially
suspect ties) through small regional sub-delegation offices
that also facilitate close monitoring of locally-hired ICRC
staff.

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CROSSINGS: KARNI AND RAFAH
--------------


5. (C) Asked about the most important thing the GOI could do
for humanitarian access, Stillhart emphasized the importance
of implementing policies and procedures to sustain the
consistent flow of goods and workers through Karni and Rafah
crossings. He said that businesses have been destroyed by
the closures and that frustration has reached alarming levels
in Gaza. Stillhart also pointed out that the various
elements of the Israeli security apparatus have
responsibility for authorizing movement through checkpoints
currently lack clear guidance on central government decisions
to support ICRC and the UN's right to operate unimpeded in
the West Bank and Gaza.


6. (C) Echoing a concern that UNRWA ComGen Karen Abu Zayd
expressed in a statement to her Advisory Commission in Amman
(septel),Stillhart also pointed to a recent uptick in
settler violence against Palestinians in the northern West
Bank. He criticized what he called "the double standard of
law enforcement" by Israeli authorities turning a blind eye
to settler violence. Stillhart said that this violence has
turned large areas into what are essentially "no go zones"
for the Palestinians, and cautioned that allowing this
situation to continue is not in long-term Israeli interests.

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ICRC TO TURN TO DAMASCUS AGAIN IN SEARCH OF SIGNS OF LIFE
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Regarding ICRC's ongoing efforts to obtain "signs of
life" for the three Israeli soldiers abducted by Hamas and
Hizballah, Stillhart said that despite repeated requests for
information, both Hamas and Hizballah have made it clear that
no "signs of life" are likely to be offered in the absence of
concessions on the part of the Israelis. Stillhart said that
Hamas was "essentially telling us that everything has a
price, including passing a message." Despite a frustrating
lack of progress, ICRC will continue to intervene with both
Hamas and Hizballah on behalf of the abducted soldiers,
adding that ICRC officials in Gaza have exhausted all known
factions and now plan to meet again soon with Hamas' external
leader Khaled Meshal in Damascus.

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RED CROSS MOVEMENT: STATUS OF NEW NATIONAL SOCIETY
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT
-------------- --------------


8. (C) PDAS Greene also reviewed access arrangements and
other issues that affect the effective implementation of the
MOU between Magen David Adom (MDA) and the Palestinian Red
Crescent Society (PRCS) -- that helped secure their admission
earlier this year as fully fledged members of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement -- with the
heads of both national societies. Dr. Noam Yifrach, chairman
of MDA, spoke of generally good cooperation with the
Palestinian Red Crescent organization. He attributed a
renewed debate on territoriality to PRCS President Khatib's
decision to nominate a former senior Palestininian Foreign
Ministry official as his deputy. Palestinian authorities had
requested that MDA not operate in the West Bank and Gaza and
that they should close their stations in those areas. (NOTE:
PRCS President Khatib has described the situation as
tantamount to PRCS operating permanent stations in Tel Aviv
or the American Red Cross taking over EMS services for the
U.S. military in Afghanistan or Iraq. END NOTE.) Yifrach
asked rhetorically who would take MDA's place. He said the
Israeli military had no staff for this, would be too slow,
and would not be accepted by the Palestinians. Noting that
MDA now has 12,000 volunteers, Yifrach said that only his
organization could do the job. He said that he offered to
ask the Palestinian authorities for permission to enter the
West Bank and Gaza, but was told by PRCS President Khatib
"don't ask" because of fears it could subject Khatib to
renewed threats against his life for having entered into an
agreement with MDA. If this impasse cannot be solved,
Yifrach said that he would transfer MDA ambulances in the
West Bank to local communities, as they had done in the Golan
Heights.


9. (C) Both Yifrach and PRCS president Younis Khatib raised
issues relating to elements of the agreements between the two
national societies that have not yet been fully implemented
including:

-- a lack of GOI response to a PRCS request for clearance for
a small number of ambulances and drivers to operate in
Jerusalem;

-- GOI permission for the PRCS to utilize Palestinian license
plates on its ambulances;

-- the issue of low-level IDF staff at checkpoints
determining whether PRCS ambulances carrying Palestinian
patients to hospitals in Jerusalem are in fact critical
medical cases.

Yifrach and Khatib relayed wholly different interpretations
of recent discussions centered on establishing a PRCS-run
clinic at the Allenby bridge crossing, with Yifrach relaying
that the Israeli authorities at the bridge have accepted this
proposal, and Khatib stating that the proposal had been
rejected by the same authorities. PDAS Greene promised to
raise these issues with GOI interlocutors (see below).

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IDF AND MFA ON ACCESS
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10. (C) Brigadier General (ret.) Baruch Spiegel, who will
retire in mid-October as Special Adviser to the Minister of
Defense, said that he found the humanitarian agencies'
continued access problems "embarrassing." He commented that
the MOD is looking favorably at Ambassador Jones' proposal
for reviving the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA). He
also expressed optimism about the reopening of Rafah crossing
in the near future, but cautioned that, due to ongoing
security threats, the GOI must proceed cautiously and take
all necessary measures to mitigate such threats. Spiegel
argued that Egypt must play an active role monitoring Gaza's
borders, especially preventing Hamas from transporting large
quantities of cash via Rafah terminal.


11. (C) Spiegel called the Karni proposal by U.S. Security
Coordinator LTG Dayton "interesting and important as a model
of bottom-up efforts to improve the existing security
structure," but questioned its viability without support from
Palestinian Authority President Abbas, explaining that Abbas
currently has neither the infrastructure nor the resources to
support the plan. Spiegel stressed that the Palestinians
"have to do it." He said that Abbas must show "immediate
performance" and better control of the crossing, but that
systematic governmental corruption on the Palestinian side
and internal power struggles are preventing progress.
Without this fundamental cooperation, Spiegel predicted that
the Dayton plan would go the way of Erez Crossing, where the
GOI had spent significant resources to upgrade security to
support Palestinian day laborers entering Israel but which is
rarely in use. Nonetheless, Speigel noted that the IDF was
committed to improving security to ensure humanitarian
access, noting that the Ministry of Defense had used internal
resources to purchase new scanners at Karni. Spiegel was
pleased to report that the volume of trucks into and out of
Gaza through Karni had been at peak levels during the
previous week, but acknowledged that access for humanitarian
goods through Karni has been inconsistent throughout the past
several months.


12. (C) Turning to specific ICRC and UN complaints that their
operations are being negatively affected by officials at Erez
who they claim are no longer abiding by the GOI's April 11
circular outlining security procedures at that crossing
point, Spiegel called the situation in Gaza "very bad," and
commented that there is always a conflict between security
and humanitarian needs. He noted that the security threats
from tunneling are very real but are very difficult to detect
given the fact that sonar cannot work in Gaza's sandy soil.
Tunnel detection requires extensive digging, resulting in
prolonged closures of access points. Nonetheless, Spiegel
suggested that much can be done to improve humanitarian
access before a final political agreement is reached and that
Israel should continue to take interim steps to ensure the
situation in Gaza does not continue to deteriorate. In
response to PDAS Greene's question as to what concrete
measures can be implemented to demonstrate that the GOI takes
seriously humanitarian access issues, Spiegel agreed to meet
with a senior UN official to discuss a list of specific
incidents impacting international staff member's ability to
operate in the West Bank and Gaza.


13. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Deputy Director
General for International Organizations (A/S equivalent) Roni
Ya'ar defended Israeli security actions as necessary and
dismissed the complaints raised by the UN and ICRC as
trivial. When pressed, Ya'ar agreed that it was not in
Israel's interest for Gaza to implode, and revealed that his
government had convened a series of meetings, at the highest
levels, to develop an access strategy in anticipation of the
Secretary's October 4-5 visit. Ya'ar also noted that FM

SIPDIS
Livni had recently appointed an MFA point person for the UN
who will work on access issues and that she had already
sought a meeting with Deputy UNSCO Kevin Kennedy. Ya'ar also
indicated that the GOI is undertaking a serious review of Jan
Egeland's recent "Proposal to Improve Access and Movement to
and from Gaza." Asked about MFA efforts to ensure real
MDA-PRCS operational coordination on the ground, Ya'ar stated
his government's clear opposition to a Swiss proposal to send
a delegation to oversee MDA-PRCS implementation and suggested
that PRCS's new Deputy President, a former Palestinian MFA
official, was pursuing a politicized agenda on territorial
access issues, adding that MDA President Noam Yifrach was
"not as politically astute." Despite these reservations,
Yaar offered to invite PRCS president Khatib to a meeting to
discuss PRCS concerns about GOI positions that are delaying
implementation of its MOU with MDA.

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PALESTINIAN REFUGEES FROM IRAQ
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14. (C) Ya'ar declared that Livni is interested in the matter
of Palestinian refugees, and has instructed Ya'ar and others
within the MFA to focus on this issue. He indicated that
Livni will have strongly held views on the Palestinian
refugee issue and revealed that Livni had recently rejected a
request from UNHCR to allow Palestinians who had fled Baghdad
and who are currently stuck on the Iraq-Syria border (after
being refused entry by Syria) to transit Israel and take up
residence in the West Bank out of concern that it would set a
precedent. To mitigate the GOI position, Livni had
instructed Ya'ar to find a mechanism to "do something for the
Palestinian refugees in Iraq." Ya'ar suggested that he might
seek the Canadian Government's support to convene a "no name"
Refugee Working Group meeting to help develop a strategy,
arguing that the "trick" would be getting the Palestinians to
approve a solution that did not involve large-scale return.


15. (U) PDAS Greene has cleared this cable.

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