PM OLMERT TO CODEL WARNER: ISRAEL READY TO SUPPORT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 003909 SIPDIS H PLEASE PASS TO SASC E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV OVIP IS IR LE KPAL SUBJECT: PM OLMERT TO CODEL WARNER: ISRAEL READY TO SUPPORT ABU MAZEN; US NEEDS A REGIONAL STRATEGY AGAINST IRAN Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Warner met with Prime Minister Olmert at the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem on October 3. (Septels to report the CODEL's meetings with Foreign Minister Livni and Defense Minister Peretz.) Olmert provided his assessment of the results of the war with Hizballah. He insisted that despite the view of Israeli "pessimists" that Israel's deterrent capability had been eroded, the war had in fact strengthened Israel's deterrence, especially with regard to Hizballah and Syria. Hizballah's military strength and the Lebanese Shia community had been hit hard and Nasrallah would be more cautious "for years to come." The real lesson of the war, Olmert stressed, was the threat to the region posed by Iran. All of the regional allies of the United States were now threatened by Iran and only the U.S. could stop the expansion of Iranian power. Olmert urged the U.S. to use the next six months to develop a strategy with its partners in Europe and the region to counter Iran's effort to acquire nuclear weapons. Olmert said he was ready to consider gestures to Abbas, but with three soldiers still held captive, Israel needed to think carefully about which gestures to make. It was "always a temptation" to think that Israeli concessions to the Palestinians would help relieve the pressure on Arab moderates, Olmert said, but then added that this was a mistaken analysis since if the Palestinian moderates did not confront Hamas, no outside power could help them do so. Senator Levin suggested that Olmert consider transferring some tax revenues to Palestinian President Abbas "if this would help Abbas." Senator Warner expressed concern that the actions Israel wanted the U.S. to take against Iran could undermine our efforts to support the new Iraqi democracy. Senators Levin and Pryor questioned whether the war in Iraq had increased Iran's regional power. PM Olmert countered that no country had supported the U.S. in Iraq more than Israel. The U.S. was still "in charge" of Iraq, and firm U.S. action against Iran would block the expansion of Iranian power, which was still an unrealized aspiration. Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia had a common interest with Israel in this regard. Olmert stated that for the first time in his life, he believed there was a serious threat to the existence of Israel as a result of Iran's nuclear program. Olmert asked the CODEL to pass a message to Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora that he was ready to meet him "confidentially" to discuss the principles of the 1949 Lebanese - Israeli Armistice Agreement. End Summary. ¶2. (U) CODEL Warner (Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner, SASC Ranking Member Carl Levin, SASC member Senator Jeff Sessions, and Senator Mark Pryor), accompanied by Ambassador, Political Counselor, and members of the SASC staff, called on Prime Minister Ehud Olmert October 3. Olmert was joined by his senior staff members, including foreign affairs adviser Shalom Tourgeman and Chief of Staff Yoram Turbowicz. ISRAEL'S DETERRENCE STRENGTHENED BY LEBANON WAR -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Senators Warner and Levin began by noting that they had just come from Jordan and Iraq. Jordanian King Abdullah had told them that moderate Arabs may be ready to work with Israel as a result of their growing fear of Iran. Olmert said he wanted to share his assessment of last summer's war with Hizballah. Israeli "pessimists" were claiming that the war had eroded Israel's deterrent capability because the IDF's "perceived performance" had been less than expected. Olmert said his perception was different. Previous Israeli governments, each for their own reasons, had failed to deter Hizballah from attempting to kidnap soldiers and occasionally fire rockets at Israeli towns. After the war, however, Nasrallah was unlikely to make the same attempt because Israel's deterrence had been strengthened. ¶4. (S) Olmert explained that deterrence was not just a question of power but also the readiness to use it. On July 12, there were no obstacles facing Hizballah, but now there was an international force, the Lebanese Army was deployed in the south, and there was no visible, armed Hizballah presence in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Shia would remember the extent of Israel's response for years to come, and this was a new factor that Nasrallah had to deal with. Syrian leaders might make "childish" remarks about Hizballah defeating Israel, but the Syrians knew what Israel could do to them. If there were a war with Syria, the Syrians understood the capabilities of the Israeli Air Force. Olmert said he had "posed restrictions" on the IDF in Lebanon, but that would not be the case in the event that Syria started a war. Olmert admitted there had been "some miscalculations" during the war, but claimed there had been similar failures in all of Israel's past wars. Looking at the overall picture, however, he insisted that no enemy of Israel could feel more relaxed after the war than it had before. MODERATE ARABS AND THE IRANIAN THREAT -------------- ¶5. (C) Olmert insisted that the war had all been due to Iran. Iran had trained Hizballah fighters and Iranian Revolutionary Guards had been present in Lebanon. There was an Axis of Iran, Syria, Hizballah, and Hamas. Iran finances Hizballah and Hamas, they both have offices in Damascus, and Iran directs their activities. There is a growing fear of Iran's power and technical sophistication among moderate Arab states, whose governments do not share the views of their people. Iran now threatens all the friends of the United States in the region. Jordan is very nervous, as are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Olmert said he had "very friendly" personal relations with Jordanian King Abdullah, as well as with Mubarak. He also expressed his respect for the Saudi leadership, as he has in several recent media interviews. ¶6. (C) Olmert said there was always a temptation to think that the way to relieve the pressure on the Arab moderates was to force Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians. This was a mistaken analysis, he insisted, since the U.S. and the international community must not strengthen Palestinian radicals. If Palestinian moderates would not confront Hamas, no outside force could make them do so. Olmert stressed that Israel was the staunch ally of the U.S. in the war on terrorism. A show of U.S. determination to stop Iran was the only way to protect Arab allies. IRAQ'S LINKAGES TO IRAN -------------- ¶7. (S) Senator Warner noted that the U.S. was making a heavy investment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraqi Government was young and struggling to exercise power and protect Iraq's sovereignty. Senator Warner said he was concerned that Israeli expectations regarding Iran could complicate efforts to shore up Iraq. This was a serious situation since we could not allow Iraq to become a new base for terrorism. Olmert responded that no country had supported the U.S. effort in Iraq more than Israel. The U.S. did not need Israelis to fight in Iraq, but he said the Senators must be aware of ways the IDF was quietly helping the U.S. military. "I pray to God the U.S. will stand firm in Iraq," Olmert said, adding "God bless President Bush." Recognizing Democratic Senators Levin and Pryor might disagree, Olmert said he judged President Bush not on his domestic policies but based on his unmatched contributions to security and democratization in the Middle East. ¶8. (C) Warner said the U.S. was focused on the next six months in Iraq. Olmert commented that the U.S. was in control of Iraq, with 150,000 troops, even if the Iraqi Government was sovereign. The real imminent danger in the world was Iran, he stressed. No one could confront the Iranian nuclear threat except the U.S. Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were all on the same side; we can work together. Senators Levin and Pryor noted concerns that the Iraq war had strengthened Iran's position as a regional power and asked whether Olmert was concerned about this. Olmert said that would only prove to be a problem if the U.S. pulled out of Iraq too soon. He added he planned to discuss how to stop the expansion of Iranian power in his next meeting with President Bush. There was a perception that Shia power in Iraq had strengthened Iran, he said, but this would collapse if the U.S. confronted Iran. On the other hand, premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be a "disaster." COUNTING ON EUROPE? -------------- ¶9. (C) Senator Sessions referred to press articles regarding the negative influence high oil prices have had on the behavior of rogue states. He asked whether Olmert thought the U.S. could help the European effort to negotiate with Iran. Olmert said President Bush had described to him the need for the U.S. to keep the Europeans on board. Olmert said he had confidence in Tony Blair and Angela Merkel, and even Jacques Chirac was worried about Iran. But Europe was "always a step behind" the U.S. due to its economic interests. Olmert recommended that the U.S. use the next six months to develop a concerted strategy with its partners in Europe and the region to block Iran's effort to possess nuclear weapons. It was not necessary to implement the strategy right away, but the U.S. must know where it was headed. REAL DANGER TO ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE -------------- ¶10. (C) Olmert commented that for the first time in his life, he knew there was a real danger to Israel's existence. Iran not only sought nuclear weapons, but it had delivery systems such as the Shihab 5 that could reach London. And its leaders openly say that they want to wipe Israel off the map. Only the U.S. can stop Iran, he insisted. There can be no compromise, allowing Iran to develop a bomb was a risk the world could not afford. GESTURE TO THE PALESTINIANS -------------- ¶11. (C) Senator Levin, saying he was speaking as an old politician, said he wanted to suggest Olmert make an unconditional gesture to Abu Mazen by turning over some percentage of tax revenues held by Israel, if Abu Mazen thought this would help him. Olmert said he was ready to think about gestures to Abu Mazen, but he needed to consider carefully which gesture to make. Israel needed to consider its own situation while three of its soldiers were still captives, but he was ready to consider what he could do. OFFER TO MEET SINIORA -------------- ¶12. (C) Noting that the CODEL was supposed to travel to Beirut October 4 (note: due to a technical problem with the CODEL's aircraft, they were unable to visit Beirut) Olmert asked that when they saw Prime Minister Siniora, they tell him that Olmert understood the pressures he was under. Olmert said he was ready to meet Siniora "confidentially" at any time to discuss the "principles of the 1949 Lebanon-Israel Armistice Agreement." Senator Warner said they would convey the message. ¶13. (U) CODEL Warner did not have the opportunity to clear this message. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES