SHEETRIT DISCUSSES WINOGRAD COMMITTEE,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 003785 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KWBG IS SUBJECT: SHEETRIT DISCUSSES WINOGRAD COMMITTEE, SETTLEMENTS, COPYRIGHT LAW AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS WITH THE AMBASSADOR Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with Israeli Acting Minister of Justice Meir Sheetrit on Tuesday, September 19, 2006, to discuss new Trafficking in Persons (TIP) and Copyright laws pending in the Knesset and settlement building in the West Bank. In addition, Sheetrit discussed the current Winograd Committee formed by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to investigate the Government and the Israeli Defense Force,s (IDF) performance in the recent Lebanon war. Sheetrit argued that a Committee of Inquiry, set up under existing Israeli law, would have been more appropriate; however, he suggested that Olmert might have been concerned that the Supreme Court would have appointed individuals opposed to his government. On settlements, Sheetrit claimed that the recent tender notification was approved in 2004 and for purely private development within existing communities. On the new copyright law, the Ambassador stressed the importance of further consultations between the U.S. and GOI before the law went further in the Knesset. Lastly, the Ambassador stressed the importance of including assistance for legal support for victims of labor trafficking in new legislation now before the Knesset. End Summary. -------------- Winograd Committee - Lebanon War -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Israeli Acting Minister of Justice Meir Sheetrit on Tuesday, September 19. Sheetrit said that PM Olmert should have created a Committee of Inquiry under existing Israeli law instead of the current Winograd Committee to investigate the GOI and IDF,s performance during the recent war in Lebanon. Sheetrit argued that a committee of inquiry would have been much stronger but that Olmert appeared to fear that the Supreme Court might appoint GOI opponents to the committee, which Olmert would not like. Sheetrit claimed he would have prevented anyone being appointed that the PM would disapprove of and said he could have assured that recently retired Supreme Court President Barak would have been the chairman. Sheetrit added that Olmert had also told him an official committee of inquiry would tie up the country for two years and that was why he (Olmert) went for the Winograd Committee. In response to the Ambassador's questions, Sheetrit said that there were no time limits on the committee's mandate and that it could go back as far in time as it felt necessary to analyze problems. ¶3. (C) Speaking more broadly about the war in Lebanon, Sheetrit argued that the ground invasion had cost Israel the most lives while its artillery and air strikes had inflicted much more damage on Hizballah. He also said that the GOI had acted too quickly when it responded to Hizballah's attack and did not take enough time to prepare. He would have preferred giving Hizballah a deadline for releasing the prisoners during which time Israel could have prepared itself more thoroughly. He agreed, however, that Israel had achieved a major success in destroying most of Hizballah's long-range missiles early in the war. Lastly, Sheetrit claimed that he had advised Olmert to suspend hostilities a few days before the tragic Kfar Qana incident when Olmert's poll numbers were still 90-plus percent. Sheetrit claimed that if Israel had paused before that incident, the UN Security Council resolution would have been more favorable for Israel than it was two weeks later. (He discounted Olmert's thesis that the IDF's eleventh-hour ground offensive had markedly improved UNSCR 1701.) -------------- Settlements -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador expressed dissatisfaction that the Ministry of Housing and Construction, of which Sheetrit is also minister, had not notified the Embassy in advance of the recent tender offer to build more units at Beitar Illit and Ma'ale Adumim. He added that advance notification was normal practice and that Sheetrit was aware of U.S. policy against the expansion of settlements. Sheetrit replied that the recent tender was approved in 2004 and was strictly for private development at no cost to the GOI. Sheetrit claimed that the GOI had stopped most building in Judea and Samaria; however, he acknowledged the need to make a clear policy on settlements. Sheetrit argued that the building in Ariel and around Jerusalem was strictly private building and that the GOI was not funding any new construction. The Ambassador challenged this claim asking who was paying for infrastructure such as roads, sewers and so on. Sheetrit said that most roads were already built and that the private contractors who won the tenders would build the remaining infrastructure. Sheetrit then noted that approving tenders did not necessarily mean building would take place; some previous tenders were canceled because nobody wanted to live in the settlements in question. Tenders also do not necessarily mean additional development, he said. Sheetrit went on to detail two further planned tenders. The first would be for 164 units (Ariel 88 units; Qarnei Shomron, 20 units; Alfei Menashe, 56 units). The second would be for 434 units (Efrat, 78 units; Gai Adon (NFI),158 units; Kiryat Arba, 156 units; Elkana, 42 units). However, he noted that the Minister of Defense had not yet approved the Efrat, Gai Adon, Kiryat Arba, and Elkana tenders. Sheetrit told Jones that he would provide the Embassy with a complete list. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador reiterated that the U.S. position on settlements had not changed and asked about the Sasson report and what the GOI was planning to do about outposts. Sheetrit replied that he had canceled a scheduled inter-ministerial meeting on the MOJ's draft reply to the Sasson report (prepared under his predecessor) to allow more time for him to study the issues. Sheetrit claimed that outposts were not an issue with the Palestinians so much as a matter of Israeli rule of law but that no politician was eager to take on the issue. Sheetrit said that it was clear to him that all outposts must be removed. However, he hoped to find a compromise that would allow the issue to be resolved peacefully, for example, by allowing those living in the outposts to resettle into nearby, legal, settlements. Any such solution would depend on the PM, however. Any final settlement would need to help those living in the outposts save face but that there were some extreme people living in them. Sheetrit added that most of the outposts have been built close to existing settlements but not all are associated with legal settlements. The Ambassador again asked about the status of the MOJ draft reply to the Sasson report and would Sheetrit push it forward. The paper still exists, Sheetrit said, but he was not sure if he would push it forward. The Ambassador stressed the U.S. view that new outposts should be removed immediately and reminded Sheetrit that the GOI has made a commitment to remove existing outposts. Sheetrit assured the Ambassador that the GOI had not allowed any new outposts to be created. He asked for more information on the GOI commitment to remove existing outposts, which the Ambassador agreed to provide. -------------- Copyright Law -------------- ¶6. (C) In a discussion on the draft copyright law recently submitted to the Knesset, the Ambassador warned Sheetrit that the current text was not acceptable to the U.S. because it appears to allow non-open source material to be declared open source upon entering Israel. Sheetrit claimed that this could not be done and that under current law there would be a penalty. The Ambassador reiterated that the current draft before the Knesset appeared to allow copying of copyright-protected material imported into Israel. Sheetrit claimed he had not seen this law but that he would get a copy of the proposed law, he noted that it did not seem logical that the law would be changed in this way. The Ambassador agreed and reiterated that a strong copyright law is in both the GOI and U.S. interest. He added that the Embassy was disappointed that the GOI had not discussed the new law with the U.S. before it had been submitted to the Knesset. He urged the GOI to consult with the U.S. before the law moves any further in the Knesset. Sheetrit said he would look into this issue. -------------- Trafficking in Persons -------------- ¶7. (C) Lastly, the Ambassador noted that a new law criminalizing labor trafficking was also before the Knesset and urged Sheetrit to do what he could to get the law brought to a vote quickly. In addition, he said that the U.S. strongly suggests that the law include a provision for providing legal support to victims of labor trafficking. Sheetrit noted that legal support was being provided to women victims of trafficking. The Ambassador recognized that help was being provided to victims of sexual exploitation; we were now seeking the extension of this practice to victims of labor trafficking. Sheetrit replied that it would be a matter of money. The Ambassador suggested that perhaps legal support for those trafficked for labor purposes could be included as part of the current women,s program. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES