Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV3692
2006-09-15 14:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:
MFA'S BARKAN SEES A GROWING CHANCE OF WAR IN THE
null Leza L Olson 09/18/2006 09:03:15 AM From DB/Inbox: Leza L Olson Cable Text: C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 03692 SIPDIS CXTelA: ACTION: POL INFO: AMB AID ADM IPSC PD IMO RES ECON DCM DAO RSO CONS DISSEMINATION: POL CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: DCM:GCRETZ DRAFTED: ECON:BMASILKO CLEARED: ECON: JWITOW, POL: NOLSEN VZCZCTVI337 PP RUEHC DE RUEHTV #3692/01 2581421 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 151421Z SEP 06 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6390
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003692
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016
TAGS: PREL KWBG SY IS
SUBJECT: MFA'S BARKAN SEES A GROWING CHANCE OF WAR IN THE
REGION
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003692
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016
TAGS: PREL KWBG SY IS
SUBJECT: MFA'S BARKAN SEES A GROWING CHANCE OF WAR IN THE
REGION
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: MFA Director of Strategic Affairs Nimrod
Barkan told Staffdel Talwar that Iran was not behind the
timing of the recent conflict with Hizballah, as Iran had
deployed missiles to Lebanon for use on a future "D-Day." He
said that the most significant strategic development this
year is the signing of a Syrian-Iranian defense pact on June
14. Barkan said he is concerned that Syria will attempt to
employ "Hizballah-style" tactics in a future war with Israel
over the Golan Heights, and expressed concern about a group
called the Golan Heights Liberation Front. Barkan outlined
three options for Israeli policy-makers dealing with Syria,
two of which involve war. Regarding the PA, he claimed that
Hamas is not interested in a cease-fire, and added that "no
one here believes an economic boycott will topple Hamas." He
also claimed that $55 million has reached Hamas through the
Rafah crossing in the last three months. Given these
realities, Barkan said the choice for Israel is to work with
a weakened Fatah or go to war with Hamas. Commenting on
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's appointment of Yaakov Dayan to
act as "Syria coordinator," Barkan supported the decision,
saying "what is needed is a realistic look at what the
Israeli public can bear in regards to Syria." End summary.
2. (C) In an August 24 meeting at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA),Barkan said that the recent conflict in
Lebanon dramatically weakened Hizballah. He claimed that
Iran had no interest in the conflict, as Iran had placed
Zilzal missiles in southern Lebanon for use as a forward base
on a future "D-Day," which he defined as the day when Iran
has a nuclear weapon. His assessment of the post-conflict
reality for Israel is that conditions on the northern border
will improve if Hizballah agrees to stop kidnapping Israeli
soldiers and cease attacks under UNSCR 1701. Responding to a
question on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's threat to
close the Syrian-Lebanese border, Barkan said that closing
the border will not end arms smuggling unless UN forces are
deployed along the border. He claimed that the Syrian regime
profits from smuggling operations, and will only close the
official crossing points, not the informal crossings. Barkan
characterized the Israeli victory in Lebanon as "diplomatic,
not military."
3. (C) Barkan said the most significant strategic development
in the Middle East this year is not the conflict with
Hizballah, but the signing of a Syrian-Iranian defense pact
on June 14. In the post-Cold War Middle East, Iranian
financing for the Syrian military has been, in Barkan's
assessment, "essential." Barkan added that shortly after the
signing of the pact, Assad publicly stated that an attack on
Iran would not be considered an attack on Syria, thus
declaring the defense pact to be a "unilateral arrangement."
4. (C) Barkan is concerned that Syria will employ military
techniques used by Hizballah in a future conflict with
Israel, and that Syria is focusing on procuring anti-tank
missiles. He said that anti-tank missiles were successful
approximately 13 percent of the time when they were employed
in attacks in southern Lebanon. Barkan explained that
soldiers, accustomed to firefights in the West Bank or Gaza,
were trained to seek shelter in abandoned houses. In Lebanon
this tactic was unsuccessful as the enemy's anti-tank weapons
were powerful enough to destroy the soldier's cover. Barkan
expressed concern about a group calling itself the "Golan
Heights Liberation Front." He said that 32 years of quiet
along the border had made the Israeli public apathetic about
defense of the Syrian border.
5. (C) Barkan's analysis is that Israel has three options for
dealing with Syria:
-- give in to Syrian demands for the return of the Golan
Heights.
-- launch a preventive war aimed at crippling the Syrian
military.
-- prepare for a full-scale defensive war in 4-5 years, once
Iran attains nuclear weapons.
6. (C) Barkan said that the Assad regime perceives three main
"external threats" from the international community:
-- regime instability, a threat which emanates from U.S.
support for democratic revolution in neighboring countries.
-- removal of the Syrian army and influence from Lebanon,
which Syria views as part of Syrian territory, not an
independent state,
-- Israel's refusal to negotiate over the status of the Golan
Heights.
Barkan admitted that Syrian mistrust of Israeli intentions in
the Golan Heights is justified in light of the history of
failed negotiations. He said that Assad twice mentioned in
recent interviews the comment of former Israeli Prime
Minister Shamir that Israel would negotiate for ten years,
but not do anything to return the Golan. Barkan said the
need for a public referendum and 61 members of the Knesset to
vote in favor of any return of territory means that the
outlook is not promising for Israel returning the Golan
Heights in the next two to three years. Unless Syria can be
assured of flexibility on at least one of these "external
threats," Barkan assessed, they will not leave the Iranian
alliance.
--------------
Palestinian Politics
--------------
7. (C) Barkan admitted that no one in the GOI expected a
Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
elections last winter. He blamed the mistake on
over-reliance on Palestinian pollsters, as well as Israeli
mis-reading of the inherent problems in the PA election
system itself. He also said that Fatah has failed to heal
its internal wounds and that if elections were held today,
Hamas would win again. Barkan added that President Abbas is
a "nice guy but very weak," and that he cannot revive Fatah.
He pointed out that Abbas has been traveling abroad too often
in recent weeks. Barkan said that Abbas is working towards a
unity government, but by demanding a unity government
acceptable to the international community, Abbas is in fact
rejecting the prisoners document. Barkan said that Abbas
would be strengthened if he were able to negotiate a
significant deliverable in a meeting with Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert.
--------------
Gaza
--------------
9. (C) Barkan described the Rafah crossing as "on the verge
of a major crisis." He claimed that terrorists and funds in
the amount of $55 million transited through the Rafah
crossing in the last three months. He claimed that at least
half of the money was from Iran, but that the source of the
other $26 million is unknown. Barkan credited Abbas with
maintaining peace along the Philadelphi corridor and
preventing militants from tearing down the border wall
itself. He also credited Abbas with turning over materials
seized from terrorists and preventing Qassams from raining
down on Israel from the West Bank.
--------------
Negotiations?
--------------
10. (C) Barkan said Israel's policy until two weeks ago was
disengagement from the Palestinians. He said that now,
Israel has no policy towards the PA, and "no policy is a
policy." Barkan claimed that Hamas is not interested in a
cease-fire. Further complicating the situation, Barkan
claimed, is the fact that there appears to be no way to
legally dismantle the Hamas government. Given these
realities, Barkan said, the choice is between working with a
weakened Fatah, or going to war with Hamas.
11. (U) Staffdel Talwar did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2016
TAGS: PREL KWBG SY IS
SUBJECT: MFA'S BARKAN SEES A GROWING CHANCE OF WAR IN THE
REGION
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: MFA Director of Strategic Affairs Nimrod
Barkan told Staffdel Talwar that Iran was not behind the
timing of the recent conflict with Hizballah, as Iran had
deployed missiles to Lebanon for use on a future "D-Day." He
said that the most significant strategic development this
year is the signing of a Syrian-Iranian defense pact on June
14. Barkan said he is concerned that Syria will attempt to
employ "Hizballah-style" tactics in a future war with Israel
over the Golan Heights, and expressed concern about a group
called the Golan Heights Liberation Front. Barkan outlined
three options for Israeli policy-makers dealing with Syria,
two of which involve war. Regarding the PA, he claimed that
Hamas is not interested in a cease-fire, and added that "no
one here believes an economic boycott will topple Hamas." He
also claimed that $55 million has reached Hamas through the
Rafah crossing in the last three months. Given these
realities, Barkan said the choice for Israel is to work with
a weakened Fatah or go to war with Hamas. Commenting on
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's appointment of Yaakov Dayan to
act as "Syria coordinator," Barkan supported the decision,
saying "what is needed is a realistic look at what the
Israeli public can bear in regards to Syria." End summary.
2. (C) In an August 24 meeting at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA),Barkan said that the recent conflict in
Lebanon dramatically weakened Hizballah. He claimed that
Iran had no interest in the conflict, as Iran had placed
Zilzal missiles in southern Lebanon for use as a forward base
on a future "D-Day," which he defined as the day when Iran
has a nuclear weapon. His assessment of the post-conflict
reality for Israel is that conditions on the northern border
will improve if Hizballah agrees to stop kidnapping Israeli
soldiers and cease attacks under UNSCR 1701. Responding to a
question on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's threat to
close the Syrian-Lebanese border, Barkan said that closing
the border will not end arms smuggling unless UN forces are
deployed along the border. He claimed that the Syrian regime
profits from smuggling operations, and will only close the
official crossing points, not the informal crossings. Barkan
characterized the Israeli victory in Lebanon as "diplomatic,
not military."
3. (C) Barkan said the most significant strategic development
in the Middle East this year is not the conflict with
Hizballah, but the signing of a Syrian-Iranian defense pact
on June 14. In the post-Cold War Middle East, Iranian
financing for the Syrian military has been, in Barkan's
assessment, "essential." Barkan added that shortly after the
signing of the pact, Assad publicly stated that an attack on
Iran would not be considered an attack on Syria, thus
declaring the defense pact to be a "unilateral arrangement."
4. (C) Barkan is concerned that Syria will employ military
techniques used by Hizballah in a future conflict with
Israel, and that Syria is focusing on procuring anti-tank
missiles. He said that anti-tank missiles were successful
approximately 13 percent of the time when they were employed
in attacks in southern Lebanon. Barkan explained that
soldiers, accustomed to firefights in the West Bank or Gaza,
were trained to seek shelter in abandoned houses. In Lebanon
this tactic was unsuccessful as the enemy's anti-tank weapons
were powerful enough to destroy the soldier's cover. Barkan
expressed concern about a group calling itself the "Golan
Heights Liberation Front." He said that 32 years of quiet
along the border had made the Israeli public apathetic about
defense of the Syrian border.
5. (C) Barkan's analysis is that Israel has three options for
dealing with Syria:
-- give in to Syrian demands for the return of the Golan
Heights.
-- launch a preventive war aimed at crippling the Syrian
military.
-- prepare for a full-scale defensive war in 4-5 years, once
Iran attains nuclear weapons.
6. (C) Barkan said that the Assad regime perceives three main
"external threats" from the international community:
-- regime instability, a threat which emanates from U.S.
support for democratic revolution in neighboring countries.
-- removal of the Syrian army and influence from Lebanon,
which Syria views as part of Syrian territory, not an
independent state,
-- Israel's refusal to negotiate over the status of the Golan
Heights.
Barkan admitted that Syrian mistrust of Israeli intentions in
the Golan Heights is justified in light of the history of
failed negotiations. He said that Assad twice mentioned in
recent interviews the comment of former Israeli Prime
Minister Shamir that Israel would negotiate for ten years,
but not do anything to return the Golan. Barkan said the
need for a public referendum and 61 members of the Knesset to
vote in favor of any return of territory means that the
outlook is not promising for Israel returning the Golan
Heights in the next two to three years. Unless Syria can be
assured of flexibility on at least one of these "external
threats," Barkan assessed, they will not leave the Iranian
alliance.
--------------
Palestinian Politics
--------------
7. (C) Barkan admitted that no one in the GOI expected a
Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC)
elections last winter. He blamed the mistake on
over-reliance on Palestinian pollsters, as well as Israeli
mis-reading of the inherent problems in the PA election
system itself. He also said that Fatah has failed to heal
its internal wounds and that if elections were held today,
Hamas would win again. Barkan added that President Abbas is
a "nice guy but very weak," and that he cannot revive Fatah.
He pointed out that Abbas has been traveling abroad too often
in recent weeks. Barkan said that Abbas is working towards a
unity government, but by demanding a unity government
acceptable to the international community, Abbas is in fact
rejecting the prisoners document. Barkan said that Abbas
would be strengthened if he were able to negotiate a
significant deliverable in a meeting with Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert.
--------------
Gaza
--------------
9. (C) Barkan described the Rafah crossing as "on the verge
of a major crisis." He claimed that terrorists and funds in
the amount of $55 million transited through the Rafah
crossing in the last three months. He claimed that at least
half of the money was from Iran, but that the source of the
other $26 million is unknown. Barkan credited Abbas with
maintaining peace along the Philadelphi corridor and
preventing militants from tearing down the border wall
itself. He also credited Abbas with turning over materials
seized from terrorists and preventing Qassams from raining
down on Israel from the West Bank.
--------------
Negotiations?
--------------
10. (C) Barkan said Israel's policy until two weeks ago was
disengagement from the Palestinians. He said that now,
Israel has no policy towards the PA, and "no policy is a
policy." Barkan claimed that Hamas is not interested in a
cease-fire. Further complicating the situation, Barkan
claimed, is the fact that there appears to be no way to
legally dismantle the Hamas government. Given these
realities, Barkan said, the choice is between working with a
weakened Fatah, or going to war with Hamas.
11. (U) Staffdel Talwar did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.
********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv
You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES