MFA DG ABRAMOVITCH DISCUSSES ABBAS, LEBANON AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003607

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: KPAL PTER PREL LE SY IS
SUBJECT: MFA DG ABRAMOVITCH DISCUSSES ABBAS, LEBANON AND
REALIGNMENT


Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones. Reasons 1.4(b,d).


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SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a September 7 meeting with the Ambassador, Israeli
MFA Director General (DG) Aharon Abramovitch confided that
Foreign Minister Livni's recent public remarks encouraging a
renewed dialogue with Palestinian Authority (PA) President
Mahmoud Abbas should not be interpreted as internal GOI
political consensus supporting such talks. He said that the
GOI must first see that Abbas has the political strength to
deliver on the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit and the
cessation of Kassam rocket fire from Gaza before engaging him
on greater political issues. Regarding Lebanon, Abramovitch
said that the GOI will insist on a strong UNIFIL presence
along the Syrian/Lebanese border. Next, the GOI will push
for the establishment of a "serious mechanism" for
sanctioning countries that attempt to arm Hizballah in order
to "reveal" the state-sponsors of Hizballah terror to the
world. Discussing his earlier work in chairing a
governmental committee on realignment, Abramovitch explained
that the committee's report is not a study of Olmert's
specific "realignment plan," but a general overview of
Israel's strategic interests regarding the future of the West
Bank that had been commissioned in late 2005 by then-Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon. End summary.

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LIVNI AHEAD OF GOI ON TALKS WITH ABBAS
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2. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's request for
clarification of Livni's recent public support for renewed
talks with PA President Abbas, Abramovitch indicated that
Livni was not speaking on behalf of Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert. He conceded that there is no "internal consensus"
within the GOI for supporting renewed dialogue with Abbas.
(However, he added that Livni's remarks represented a "large
faction" within the GOI.) Putting the onus back on Abbas,
the DG said that the GOI would not "meet for the sake of
meeting," but would require Abbas to demonstrate progress on
the issues of kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit and the
continued firing of Kassam rockets into Israel from Gaza. He
assured the Ambassador that the GOI had also not forgotten
about the Quartet's three conditions as a premise for
dialogue. He characterized Shalit's release and the Kassam
rocket ceasefire as basic tests of Abbas's political strength
to actually deliver on promises, and said that the GOI must
see that Abbas has sufficient strength before engaging him on
greater political issues.

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ACCESS AND MOVEMENT AGREEMENT
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3. (C) The Ambassador emphasized that the USG is re-examining
the Access and Movement Agreement (AMA) as it nears its first
anniversary. He explained that the USG is not completely
satisfied with several aspects of AMA implementation, such as
operation of the crossings, obstacles to movement in the West
Bank, and convoys between Gaza and the West Bank.

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GOI TO PUSH UNIFIL PRESENCE ON SYRIA/LEBANON BORDER
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4. (C) Regarding Israel's short-term, post-war objectives in
Lebanon, Abramovitch told the Ambassador that the main threat
to the ceasefire is the re-armament of Hizballah, primarily
by Syria and Iran. Therefore, the GOI will insist on a
strong UNIFIL presence along the Syrian/Lebanese border.
Next, the GOI wants the establishment of a "serious
mechanism" for sanctioning countries that attempt to arm
Hizballah in order to "reveal the picture" of state-sponsored
terrorism to the world. The DG acknowledged that covert arms
smuggling would be difficult to reveal given the intelligence
community's reluctance to publicly share information.


5. (C) Abramovitch assessed that Lebanese Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora might be open to renewing a dialogue with the
GOI as part of his desire to "change the situation."
Abramovitch stressed that the GOI would not accept the
defunct Armistice Committee as a venue for dialogue, because
the agreement that had spawned the Armistice Committee
addressed a boundary line that differs from today's Blue
Line. It also placed limits on the military presence on both
sides of the border which would be undesirable in today's
situation. However, Abramovitch was optimistic that a
mechanism similar to the Armistice Committee would be
acceptable to facilitate dialogue among Israel, UNIFIL, and
Lebanon. He posited that such a committee could address
civilian issues, such as water and air pollution, and perhaps
eventually, trade. Abramovitch concluded by saying that in
the current political environment, it might be too risky for
Siniora to address this topic. The Ambassador encouraged the
GOI to push for the full implementation of UNSCR 1701, but
agreed that the GOI should allow the political situation in
Lebanon to settle a bit before making political demands of
the GOL.

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INSIGHT INTO REALIGNMENT COMMITTEE REPORT
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6. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question about his work
as chairman of a government committee on realignment, the DG
played down the significance of his committee's report in the
current political environment. Abramovitch explained that
this report was commissioned by then-Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon in December 2005, when he was still DG of the Justice
Ministry, and was not a study of current Prime Minister
Olmert's specific "realignment plan." Abramovitch clarified
that the committee had completed a draft report, which was
not yet "finalized," and had not been formally transmitted to
Olmert's office. He added that the committee's work had been
overtaken by the war, with which many of its members were
directly involved, such as IDF Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe
Kaplinski.


7. (C) Abramovitch further explained that the goal of the
report was not to make explicit policy recommendations, but
rather to identify Israel's strategic interests regarding the
future of the West Bank. He conceded that it might be
possible to draw conclusions from the report by "reading
between the lines," but remained insistent that the committee
was not asked to provide policy recommendations. He said
that the committee was under no current pressure to finalize
the report, but that the interests identified in it are as
valid today as they were before the war in Lebanon.

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LIVNI'S TRIP TO THE U.S.
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8. (C) Abramovitch told the Ambassador that Israeli
Ambassador Daniel Ayalon's replacement had not yet been
selected and no announcement would be forthcoming during
Livni's trip to Washington during the week of September 11.
The Ambassador also inquired about the Foreign Minister's
availability to attend Secretary Rice's conference on
empowering women in New York on September 23. The DG said
that Livni would not be in New York at that time. Even if
she were, she would not be able to attend an event falling on
the Jewish holiday of Rosh Hashanah.

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