TOURGEMAN AND STAFFDEL TALWAR DISCUSS LEBANON,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TEL AVIV 003561 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 TAGS: EAID ECON PGOV PREL KWBG IS LE SY SUBJECT: TOURGEMAN AND STAFFDEL TALWAR DISCUSS LEBANON, SYRIA, AND PALESTINIANS Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4 (b ) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 24 meeting, Shalom Tourgeman, foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, predicted to Staffdel Talwar that budget wrangling will be taking place between the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) over the next few months as usual. The MOD will blame the MOF for having cut too much of the MOD's budget over recent years, and the MOF will blame the MOD for not prioritizing its spending. Tourgeman reported that the MOD is requesting an additional NIS 25-28 billion ($5.7-6.4 billion) for its budget over the next three years, and that the GOI will organize its aid request to the USG over the next few weeks. In his assessment of the conflict with Lebanon, the IDF successfully targeted long- and medium-range missiles -- the GOI's two top priorities -- within the first few days of the hostilities. In attempting to hit its third priority, Hizballah's leadership, Tourgeman repeatedly stressed that the IDF gave civilians time to evacuate from neighborhoods in Beirut that it planned to strike. He admitted that Israel was not very effective at countering the threat posed by Katyusha rockets, however. In a discussion on Lebanon's stability, Tourgeman opined that key factors are implementation of UNSCR 1701, an international force that does not undermine GOL sovereignty, and a strengthened and effective Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). He categorically rejected the idea of putting Sheba'a Farms on the table because it is located in the Golan Heights, which was part of Syria and not Lebanon, and because that would give a victory to Hizballah. Tourgeman said that the Lebanese government is the only entity with which it will deal. Summary con't. ¶2. (C) Summary con't: Tourgeman also rejected the idea of negotiating with Syria for the time being. He said that it would be an acknowledgment that Israel lost the war and would be seen as crawling to President Bashar al-Asad. He characterized Asad as immature and unstable, and said that if peace negotiations failed, Asad would likely go to war with Israel. On Iran, Tourgeman opined that military action will have to be undertaken at some point because Iran is "fooling everyone," and sanctions are "dragging time." With respect to the Palestinian Authority (PA),Tourgeman asserted that the GOI was preparing to meet with PA President Mahmud Abbas and offer a prisoner release, but he said that the kidnapping of soldier Gilad Shalit changed the equation because it shows Abbas cannot do anything to counter Hamas. "Without Shalit, the Palestinian track is doomed," Tourgeman concluded. End summary. -------------- Re-Building the North -------------- ¶3. (C) Shalom Tourgeman, foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, told Staffdel Talwar in an August 24 meeting that Olmert's current focus is re-building northern Israel. He said that Olmert was in the north at the time of the meeting, and that Olmert would be going up north two times a week to visit places hit by Katyusha rockets to determine how to deal with the damage. He said that re-building would be the GOI's main job for the next few months. -------------- Budget Battle Between MOD/MOF -------------- ¶4. (C) Tourgeman admitted that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is receiving a lot of criticism for having insufficient or outdated equipment for its soldiers during the conflict with Lebanon. Tourgeman claimed that much of the problem stemmed from "priorities set to different agendas" as a result of cuts to the Ministry of Defense's (MOD) budget over the past few years, suggesting that the MOD cut financing in the wrong places. Tourgeman was grateful for the extension of the U.S. loan guarantee program to 2011, and added that over the next few weeks Israel will be organizing its aid request. He explained that there are two options for aid to Israel: direct budgetary support or foreign military funds. He estimated that repairing civilian infrastructure would require NIS 8 billion (approximately $1.8 billion),and noted that the MOD is requesting an additional NIS 25-28 billion ($5.7-6.4 billion) for its budget over the next three years. In response to the Staffdel's question on how much aid the GOI would request from the USG, Tourgeman responded, "Let's get the first billion and then..." ¶5. (C) Tourgeman predicted that the typical budget wrangling would be taking place between the MOD and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) over the coming months. He said that the MOD would blame the MOF for having cut too much of its budget in recent years, but mentioned that it would be important to investigate how the MOD had implemented those cuts in its operations. He commented that in return, the MOF would likely blame the MOD for not prioritizing its spending correctly. He assessed that the MOF would focus on high salaries in the MOD, and ask for explanations on why the MOD has "100 F-16s if it only needs 98." Tourgeman also predicted that increasing the MOD budget would be a big problem for the Labor party in the future, given that its election platform called for cutting MOD funding in favor of additional social spending. He said that Defense Minister Amir Peretz would now be forced to ask for a bigger budget for the MOD, contradicting his own campaign promises. -------------- Assessing the Conflict -------------- ¶6. (C) On the Lebanon war, Tourgeman stated that the GOI had four priorities during the conflict. The first was to target those Hizballah missiles with ranges of 120-220 kilometers. The second was targeting the medium-range missiles, which were located south of Beirut and north of the Litani River, with ranges of 55-75 km. The GOI's third target was the Hizballah organization itself, attacking the headquarters and the leadership. The last target was Katyusha rockets south of the Litani River. Tourgeman claimed that the IDF successfully struck the "vast majority" of the long-range missiles in the first day of the conflict, and others a few days later. He commented that on the second day, Israel began targeting medium-range missiles such as the al-Fajjar type, and destroyed most of the infrastructure and permanent launchers for the missiles. He noted that over the past six years, many of the permanent launchers were placed inside houses with the full knowledge of homeowners, whom he claimed had manuals and knew how to care for and use the launchers if necessary. Tourgeman said that the launchers took up entire rooms in the houses, and that the IDF successfully destroyed many of them. He admitted that the GOI did not know where the mobile launchers were until after they were used, but said that the IDF could target them once they had been used. ¶7. (C) Tourgeman explained that the GOI hit the al-Dahiyya neighborhood in Beirut on the third day of the conflict to meet its third priority, Hizballah's leadership. He asserted that the neighborhood is "like a military compound" with several layers of security around Hassan al-Nasrallah's office, other offices, and banks. He said that the GOI "hit where we knew," and gave the civilian population a clear sign that the IDF was going to attack and that it should evacuate. He acknowledged that Israel struck in Beirut only the first two weeks of the conflict, and that the "visuals" there would have been problematic, even had no civilians been killed. Tourgeman cited intelligence saying that Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora reportedly asked in private why the IDF did not do more to target Hizballah in this area. Tourgeman stressed that the IDF targeted Hizballah offices when it hit Christian and Shia neighborhoods in Beirut as well, and again said that the IDF warned the civilians to evacuate these areas. ¶8. (C) Tourgeman highlighted that the GOI did not target Lebanon's infrastructure or army, and asserted that it targeted bridges to prevent a resupply of arms to Hizballah, and to prevent Hizballah soldiers from moving from the north to the south. He assessed that destroying bridges "worked," and made it difficult for Syria to move big trucks with large, long-range missiles in and around Lebanon. He asserted that Israel targeted the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) radar because the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) used the radar to launch the Chinese C-802 missile against the Israel naval vessel. ¶8. (C) Tourgeman said that the majority of hits against Israel came from Katyusha rockets. He explained that they are difficult to detect in the air, and that while they can be targeted on the ground, even this is hard due to the system of underground bunkers that Hizballah built. According to Tourgeman, the rockets can be put on timers while Hizballah members hide in the bunkers, so the IDF does not see anyone launching the rockets, at which point is too late to destroy them. He described the bunkers as being approximately nine square meters with concrete walls and built at a depth of 20 meters. Hizballah members could hide in them because they had 30-day supply of water and food, and they were covered by stone, so they could not be detected even when stepped on, according to Tourgeman. He said that the GOI had been afraid to send the IDF into Lebanon to go after Hizballah members launching Katyushas because the IDF would be ineffective and would "look like clowns." ¶10. (C) In response to a question on anti-tank missiles, Tourgeman admitted that Israel knew Hizballah had them but did not know in what quantities. He said that it was the first time that Russian missiles had been used against Israeli tanks, and that no one had anticipated the amount of damage the missiles could cause. ¶11. (C) Tourgeman said that the GOI had enough time to undertake its operations. He added that the length of the operations was more a matter of how long Israel wanted to stay in Lebanon, considering the years Israel had been in Lebanon the last time when it had only intended to go in for one month. -------------- The Future of Lebanon -------------- ¶12. (C) Staffdel Talwar asked about the key points for the future of Lebanon. Tourgeman responded that he sees UNSCR 1701 as very important because he does not think military action can stand alone. He noted that diplomacy and politics are necessary to stabilize Lebanon. He also mentioned that it would be an important test for the U.S. because the USG "put all its energy into it." Tourgeman cited the international force as another key factor in Lebanon's stability. He commented that "when it arrives, we can get out" because holding a 7-12 km strip of land north of the blue line is a burden for the IDF, and because it is difficult to explain to Israeli families why their soldiers are still in Lebanon if they are supposed to be withdrawing from the country. He said that the international force should not undermine GOL sovereignty. ¶13. (C) Tourgeman added that the LAF were another key point for Lebanon's future. He acknowledged that the U.S. had spent much time and effort trying to strengthen the Lebanese army, and that this process had started before the beginning of hostilities on July 12. He said that it is a process that must be continued, and even upgraded, but cautioned the USG to be careful because it is difficult to know what the LAF will look like in the end, and what parts of the LAF will be loyal to Hizballah. He opined that it is good that Shia make up less than 30 percent of the LAF, and that they are spread out among the forces. According to Tourgeman, the LAF will have a difficult job in the future because it cannot focus only on preventing major resupply attempts. He claimed that Hizballah has opened a new headquarters near the Syrian border, and that Syria will use any possible way to resupply Hizballah. He explained that intelligence has shown large trucks moving on major roads, but it is impossible to know whether the trucks have peaches, tomatoes, or missiles, so the GOI itself cannot bomb all trucks that move on Lebanese roads. As such, the GOL will have to try to interdict them. ¶14. (C) Tourgeman noted that the air and sea blockade can be reversed when an efficient LAF contingent is deployed and can detect violations. He claimed, however, that all humanitarian needs are being met. He cited as examples flights with humanitarian goods being allowed into Lebanon from Jordan, and said that four ships of fuel had been allowed into Lebanon that day, so no fuel shortage exists. He concluded that the humanitarian situation is not being portrayed accurately. -------------- Sheba'a Farms -------------- ¶15. (C) In response to the Staffdel's question, Tourgeman said that the question of the return of Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon is completely off the table from Israel's perspective. He said that Siniora does not actually know the history behind Sheba'a Farms, and does not understand the significance of the area. According to Tourgeman, Sheba'a was a village that was part of the Golan Heights and belonged to Syria, but was farmed by Lebanese farmers, who paid rent to Syria, not Lebanon. When Israel occupied the territory in 1967, the Lebanese left the land, and the GOI kept it as part of the Golan Heights. He noted that claims to Sheba'a arose only when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 because "Hizballah had no other excuse to continue attacks against Israel." He cited intelligence that shows Siniora knows the area is not Lebanese, and added that in order for Sheba'a Farms to be given to Lebanon, 61 Knesset members would have to agree and Israel would have to hold a referendum on the subject. ¶16. (C) Tourgeman continued that ultimately Sheba'a Farms is not an Israeli issue, and said that Lebanon and Syria should decide amongst themselves to whom the land belongs. He said that when they determine this, Israel will then deal with the responsible party. He commented that Israel would deal with Lebanon when the GOL implements UNSCR 1559, and that it would deal with Syria separately if the land belongs to Syria. He remarked, however, that putting Sheba'a Farms on the table now would be "a huge victory for Hizballah and the USG would make a major mistake." From Israel's point of view, the UN approved Israel's withdrawal, and the GOI will not give the land, or victory, to terrorists, according to Tourgeman. He added that because the GOL has accepted UNSCR 1701, the GOL is the only address to which the GOI will go. He said that Israel will deal with the Lebanese government on kidnapped soldiers, border control, security coordination, water, and any other issue, but it will not deal with Hizballah on any of these topics. ¶17. (C) Tourgeman assessed that it is significant for the GOL to implement UNSCR 1701 because it is important for the GOL to be a sovereign entity. He explained that currently there is an internal split in Lebanon, as well as splits between Lebanon and Syria, and Lebanon and Iran. He pointed out Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's comment that if Syria wanted to go to war with Israel, it should have done so through the Golan Heights and not through Lebanon. He mentioned that Iran is also currently critical of Hizballah because it built the long-range missiles for "D-Day" to open a second or third front against Israel, but not to be used because of two kidnapped soldiers. Tourgeman asserted that this was a strategic loss and defeat for Iran. -------------- Commission of Inquiry and the Syrian Track -------------- ¶18. (C) In response to the Staffdel's question on a commission of inquiry, Tourgeman replied that he did not know if there would be one because it would need to have a legal basis, otherwise "no one would appear" to testify. He claimed that establishing a commission would be a process that could take two to five years, and that Israel cannot afford that at this time. He explained that the IDF would stagnate while the commission is ongoing because every military officer will be with his lawyer, and the GOI needs the IDF to be prepared vis-a-vis Syria. ¶19. (C) Tourgeman continued that exploring a Syrian track at this point would be a major mistake. He noted that when the Mehlis report came out a year ago, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad tried to deflect attention from any Syrian role in the Hariri assassination by offering to open negotiations with Israel. As Tourgeman explained, the GOI rejected the offer because it did not want international pressure on Syria to be lifted. Going to Syria now would be admitting to the Arab world that Israel lost the war, and it would be seen as crawling to Asad, according to Tourgeman. In addition, he said, intelligence shows that the Syrians are very confident about their army, and that the SAG went on the highest alert possible during Israel's conflict with Lebanon. Because of this, Israel, "who knows what it takes for peace with Syria," cannot afford to have failed peace negotiations with Syria because, he claimed, the "alternative is war" from Asad's perspective. Tourgeman characterized Asad as immature and unstable, and said that this is the reason why Israel did not send units to the border and does not want to "start with Syria." He cited a recent interview by Asad on Abu Dhabi TV in which Asad said that in a few months, Syrians would know whether there will be peace between Syria and Israel, or whether the two countries would go to war. According to Tourgeman, this shows that Asad has very little ability to calculate results, like Nasrallah when Hizballah attacked Israel, and that Asad thinks that it is enough to have "good missiles." Hoes not understand that he has a weak army and is in a weak position. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶20. (C) On Iran, Tourgeman offered that the Russians and Chinese will follow the "decisiveness of others" in the UN. He opined that sanctions will not work and are "dragging time," and that military action will have to be undertaken because Iran is "fooling everyone." -------------- Palestinians -------------- ¶21. (C) Moving on to a short discussion on the Palestinians, Tourgeman opined that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas has lost what Tourgeman termed the 1 percent of control he had, and that "things look very, very bad." He said the PA is in total chaos, and that even Hamas has splits: in the West Bank (WB),in the Gaza Strip (GS), between the military and political wings, and between the WB and GS and Syria. He remarked that only the military wing in Gaza and the political leadership in Syria is functioning, and "unfortunately, they're the ones holding (kidnapped soldier) Gilad Shalit." Staffdel Talwar asked whether the PA is doing anything new, and Tourgeman replied that even placing the Presidential Guard at Rafah crossing only lasted a few days, and the crossing was subsequently closed under threat. ¶22. (C) Tourgeman argued that Shalit's kidnapping complicated matters significantly. He said that the GOI had wanted and was willing to be generous and strengthen Abbas and the moderates in the PA through a release of prisoners, and with a meeting between Olmert and Abbas. He commented that since Shalit's kidnapping, however, Abbas has shown that he cannot do anything to counter Hamas, and that a meeting with him would be "inefficient" because the GOI cannot offer a prisoner release. Tourgeman mentioned that if the GOI talked to Hamas, it would "be the end of Abu Mazen as we know it." He concluded, "Without Shalit, the Palestinian track is doomed," and added that there are no other possibilities. In response to a question on a unity government, Tourgeman characterized it as a game, and said that if the PA government cannot agree on the three principles outlined by the Quartet, "we have nothing to talk about." ¶23. (C) Staffdel Talwar did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES