OLMERT AND LIVNI TO CODEL LANTOS: CONTROLLING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003433

SIPDIS

CODEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS LE IS PHUM UN
SUBJECT: OLMERT AND LIVNI TO CODEL LANTOS: CONTROLLING
LEBANESE/SYRIAN BORDER "MOST CRUCIAL"

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: In brief, separate meetings August 27,
Prime Minister Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told
the Ambassador and CODEL Lantos that controlling the border
between Lebanon and Syria was the "most crucial" issue for
proper implementation of UNSCR 1701. Congressman Lantos
informed Olmert that he had put an informal hold on the USG's
Lebanese assistance package pending his return to Washington.
Olmert and Livni also stressed the importance of the safe
return of the Israeli soldiers, with both saying that now is
the time for the Government of Lebanon to take the soldiers
into custody from Hizballah. On enforcement of the arms
embargo, Livni expressed concern that the GOL appeared to be
hesitating in making its request to UNIFIL for assistance.
End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Lantos Puts Informal Hold on Lebanese Assistance Package
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In a twenty-minute meeting, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert
told visiting Member of Congress Tom Lantos on Sunday August
27 that controlling the border between Lebanon and Syria was
the "most crucial" issue for proper implementation of UNSC
Resolution 1701. In Olmert,s view, technical means alone
would not be sufficient to accomplish this objective; it
would require the stationing of UNIFIL troops along the
border. Olmert and Lantos agreed that for the Government of
Lebanon to agree to this would require outside pressure.


3. (C) Lantos informed Olmert that during his meetings with
Lebanese officials the previous day, he had told them that
Congress is a co-equal branch of government and that it would
have to agree to Administration proposals for assistance to
Lebanon before they would become reality. Although he
considers himself a good friend of Lebanon, Lantos said, he
had put an informal hold on the Lebanese assistance package
pending his return from the region. Olmert welcomed this
news and argued that international assistance for Lebanon in
general should be tied to full implementation of UNSCR 1701,
especially enforcement of the arms embargo by controlling the
border with Syria.

NB: After the meeting, Olmert told the Ambassador that he
had made a similar point to Secretary Rice during a recent
conversation on the possibility of Israel,s relaxing its air
blockade of Lebanon. He added that Israel would not agree to
arms deliveries for the Lebanese Armed Forces until the GOL
had made the necessary request to UNIFIL for assistance in
policing its borders.

-------------- --------------
OLMERT: LANTOS SHOULD TAKE CONTROL OF THE SOLDIERS NOW
-------------- --------------


4. (C) In a discussion of the two IDF soldiers held captive
by Hizballah, Olmert told Lantos that he believed that the
time had come for the government of Lebanon to take control
of the soldiers from Hizballah. Once Israel knew that they
were in official Lebanese custody and would be kept safe, it
would be possible for the GOI to enter into negotiations for
their release. Olmert also said that he liked Lebanese PM
Fuad Siniora and would be happy to meet with him anytime.
However, he understood that the weakness of Siniora,s
government precluded that. "Trust me," he said, "I know all
about weakness (in government); I wish that some of those who
are always asking me to help strengthen (PA President
Mahmoud) Abbas or Siniora would recognize how weak I am."
Lantos sympathized with Olmert,s situation and confided that
he planned to help organize an initiative to raise private
funds in the United States for the reconstruction of northern
Israel. He also mentioned his intentions to introduce
legislation for humanitarian assistance to Israeli victims of
Hizballah rocket attacks. Olmert noted that over 40 percent
of Israeli civilians (18 of 42) killed by rocket attacks were
of Arab origin. He also stressed the irony of Hizballah SYG
Nasrallah,s call to the Arab citizens of Haifa to flee the
city during the conflict. "That,s exactly what they (Arab
leaders) did during the war of independence," he said.
"They,re the ones who created the refugee problem that
causes us so many problems."

-------------- --------------
LIVNI REINFORCES OLMERT,S MESSAGE ON UNSCR 1701 AND CUSTODY
OF THE SOLDIERS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) In a subsequent, equally brief meeting with Foreign
Minister Livni, implementation of UNSCR 1701 and the Israeli
captives also dominated the discussion. Livni told Lantos
that she would be leaving for Germany later in the day to
press for "quick, complete implementation" of 1701. Calling
the captured soldiers the "most sensitive" issue for Israeli
society, she also informed Lantos that the GOI was now trying
to press the GOL to take them into its custody. Comment:
Livni,s reference to this effort in the context of her trip
to Germany could indicate that the GOI will seek German
mediation on the prisoners, as it has done in previous cases.


6. (C) Turning to enforcement of the arms embargo, Livni
expressed concern that the GOL appeared to be hesitating in
making its request to UNIFIL for assistance. It was not
clear to her what the GOL would require before making the
request. She knew that they had already been discussing the
matter with the Germans, however, and perhaps with a little
bit of pressure it might be possible to get them to make the
request. Lantos observed that PM Siniora was weak and no
doubt feared a negative Syrian reaction. Livni agreed that
Syria,s attitude was an obstacle. However, she said that in
recent discussions with Italian leaders they said that they
had detected a steady softening in Syria,s position.
Initially, the Syrians had tried to pressure prospective
troop contributors not to join UNIFIL at all. Then they had
threatened to close the border with Lebanon if UNIFIL
deployed there. Now, they were professing their intention to
honor the embargo. In this environment, she thought that
some external pressure might help Siniora to do the right
thing. She closed the discussion by observing that she knew
that Siniora is weak, and adding, "so are we; it,s
impossible for us to make gestures (to him) right now, but
there are some things he could do to improve the situation."


7. (C) COMMENT: Representative Lantos provided some external
pressure of his own on Siniora in statements made to the
press prior to the meeting with Livni. Lantos called for the
USD 230 million in assistance to Lebanon announced by the
President to be conditioned on troop deployments along the
Lebanese/Syrian border. It was time he said for the GOL to
"show some backbone." He also recounted that he had tried in
vain in the past to condition U.S. aid to Lebanon to
deployment of the LAF to the border with Israel. He argued
that had then Secretary Powell accepted his proposal, more
than one thousand lives and several billions of dollars would
have been saved. For her part, FM Livni told the press that
UNSCR 1701 gives Israel and Lebanon a chance to transform the
situation for the better. However, it must be implemented
properly, including its arms embargo and its call for the
return of Israel,s prisoners.


8. (U): Representative Lantos did not see this message prior
to his departure from post.

********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
JONES