Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TELAVIV3317
2006-08-21 16:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tel Aviv
Cable title:  

OLMERT TELLS CODEL SPECTER IT WILL BE "AMERICA'S

Tags:  PREL PTER MOPS LE SY IS KPAL KWBG 
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Carol X Weakley 08/22/2006 03:30:31 PM From DB/Inbox: Carol X Weakley

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 03317

SIPDIS
CXTelA:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: IPSC PD IMO RES ECON DCM DAO AMB AID ADM RSO
 CONS

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:RJONES
DRAFTED: EXEC:SISKAL
CLEARED: DCM:GCRETZ, POL: MKEAYS

VZCZCTVI801
OO RUEHC RUEHXK RHEHNSC RUEKJCS RUEHBJ
DE RUEHTV #3317/01 2331631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211631Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5776
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0755
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003317

SIPDIS

CODEL

STATE FOR DEFENSE FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER (ANDERSON),
NSC FOR LOGERFO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS LE SY IS KPAL KWBG
SUBJECT: OLMERT TELLS CODEL SPECTER IT WILL BE "AMERICA'S
FAILURE" IF UNIFIL IS NOT SUCCESSFUL.

Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

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SUMMARY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003317 SIPDIS CODEL STATE FOR DEFENSE FOR OSD ISRAEL DESK OFFICER (ANDERSON), NSC FOR LOGERFO E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS LE SY IS KPAL KWBG SUBJECT: OLMERT TELLS CODEL SPECTER IT WILL BE "AMERICA'S FAILURE" IF UNIFIL IS NOT SUCCESSFUL. Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) Israeli Prime Minister Olmert stressed to U.S Senator Arlen Specter August 20 that the robust international force called for in UNSCR 1701 is an American concept and that the United States would bear responsibility should it fail to materialize and fighting resume between Israel and Hizballah. Olmert also said the "evil axis" of Iran/Syria/Hizballah/Hamas presents a more serious and immediate threat than even Israel had realized, and called on the international community to take on Iran. Olmert was not enthusiastic about the possibility of talks with Syria. END SUMMARY. -------------- Iran Eager to Assist a Weakened Hizballah -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with CODEL Specter and the Ambassador, PM Olmert updated Specter on the results of Israel's conflict with Hizballah, telling him that the IDF had won every engagement on the ground and seriously weakened Hizballah. Moreover, it had pushed Hizballah back away from the border, but Hizballah's "amazing" network of underground fortifications had slowed its efforts considerably. While Hizballah,s losses numbered between 600-800 fighters, Olmert said IDF losses were much fewer and primarily as a result of missile attacks. Although he had acknowledged that the potential threat from Iranian rockets remains a major problem, Olmert claimed that Israel had enjoyed excellent success versus Hizballah,s medium and long -range rocket launchers. The IDF had developed a rapid response system which could verify a launch within four seconds and direct return fire against the launches in well under a minute. The system proved so effective that Hizballah never used the same launcher twice. Regarding the widely-reported August 20 commando raid, Olmert said the GOI had information on possible arms smuggling and takes such threats seriously, adding that he had warned Secretary Rice in talks leading up to UNSCR that the GOI would attack perceived instances of smuggling. ¶3. (C) Olmert expressed concern regarding Iran, explaining that it had trained Hizballah well and provided it "first-class8 equipment from Russia and China. Specter told�
A;Olmert that during a recent trip to Beijing, Specter had received no answer from the Chinese when he asked them if they would stop selling arms to Iran. Olmert replied that the GOI maintains good RELATIONS with China, but that the GOI has no illusions regarding Chinese POLITICAL persuasions. ¶4. (C) Asked by Specter if it was frustrating for the Israelis not to be able to attack Iran, Olmert replied that Iran was an international problem and called on the international community to take the lead in dealing with it. Time is limited and the next two years would be crucial, he said, adding that if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, Israel,s existence would be on the line. Lamenting Iran,s large physical size and population compared to Israel, Olmert said the GOI &is in no mood to play games with a guy like Ahmadinejad8 who, he claimed, already has delivery vehicles that could potentially reach Paris or London. Specter agreed and referenced his own recent efforts to heighten awareness of the Iranian threat, both in a speech on the floor of the U.S. Senate and through a letter to USUN Permanent Representative Ambassador John Bolton. He also said he would see the Secretary regarding Iran when he returned. -------------- &1701 is Your Doing8 -------------- ¶5. (C) Regarding the cessation of hostilities and its chances for success, Olmert said that despite Nasrallah's bravado, Hizballah had not fired on Israel since August 14, &yet.8 Olmert saw the current lull in activity as proof that Israel had weakened the terrorist group. Olmert, nevertheless, questioned how long the calm could last, adding that the GOI is waiting for the arrival of a &robust and effective8 international force as &promised8 by Secretary Rice and set forth in UNSCR 1701. &I rely on her and President Bush,8 Olmert said. &We have no better friends.8 He added that UNSCR 1701 must be fully implemented, and that the United States would bear the responsibility for the collapse of the ceasefire since UNSCR 1701 is &your doing.8 Olmert elaborated that the international force was the main reason why he agreed to the ceasefire, telling Israelis, &Why send our people to die when an international force can do the job?8 (Note: Olmert later repeated the point that the &robust and effective8 international force is an American concept and key to the success of UNSCR 1701, adding that Israelis are already asking him where the force is. He added that absent this international force, Israel will have to be &more aggressive and impatient8 on dealing with Iran. End note.) -------------- Hamas CONTROLLED BY MESHAAL IN SYRIA -------------- ¶6. (C) Regarding the Palestinians, Olmert said the weakness of Mahmud Abbas, Fatah party continues to be the major problem, and added that Israel has no choice but to continue its war against Hamas. He told Specter that the GOI would continue to target Hamas leaders, specifically focusing on those with links to terrorist activities. Khaled Meshaal calls the shots from Damascus, Olmert said, adding that there is no real chance for deals in such a situation. When asked about prospects for a deal regarding a prisoner exchange for captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, Olmert said there had been no progress with Hamas, and that the GOI will not deal with their demands. In reference to Lebanon, Olmert added that an exchange of POWs might be possible via the Government of Lebanon or the United Nations, but added direct talks between the GOI and Hizballah would be impossible. ¶7. (C) In response to Specter,s question regarding the utility of former NSA Brent Scowcroft,s proposal that Israel return to its 1967 borders, Olmert replied that the proposal is "outdated" and that Hamas and Hizballah are not interested in peace. He noted that 45 percent of Katyusha rocket victims were Muslim Israeli Arabs. The PM added that Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah had called on Arabs in Haifa to leave &just like in 1948, when they (Arab leaders) created the refugee problem.8 Hamas wants to push Israel back to the 1967 borders and then resume fighting, Olmert said. -------------- Syria: No prospects for negotiations -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to Syria, Specter noted that the GOI had been close to agreement with Syria once before and asked about the prospect of revived talks. Olmert discounted this prospect, recalling that talks occurred when Hafez Assad was in power, noting that he was smarter and more balanced than his &immature8 son Bashar Assad. ¶9. (C) Senator Specter did not have an opportunity to clear this cable before departing post. ********************************************* ******************** Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv You can also access this site through the State Department's Classified SIPRNET website. ********************************************* ******************** JONES

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