FM LIVNI: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST DO ITS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 003195

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2016
TAGS: IS KPAL LE PINR PREL
SUBJECT: FM LIVNI: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST DO ITS
PART ON ARMS EMBARGO


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Gene A. Cretz for reasons 1.4(b) and (
d)


1. (C) During her August 14th late morning briefing of the
Diplomatic Corps in Jerusalem, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni
opened by expressing the hope that UNSCR 1701 would reshape
the region and asserting that the Government of Lebanon (GOL)
and the international community shared the burden of its
implementation. She asserted that the GOL plus the
international community must now act to ensure the two most
important elements of the resolution were caried out; first,
that Hezbollah be disarmed, and second, that the GOL exercise
its sovereignty throughout the country. She noted that
questions remained as to the best way to implement 1701,
adding that Israel and others believed that the key was a
robust foreign FORCE contingent, given the current LAF
weakness and the probability that they were not up to the
job. She called upon the international community to exert
maximum efforts to ensure that Hezbollah did not have any
opportunity to rearm. Israel would maintain its naval
blockade and restrictions over AIR travel into Lebanon until
such as time as a real and effective enforcement of an arms
embargo took shape. She insisted that Israel wanted to
&reopen the doors of Lebanon8 upon its departure but that
depended on strict interdiction of the certain efforts by
Iran and Syria to resupply Hezbollah.


2. (C) Livni reiterated several times throughout her
presentation that now was the time for PM Siniora,s
government to take responsibility of governance. Israel
&could not afford GOL weakness anymore.8 She claimed that
despite pressure from the military from the start of the
campaign, the GOI chose not to attack Lebanon "as a state"
since the Siniora government was seen as an &achievement of
the international community.8 Israel intentionally did not
undermine the GOL during its military operations even though
it was not always easy to differentiate between Hezbollah and
the GOL while the IDF operated in Lebanon, and that decision
of restraint entailed certain risks to IDF personnel.


3. (C) She asserted that the G-8 statement, the Rome
gathering and the UN Security Council had called for the
unconditional release of the two Israeli abductees. Citing
the risks that the Olmert government had taken by showing
restraint in the conduct of the military campaign, she said
that Israel needed the two soldiers back without any
reference to Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. The return
of the two soldiers was the only humanitarian issue that
Israel had put on the table for itself and it was prompting a
rising crescendo among Israelis demanding their return.

4. (C) Livni asserted that an effective end to the fighting
under 1701 required a "complete rpt complete" cessation of
hostilities by both sides. If Hezbollah leader Nasrallah,s
claim that he would continue to attack the IDF while on
Lebanese soil remained operative, Israel would react quickly
to these attacks and the situation could deteriorate rapidly.
Livni claimed that this Israeli interpretation had been part
and parcel of the cessation issue discussion regarding the
UNSCR.


5. (C) Regarding the provision of humanitarian aid, Livni
said that Israel looked forward to establishing effective
procedures for its delivery but the success of any
humanitarian project would depend on how the cessation of
hostilities regime works. If the situation is stable, the
people of south Lebanon can return home. She noted that
according to the UNSCR one of the important responsibilities
of the new international FORCE would be to help with
humanitarian issues.


6. (C) Responding to a question whether Israel would consider
international forces to help resolve Israel,s other
problems, for example with the Palestinians, Livni gave a
resounding &No,8 referring to Israel,s historically uneasy
relationship with the international community (especially the
Europeans.) This had been reflected once again in the rapid
change from the international community's early support for
Israeli actions against Hezbollah to strident criticism of
Israel over &disproportionality8 regarding its conduct of
the military campaign. Livni argued that Israel's
precedent-setting acceptance of the FORCE under Chapter 7
(later changed in the UNSCR) had required a wrenching and
difficult change of heart here but that did not mean the GOI
had now adopted a new and more welcoming approach to
international community intervention in the region's disputes.

7.(C) Finally, a very defensive and combative Livni responded
to a question of whether Israel had now recognized its
"mistakes" in conducting unilateral diplomacy in Lebanon,
Gaza, and possibly in future moves in the West Bank and would
return to negotiations with its various Arab partners. Livni
responded that Israel had been forced to go down that road
and taken those steps out of a true desire for peace. In
return, it had only reaped international criticism and had
been subjected to unprovoked attacks.


********************************************* ********************
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv

You can also access this site through the State Department's
Classified SIPRNET website.
********************************************* ********************
CRETZ